Policing Large Scale Disorder: Lessons from the disturbances of ...

Ev w10 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence
— Young People.
— Parents and Families.
— Community Safety.
— Community Cohesion.
This report summarises the key messages and recommendations flowing from workshop discussions and
closes with a list of questions to which delegates are inviting responses.
3. Messages
Across the workshops it quickly became apparent that individual themes could not be considered in entire
isolation from other themes. Furthermore, feedback reports highlighted the prevalence of cross-cutting issues—
issues such as “sense of community” that have a bearing on all four themes under consideration. As a
consequence, the messages are presented under a series of cross-cutting issues.
3.1 Race
(a) These disturbances should not be considered in the same way as the disturbances in 1985. People from
all races were involved. It was not a race riot.
(b) What was not an issue of race is being whipped up as a racial issue and creating fear. Delegates were
unanimous in their concerns racial stereotyping by the media and malicious individuals using race and racial
tensions to feed their own interests.
3.2 Community cohesion
(a) The rioting was branded as criminality and not a breakdown in community cohesion. However
community cohesion tensions arose out of the fear of attack—eg Sikhs protecting their property against attacks
from other communities and the irresponsible portrayal of young African Caribbean males as the majority
rioters. The popular perception was that 90% of media pictures showed young Black males, thereby creating
negative views and fear about this specific cohort.
(b) A cohesive community mourns the untimely death of any of its residents. African Caribbean deaths
within the locality have not stimulated the same intensity of response as afforded to the three Asian men so
tragically killed. The perception of differential treatment breeds resentment and tension.
(c) In view of what has been happening and the associated horrors and traumas, there is a deep sense of fear
in sections of the community. The African Caribbean community feels particularly demonised as perpetrators
and the majority group in the riots.
(d) The government, media and the courts are creating a climate of racial tensions through demonising the
African Caribbean community and disproportionate sentencing.
(e) The African Caribbean community is taking the brunt of the blame, fuelling tensions within the African
Caribbean community and against it.
(f) Communities are not being brought together through natural or even contrived mechanisms. Nevertheless,
some very good relationships do exist between Asians and African Caribbeans. These should be celebrated and
shared—not flushed away.
(g) There is some fear (difficulty to quantify) of Muslim backlash after Ramadan.
3.3 Police and policing
(a) The riots caught police on the hop. There appeared to be either a lack of awareness or a lack of
readiness—or even both. There was no presence of police in some areas despite warnings via social media and
a general view of a slow response time. Communities felt that they had no option but to protect their properties,
particularly those with homes above shops.
(b) The Police needed to act quickly in order to prevent crime and disorder and should have been present
prior to the incident that resulted in three lives being lost. The Police failed to the job that they were paid to do.
(c) Baton rounds could have killed and or seriously injured people and possibly inflamed the situation.
(d) The Police Strategy failed to engage with local people leading the community to feel it was not protected.
The Police need to seriously review how they responded to the difficulties.
(e) The Prime Minister’s use of inflammatory language when referring to an all-out war on gangs and gang
culture was unhelpful and undermined some good work undertaken locally between Police, communities and
gang members.