Legitimate use of military force against state-sponsored - Air University

[A] challenge to [our military leadership is] to make sure doctrine keeps
pace with the evolving threat. We need only go back in history to illustrate that
we must never again prepare to fight “the last war.” Future warfare may not exist
in the traditional sense. It may be nothing more than well-organized and
coordinated terrorism, perpetrated by highly dedicated and heavily armed
terrorists on a mass scale. 90
Doctrine has not kept pace with the terrorist threat. According to the “USAF Anti-
Terrorism Task Group Final Report,” 1 January 1984, “the Air Force has not developed doctrine
to combat terrorism because doctrine focuses on conflict and terrorism has been treated as a
criminal activity.” 91 The report also finds similar deficiencies in rules of engagement (ROE):
Personnel do not tend to think of ROE relative to terrorism. Terrorism
consists of criminal activity and is currently addressed in terms of law
enforcement and self-defense, most notably centering on the use of deadly
force… The question arises whether we want to create a separate body of rules for
dealing with terrorism or merely insure that the terrorist threat is adequately
addressed in existing regulations and plans which are, in effect, the ROE for
dealing with terrorist and other criminal acts. 92
The task group recommended in favor of the second option without considering the possibilities
inherent in the law of armed conflict approach.
This lack of doctrine and an accompanying confusion over rules of engagement are not
helpful. Uncertainty about how and when military force will be used against international
terrorism is dangerous and should be troublesome to national leaders. Shifting from a law
enforcement approach to a law of armed conflict approach with emphasis on terrorism as a mode
of warfare could contribute to clearer thinking about the military role and mission. Even if this
shift were not to occur, an understanding of the two legal approaches described in this chapter
could put international terrorism in clear focus. It is disturbing, therefore, to read the August
1986 joint study on low-intensity conflict sponsored by the US Army Training and Doctrine
Command and find nothing in it on the legal aspects of the either low-intensity conflict or its
subelement, international terrorism. 93
Ancillary Issues
Finally, applying the law of armed conflict to international terrorist activities could result
in some collateral legal problems. Thus, the full effect of such an approach would require further
study. For example, all-risk insurance policies (both life and pro-petty) usually contain a clause
excluding coverage in time of “war... civil war, revolution, rebellion, insurrection, or warlike
operations, whether there be a declaration of war or not.” For the law of armed conflict to apply,
a state of armed conflict must be recognized. Would insurance coverage cease? 94