Policing Large Scale Disorder: Lessons from the disturbances of ...

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Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev w57 3. The Bradford Response to the English Defence League and Unite Against Fascism Protests of August 2010 3.1 The “Big One” 3.1.1 There was a concern among some of those who live and work in the city that the English Defence League (EDL) and Unite Against Fascism protests that took place in August 2010, could see a repeat of the disorder experienced in 2001. This was fuelled by internet sites/video postings from the EDL promoting their protest as the “Big One” and comparing the events around the 2001 riots with the 2010 protests. 3.1.2 It certainly was the “Big One,” but not in the way the EDL had intended. Only 700 of their supporters came to Bradford, much fewer than expected, and those that did found a city united in its opposition to all forms of extremism. 3.1.3 It was the “Big One” however for excellent community leadership that gave reassurance and built confidence in the ability of the Police, with support from the Council and other key organisations, to deal effectively with the protests. This community leadership, from the Leader of the Council, the Leaders of the Opposition Groups and ward councillors, supported by the Police Chief Superintendent and Council’s Chief Executive, delivered exceptionally detailed planning and execution of operational delivery, underpinned by the strongest partnership working any of us had been involved in, and effective communications which reached our intended audiences consistently giving both reassurance and tough messages about the consequences of getting involved in any disorder. It is no coincidence that the vast majority of the people involved in this work were born, brought up or have lived for long periods in Bradford. Or that all of the people involved in this work have total commitment to Bradford, city and district. 3.1.4 Local organisations across the public, private and third sectors in Bradford all worked extremely hard to plan for, deliver effective communication about, and manage the protests. All of this was undertaken through three main strands, operational and intelligence, communications internal and external, and engagement with the community. 3.2 Partnership planning 3.2.1 Bradford Council, West Yorkshire Police, partner organisations and the vast majority of Bradfordians, welcomed the Home Secretary giving her consent for the Council to impose an order banning any “public processions” (marches), in Bradford District over the August bank holiday weekend 2010. Even though the Home Secretary gave her consent it did not, of course, prevent static demonstrations taking place and it was explained through communications, that these were still lawful provided they remained peaceful, as there are no legal powers to prevent them. 3.2.2 It was also explained to local people that Bradford Council sought the Home Secretary’s permission to impose this order, after receiving a letter from the Chief Constable asking us to do so and after listening to the views of a wide range of local groups and organisations. The Chief Constable’s support for the Council’s pursuit of the order banning marches, was very important. It demonstrated beyond any doubt the Police’s solidarity with and understanding about the views of Bradfordians. Local people showed clearly that they did not want outsiders protesting in their city. 11,000 people signed the petition requesting a ban, organised by “Bradford Together” and promoted by the local newspaper “Telegraph and Argus”, which was handed to the Home Secretary. 3.2.3 The Police, the Council and local partner organisations wanted to reassure and support all communities and encourage them not to be provoked into reacting to the demonstrations. From the beginning, it was recognised that the people of Bradford would have a big role to play. Our city faced a not dissimilar situation in 2001 with the Bradford riots being the well known result. 3.2.4 Multi agency Gold and Silver Command groups met regularly to plan for the demonstrations. The Leader of the Council, Leaders of the Opposition Groups and the Chief Executive worked with the Chief Constable and Chief Superintendent as an integral part of Gold Command planning, for months before the day of the protests. A multi agency group to support local people, established by the Police and the Council through the Safer Communities Partnership, also met regularly and co-ordinated activity to reassure, inform and engage people, community groups, and city centre businesses. A “Community Engagement and Reassurance” plan was developed by West Yorkshire Police and supported by the Council and wider partnership at a strategic level. This underpinned the work of the multi agency task group which identified key issues and actions to be addressed at every stage. People were tasked with specific duties, areas of specialism and levels of engagement. 3.2.5 “Teams” of neighbourhood police officers, councillors, representatives of community and faith groups, neighbourhood wardens, youth workers, local business people and locality based council staff worked together seamlessly. 3.2.6 The leader of the Council of Mosques and the Dean of Bradford Cathedral called on all
Ev w58 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Bradfordians to approach the protests in a spirit of calm and peace. Places of worship were visited and the importance of ensuring young white and Asian-heritage men were not drawn into being provoked by the presence of the EDL in their home town, was emphasised. The Faith Forum in Bradford also brought different faiths together to deliver a united message and a consistent voice. 3.2.7 Meetings were also held with key business and community leaders, from a range of cultural and economic backgrounds, to ensure that these individuals could utilise their influence and engage positively with grass-roots community activity. 3.2.8 Support was offered to community organisations working with the Council’s youth service and the Police, to provide diversionary activities for young people on the day of the demonstration. The depth of planning to “safeguard” our young people is illustrated by the fact that a risk assessment and diversion plan was developed for every young person regarded as being at risk of getting involved in the protests, based on shared intelligence across all key agencies. 3.2.9 The Council and the Police developed a media communications strategy through the partnership District Communications Group well in advance of the protests, which was widely shared and constantly updated. A secure web based forum called “Huddle” was also set up, allowing all communication partners to quickly share documents and key messages. Daily “Information Updates” were also shared via e-mail and on “Huddle” offering bullet points on the latest situation, media coverage and forthcoming events. The Leader of the Council, Leaders of the Opposition Groups and local councillors in their community leadership and ward representative roles, played a pivotal and essential role as key communicators, as did senior police officers. Many media interviews were conducted jointly by the Bradford South Divisional Commander and the Leader of the Council through local television, radio and print media. This also included a series of interviews with Fast FM which was running throughout Ramadan and during the visit of the EDL. This allowed us to update key sections of the community at relevant times. Social Media sites such as Facebook, Twitter and You Tube were also significant tools in providing “real time” messages to the public. For instance, the Bradford South Police Divisional Commander filmed four videos which were placed on-line before during and after the event to offer information updates. 3.2.10 The Police and the Council, working with partner organisations across the public private and third sector sectors, gave clear consistent messages about the protests: at meetings and briefings for local people, through regular emails that were sent to a wide range of groups and organisations and via social media networks. We wanted to reassure and support all communities. We encouraged local people not to be provoked into reacting to these protests by outsiders, who were using our city centre as a venue and who did not care about the disruption to local people and businesses or any potential disorder they could cause. We made it clear that the Police’s role was to facilitate peaceful protest and we would not tolerate any potential damage to the city or acts of violence. Local people were reminded about the prison sentences that some Bradfordians had received as a result of the riots in 2001 and the devastating impact the riots had on individuals, communities and our city. We acknowledged that local people had a big role to play and asked whatever happened, they should allow the Police and the Council to manage events, which we could do with the co-ordinated resources at our disposal. We promised that local people and businesses could have confidence in the Police and the Council maintaining public safety and could be reassured that the city would be returned to a state of normality very quickly after the static demonstrations. Both the Police and Council also utilised their constant relationship with the organisations like the Bradford Council for Mosques, Mosque Committees and Community Organisations to undertake intensive work with the Muslim Community. This involved open and honest conversations about the events in 2001, trust and confidence, mutual understanding and support. 3.2.11 A “Consequences Card” was produced to advise local people about the offences they could be arrested for, if they allowed themselves to be provoked into violence or criminal behaviour by protestors. The card also highlighted the total prison sentences given out as a result of the 2001 riots. It was used extensively to discuss issues about the protests with local young people. It reinforced the message that young people should stay away from the protests, in case they inadvertently become involved, without thinking about the possible long-term consequences for themselves and their futures. This was used to great effect by Youth Services and key personnel when young people were identified as at risk. The card was also later adapted by Youth Services and West Yorkshire Police for use in the Calderdale area when the English Defence League visited for a planned event. 3.2.12 The Council and the Police jointly assessed a number of city centre locations on which to site the static protests. Bradford Urban Garden was jointly agreed as the most manageable and appropriate site for the EDL demonstration, in terms of policing, public safety and the minimising of disruption to the people of Bradford. Potential infrastructure and physical hazards to safety, like the City Park construction site, were also jointly identified. Building materials and stones that could potentially be used as weapons were removed. Structures were strengthened,
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