LAW OF DURESS IN ISLAMIC LAW AND COMMON LAW: A ...
LAW OF DURESS IN ISLAMIC LAW AND COMMON LAW: A ...
LAW OF DURESS IN ISLAMIC LAW AND COMMON LAW: A ...
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Islamic Studies, 30:3 (1991) 307<br />
overall approach or theory of duress. Nor will this essay address all forms<br />
of duress. The goal is to contrast Islamic law with the Common law, and to<br />
argue that the methodology adopted by Islamic law presents a useful addition<br />
to the field.<br />
A DEFTNITION <strong>OF</strong> <strong>DURESS</strong><br />
There is no uniform legal definition of duress. Because of the amorph-<br />
ousness of the concept, duress can only be defined in the most indefinite<br />
sense. Generally, duress is a wrongful pressure placed upon the person of<br />
another forcing such a person to commit or not to commit a certain act.9<br />
Article 948 of the Mejelle defines duress as "[Duress] is without right to<br />
compel a person to do a thing without his consent by fear."1° These defin-<br />
itions have the virtue of simplicity but, of course, they do not say much,<br />
some would add to this definition that the threatened harm must be present<br />
and imminent." While others might add that the threatened harm must<br />
overcome or overbear a persons' will and deprive him or her of the freedom<br />
of choice.12 Still, in the articulation of some sources, the threat must produce<br />
a reasonable fear of harm or produce a fear which a person of reasonable<br />
firmness would be unable to resist.13<br />
Regardless of the definition, at essence there is an everexisting tension<br />
between the desire to accommodate the actual feelings and practical limita-<br />
tions of the victims of duress, and the need for society to impose standards<br />
of conduct. Thus, should the law of duress accommodate the especially timid<br />
and weak, or should it require all persons to live up to a standard of social<br />
conduct irrespective of their particular circumstances? Should one hold de-<br />
terminative the subjective feelings and fears of the threatened person or<br />
should the type of threatened harm be held determinative Or, should the<br />
proportionality between the threatened harm, and the crime committed be<br />
determinative? If one decides that the subjective feelings of the victim are<br />
determinative, does it make a difference whether the victim's response to<br />
the threat is very unusual and generally unreasonable? Even then, does it<br />
matter that the victim's uncommon response is the result of his selfish and<br />
self-centred personality rather than a faint hearted and feeble character?<br />
Even more, are there situations in which society will decide that<br />
certain choices are inexcusable or unjustifiable as a matter of law? For<br />
example, assume that a scholar who adores her books murders an innocent<br />
person to escape a threat to destroy her library. Should society provide, as<br />
a matter of law, that human life is more valuable than books? What if the<br />
scholar's library consists of very rare and irreplaceable manuscripts, does<br />
that make a difference? What if in the course of trying to save a library<br />
from the hands of an oppressive government, a scholar commits a murder<br />
or, perhaps, seriously injures a person: does that make a difference?