Freedom of Information: A Comparative Legal Survey - Federation of ...
Freedom of Information: A Comparative Legal Survey - Federation of ...
Freedom of Information: A Comparative Legal Survey - Federation of ...
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Unfortunately, the reaction <strong>of</strong> many States to the problem <strong>of</strong> terrorism has been to increase secrecy rather<br />
than to bolster democracy through openness.<br />
Appeals<br />
It is widely recognised that individuals should have the right to lodge complaints or appeals where they<br />
feel that their requests for information have not been dealt with properly, in particular where they have<br />
been refused access to the information sought. Different laws provide for different complaint options. An<br />
internal complaint is a common option, as is a complaint to an independent oversight body and/or the<br />
courts. Some sort <strong>of</strong> independent oversight is clearly needed since otherwise decisions on whether or not<br />
to disclose information ultimately rest on the discretion <strong>of</strong> public <strong>of</strong>fi cials.<br />
Many laws – including those <strong>of</strong> South Africa, the United States, Peru, India and Jamaica – provide specifi cally<br />
for an internal appeal, normally to a higher authority within the same body which originally refused the<br />
request. In some cases, such as in the United Kingdom, completing this appeal is a pre-requisite to lodging<br />
a higher level appeal.<br />
Most <strong>of</strong> the laws reviewed – with the exception <strong>of</strong> South Africa, Sweden, Uganda, Peru and Bulgaria –<br />
provide for an independent oversight body to play a role in resolving access to information complaints.<br />
This is something which has proven central to the effective functioning <strong>of</strong> the right to information regime.<br />
Appeals to the courts are too time-consuming and expensive for all but a small minority <strong>of</strong> applicants, and<br />
yet it is essential that an external level <strong>of</strong> appeal be available. The importance <strong>of</strong> this is refl ected in part by<br />
moves in countries which do or did not have oversight bodies to introduce them. Very recent amendments<br />
in the United States have fi nally established an oversight body with a mandate to help resolve complaints,<br />
while in South Africa the establishment <strong>of</strong> such a body is a key civil society demand.<br />
For the most part, laws establish specifi c bodies for this purpose although some, such as the Kyrgyz law,<br />
allocate the task to an existing body, in that case the ombudsman. This has a number <strong>of</strong> disadvantages,<br />
including that the powers <strong>of</strong> the body are unlikely to be tailored to the specifi c needs <strong>of</strong> information appeals<br />
and that the body is unlikely to develop the specialised expertise required to deal properly with information<br />
appeals. At the same time, this can be an attractive option for less wealthy or smaller countries. In some<br />
countries – such as the United Kingdom and Thailand – the law provides for both an independent oversight<br />
body and a specialised tribunal with the power to hear further appeals.<br />
Given that, at least in their complaints role, oversight bodies have to mediate between the public and <strong>of</strong>fi cials,<br />
it is important that they be protected against interference, particularly <strong>of</strong> a political nature. Different laws<br />
take different approaches to guaranteeing the independence <strong>of</strong> these bodies. The appointments process<br />
is clearly central to this guarantee. In Japan, the Prime Minister appoints the Commissioners upon the<br />
approval <strong>of</strong> both houses <strong>of</strong> parliament. In Mexico, appointments are made by the executive branch, but<br />
are subject to veto by the Senate or Permanent Commission. In India, the President appoints, but on the<br />
nomination <strong>of</strong> a committee consisting <strong>of</strong> the Prime Minster, the Leader <strong>of</strong> the Opposition and a cabinet<br />
minister. A similar system applies in Jamaica, but without the cabinet minister. Involving more different<br />
sectors <strong>of</strong> society in the appointments process is an important way <strong>of</strong> enhancing the independence <strong>of</strong><br />
appointments.<br />
A number <strong>of</strong> other provisions in different laws enhance independence, including prerequisites for being<br />
appointed as a member – such as having expertise and having a strong moral record – conditions on<br />
membership – for example against individuals with strong political connections from being appointed<br />
– protection <strong>of</strong> tenure – for example through establishing limited grounds for removal – and funding<br />
mechanisms – including by linking salaries <strong>of</strong> members to pre-existing civil service grades, such as those<br />
<strong>of</strong> the judicial service.<br />
The grounds for complaint should be broad, so that all failures to apply the law may be remedied. Specifi c<br />
grounds in different laws include an inability to lodge a request, failure to respond to a request within<br />
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