31.07.2013 Views

View Original - Middle East Technical University

View Original - Middle East Technical University

View Original - Middle East Technical University

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

Villeval, in her paper for Boyer and Salliard’s edited dossier on late regulationist<br />

research, contrasts Group I(Menger, Hayek, new industrial theory, Williamson and<br />

North’s New Institutional Economics) and Group II(old and neo-instutionalism,<br />

regulation theory) institutionalisms on the bases of ‘methodology, principles of<br />

institutional development and the functions of institutions’(2002:293). Group II<br />

theories, unlike Group I, consider institutions as a heuristic category for ‘the analysis<br />

of coherence’; institutions, especially in regulation theory, are thereby explanatory<br />

variables in ‘the reproduction and transformation of a system that is built on<br />

antagonistic social relations, in the process of making the compromises coherent’;<br />

institutions indeed ‘form the basic unit’(ibid.:292-3). Regulation theory however<br />

contrasts not only with Group I institutionalisms but with its counterparts in Group II<br />

in that ‘the learning process ... not only relates to selection through economic<br />

efficiency, it also involves the question of the social compatibility of compromises<br />

that are not immediately institutionalised’(ibid.:294). To that effect, Boyer would<br />

argue ‘institutions matter’, but ‘institutional complementarity matters’ even<br />

more(Amable 2000). Regulation theorists have analysed the structural changes since<br />

the early the 1970s in capitalist economies in terms of the ‘reversal of the hierarchy<br />

among institutional forms’(ibid.:666) or the change from a ‘static hierarchy’ into a<br />

‘dynamic hierarchy’, however, they are once more not at one as to which of the five<br />

institutional forms is the hierarchically superior institutional form. For<br />

Aglietta(1998), the latter would be money; for Bruno Amable and Pascal Petit(1995),<br />

this would be the forms of competition; and for Boyer(1999), the international regime.<br />

Curiously, even for institutionalists, the five institutional forms of the regulation<br />

theory are inchoately inclusive or ‘too large to rule out a certain vagueness in the<br />

institutions taken into account’(Amable 2000:667); theoretical research via the<br />

concepts of institutional complementarity and hierarchy(dynamic and/or static) is still<br />

ex post functionalist despite much ‘theory informed’ empirical research on<br />

‘cumulative changes’. Institutional complementarity and hierarchy are, alas, post<br />

factum and not a priori complementarity and hierarchy of intuitional forms so Boyer<br />

would argue ‘the various institutionalized compromises must manifest a certain<br />

91

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!