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QS Investors Diversification Based Investing Whitepaper - FTSE

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W H I T E P A P E R<br />

<strong>FTSE</strong> DBI<br />

(<strong>Diversification</strong> <strong>Based</strong> <strong>Investing</strong>)<br />

By <strong>QS</strong> <strong>Investors</strong>, LLC<br />

<strong>Diversification</strong> <strong>Based</strong> <strong>Investing</strong> or DBI, is an investment<br />

strategy that seeks to take advantage of macro and<br />

behavioural inefficiencies in global and international equity<br />

markets by developing a diversified exposure to macro risk<br />

factors. DBI focuses purely on portfolio construction rather<br />

than stock selection and uses analysis of country and<br />

industry correlations to create an active index that is highly<br />

diversified across countries and industries. In this paper, we<br />

explain the rationale for DBI, the details of the investment<br />

process, and present detailed analysis of its performance<br />

and characteristics to show why we believe it can deliver:<br />

1. Higher absolute and risk-adjusted returns than market<br />

capitalization weighted benchmarks over the long run<br />

2. Higher returns in both falling and rising equity markets1 3. Low correlation of excess returns to market<br />

capitalization indices2 and alternatively weighted equity<br />

indices<br />

1 Higher returns is defined as market return participation, i.e. when markets are rising the DBI index rises more than 100% and when the market is falling it falls less than 100% .<br />

2 The excess return has no dependence on market direction, in other words there is no beta exposure in the excess return.<br />

<strong>FTSE</strong> DBI Page 1


Introduction<br />

Over ten years ago, <strong>QS</strong> <strong>Investors</strong> developed the<br />

<strong>Diversification</strong> <strong>Based</strong> <strong>Investing</strong> (DBI) strategy to try to<br />

take advantage of macro inefficiencies in equity<br />

markets by developing a portfolio construction<br />

process with a greater degree of diversified exposure<br />

to macro risk factors. Through analysis of country and<br />

industry correlations, DBI creates a portfolio that is<br />

highly diversified across these factors and can create<br />

higher absolute and risk-adjusted returns than market<br />

capitalization indices with less downside risk.<br />

DBI is based on three key beliefs:<br />

1. Geography and industry are the primary drivers of<br />

global equity risk<br />

2. Market sentiment generates momentum effects in<br />

indices, which leads to concentration risk that<br />

builds and collapses<br />

3. A diversified portfolio helps to avoid concentration<br />

risk and reduces downside market participation<br />

Recent academic and practitioner research lends<br />

support to these beliefs by pointing out that a large<br />

part of returns in international equity markets are<br />

driven by macro effects: the business a company is in<br />

(industry) and where the business is located<br />

(geography).<br />

Jung and Shiller have asserted that markets show<br />

macro-inefficiency “in the sense that there are long<br />

waves in the time series of aggregate indexes of<br />

security prices below and above various definitions of<br />

fundamental values.” 3<br />

<strong>FTSE</strong> DBI Page 3<br />

However, most active equity managers focus on stock<br />

selection to beat their benchmarks despite the<br />

argument from academic research that equity<br />

markets show considerable micro efficiency, 4 that is<br />

that individual security mispricings tend to be wiped<br />

out fairly quickly.<br />

This suggests broader investment opportunities may<br />

exist to add value at the macro level through portfolio<br />

construction rather than stock selection. DBI’s unique<br />

portfolio construction process takes advantage of<br />

these findings and has consistently added value,<br />

delivering:<br />

1. Higher absolute and risk-adjusted returns than<br />

their respective indices<br />

2. Outperformance in both up and down markets<br />

3. Low correlation of excess return to both their<br />

respective indices and stock selection based<br />

alternative equity index approaches<br />

For the 10 years ending December 31, 2010, the<br />

<strong>FTSE</strong> DBI Indices have outperformed their respective<br />

market capitalization benchmarks with a high level of<br />

consistency as measured by the information ratio.<br />

10 Year (%pa) 10 Year Information Ratio 5<br />

<strong>FTSE</strong> DBI Developed Index 6.52 0.80<br />

<strong>FTSE</strong> Developed Index 3.02<br />

<strong>FTSE</strong> DBI Developed ex Japan Index 6.75 0.81<br />

<strong>FTSE</strong> Developed ex Japan Index 3.23<br />

<strong>FTSE</strong> DBI Developed ex US Index 8.43 1.36<br />

<strong>FTSE</strong> Developed ex US Index 4.83<br />

* <strong>Based</strong> on monthly annualized total returns<br />

SOURCE: <strong>FTSE</strong> Group<br />

3 Samuelson’s dictum and the stock market, Jung and Shiller (2005)<br />

4 Irrational Exuberance, 2nd Ed. (2001), p. 243<br />

5 Information Ratio as a measure of consistency of return measured by the annualized excess return divided by annualized standard deviation of that return


1 | Rationale and philosophy<br />

DBI is based on three key beliefs:<br />

1. Geography and industry are the primary drivers of global<br />

equity risk<br />

2. Market sentiment generates momentum effects in<br />

capitalization-weighted indices, which leads to<br />

concentration risk that builds and collapses<br />

3. A diversified portfolio helps to avoid concentration risk<br />

and reduces downside market participation<br />

The rationale for the first two beliefs is given below. The third<br />

is explained in section three, “Performance analysis”.<br />

Figure 1: The importance of Country, Currency and Industry exposures<br />

Explanatory Power of Gem Factors<br />

Rolling 12-month average<br />

100%<br />

80%<br />

60%<br />

40%<br />

20%<br />

0%<br />

Jan-1995<br />

Jan-1996<br />

<strong>FTSE</strong> DBI Page 4<br />

Jan-1997<br />

Jan-1998<br />

Jan-1999<br />

Jan-2000<br />

Jan-2001<br />

Belief 1 | Geography and industry drive global equity<br />

risk and return<br />

Geography (where a company is located or country and<br />

currency) and Industry (what company a business is in) have<br />

explained more than 90% of the factor risk in global equity<br />

markets over the last 15 years. Other factors such as size,<br />

value/growth, volatility and momentum, have explained less<br />

than 10%. To illustrate this, Figure 1 shows the explanatory<br />

power of BARRA’s Global Equity Market factors highlighting<br />

that over a rolling 12-month basis that the Country, Currency<br />

and Industry factors drive over 90% of the factor risk.<br />

This is why DBI’s investment process focuses on geography<br />

and industry as the key building blocks.<br />

Jan-2002<br />

Jan-2003<br />

Jan-2004<br />

Jan-2005<br />

Jan-2006<br />

Jan-2007<br />

Jan-2008<br />

Jan-2009<br />

Source: BARRA, <strong>QS</strong> <strong>Investors</strong> analysis<br />

Risk Indices<br />

Industries<br />

Currencies<br />

Countries


Belief 2 | Market sentiment leads to concentration risk<br />

that builds and collapses<br />

Broad equity indices are often considered highly diversified<br />

investments. And yet, market sentiment—or, put another<br />

way, investors’ collective enthusiasms—can cause dangerous<br />

concentrations in certain parts of capitalization weighted<br />

indices.<br />

Dec-1993<br />

<strong>FTSE</strong> DBI Page 5<br />

Dec-1995<br />

Dec-1997<br />

Dec-1999<br />

Dec-2001<br />

The <strong>FTSE</strong> World Index is one of many benchmarks to have<br />

experienced concentrations that built up and then collapsed.<br />

Two prime examples—from different decades—involved<br />

Technology stocks and more recently, Financial stocks.<br />

In the mid-to- late 1990s the weight of Technology stocks in<br />

the <strong>FTSE</strong> Developed Index surged from just over 5% to almost<br />

25% (Figure 2).<br />

Figure 2: Index weight of Technology stocks in the <strong>FTSE</strong> Developed Index (December 1993 – August 2010)<br />

% Weight Index<br />

30%<br />

25%<br />

20%<br />

15%<br />

10%<br />

5%<br />

0%<br />

Source: <strong>FTSE</strong> Group, <strong>QS</strong> <strong>Investors</strong> LLC analysis<br />

Dec-2003<br />

Dec-2005<br />

Dec-2007<br />

Dec-2009<br />

Aug-2010


The increased weight reflected a strong enthusiasm for<br />

Technology stocks. But it also generated momentum that<br />

propelled the collective market capitalization of Technology<br />

stocks even higher, as index tracking funds and active<br />

managers bid up the stocks.<br />

More recently, Financial stocks went through large increases<br />

as earnings increased with the advent of financial firms<br />

leveraging the real estate boom, new earnings sources<br />

generated by new financial instruments, investors belief that<br />

business cycles would be more moderate than in the past,<br />

Dec-1993<br />

In our view, these concentrations resulted from consistent and<br />

repeated patterns of investor behavior. Over the long-term,<br />

stock prices will oscillate around the company’s intrinsic value<br />

but be closer to the average intrinsic value. But in the shortterm—and<br />

for more extended periods during bubbles—<br />

market cap-weighted indices often overweight overvalued<br />

stocks as investors become too optimistic about their growth<br />

potential, and underweight undervalued stocks for the<br />

opposite reason. This phenomenon, which has been<br />

documented in the academic literature over the last several<br />

years, 6 is illustrated in Figure 5.<br />

DBI’s investment process is designed to counteract the<br />

concentration risk seen in market capitalization weighted<br />

indices.<br />

6 Financial Analysts Journal (Treynor, 2005), Journal of <strong>Investing</strong> (Hamza, et al, 2007)<br />

<strong>FTSE</strong> DBI Page 6<br />

Dec-1995<br />

Dec-1997<br />

Dec-1999<br />

Dec-2001<br />

and increased risk taking by these institutions. The increase<br />

in earnings led investors to become very excited by the<br />

earnings growth prospects of financial firms and the lower<br />

potential volatility of earnings. This led them to bid up<br />

financial stocks relative to the rest of the market causing the<br />

weight of Financials in the index to increase from a low of<br />

17% in 2000 to a peak of almost 28% of the index in 2006.<br />

Over the next two years the concentration collapsed as<br />

financial stocks fell to nearly half their weight to just over<br />

16% of the index in early 2009 (see Figure 4).<br />

Figure 4: Index weight of Financial stocks in the <strong>FTSE</strong> Developed Index (December 1993 – August 2010)<br />

% Weight Index<br />

30%<br />

25%<br />

20%<br />

15%<br />

Source: <strong>FTSE</strong> Group, <strong>QS</strong> <strong>Investors</strong> LLC analysis<br />

Dec-2003<br />

Dec-2005<br />

Intrinsic value<br />

Dec-2007<br />

Figure 5: Distribution of Stock Price Versus True<br />

“Intrinsic Value”<br />

Undervalued Overvalued<br />

Increasing<br />

underweight<br />

Source: <strong>FTSE</strong> Group, <strong>QS</strong> <strong>Investors</strong> LLC analysis<br />

Increasing<br />

overweight<br />

Dec-2009<br />

Aug-2010


Academic foundations<br />

The conceptual basis for DBI is supported by a growing<br />

body of research. Academics and theorists have recently<br />

argued that although modern markets show considerable<br />

micro efficiency7 —simply put, that individual security<br />

mispricings tend to be wiped out fairly quickly—they are<br />

less efficient at the macro level. Jung and Shiller have<br />

asserted that markets show macro-inefficiency “in the sense<br />

that there are long waves in the time series of aggregate<br />

indices of security prices below and above various<br />

definitions of fundamental values.” 8<br />

Put another way, “because the aggregate averages out the<br />

individual stories of the firms, and the reasons for changes<br />

in the aggregate are more subtle and harder for the<br />

investment public to understand—having to do with<br />

national economic growth, stabilizing economic policy and<br />

the like—factors such as stock market booms and busts<br />

swamp out the effect of information about future dividends<br />

in determining price and make the simple efficient markets<br />

model a bad approximation for the aggregate stock<br />

market.” 9<br />

We believe that there are three primary drivers of this<br />

inefficiency caused by the uncertainty of the impact of<br />

these drivers: monetary policy, fiscal policy and regulatory<br />

policy.<br />

1. Monetary policy: The future levels of interest rates,<br />

potential and implemented asset purchases, as well as<br />

other actions by central banks are uncertain, as is their<br />

impact over the near- and medium-term. <strong>Investors</strong><br />

struggle with these issues when evaluating the value of<br />

different parts of the market and the impact on<br />

economic growth as well as the effectiveness of policy<br />

actions. Recent examples include expectations around<br />

interest rate levels in 2010 and beyond and the use and<br />

effectiveness of quantitative easing policies and tools.<br />

7 Irrational Exuberance, 2nd Ed. (2001), p. 243<br />

8 Samuelson’s dictum and the stock market, Jung and Shiller (2005)<br />

9 Ibid<br />

10 Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises, Nickerson (1998)<br />

<strong>FTSE</strong> DBI Page 7<br />

2. Fiscal policy: Similarly to monetary policy, fiscal stimulus<br />

or austerity is debated, enacted and modified over the<br />

medium-term and subject to disagreement by policy<br />

makers as well as investors. It takes years to assess the<br />

impact of fiscal policy often with uneven and<br />

contradictory economic data that is released on an<br />

infrequent basis. Recent examples include the perceived<br />

impact and market reaction to the size and length of<br />

fiscal stimulus, its impact on sovereign debt levels, as<br />

well as the impact of fiscal austerity on country growth<br />

rates.<br />

3. Regulatory policy: Legislative agendas and reaction to<br />

market events can have a large impact on perceived and<br />

actual country competitiveness as well as industry<br />

profitability and business strategy. These changes are<br />

often debated over a multi-year time frame and the<br />

impact of legislation is uncertain. One needs look no<br />

further then proposed and enacted reform surrounding<br />

banks and other financial institutions in the US and<br />

Europe as well as healthcare reform in the US for recent<br />

examples.<br />

This macro uncertainty opens the door for behavioral biases<br />

and sentiment effects. One that has been well documented<br />

is that people – and investors are no exception – are subject<br />

to confirmation bias. That is, that they tend to hang on to<br />

hypotheses in the face of conflicting data. 10 Even when<br />

certain country and industry valuations are very high or low<br />

compared to history, investors often hold on to their beliefs<br />

in the face of contradictory data until it becomes patently<br />

obvious that they have misjudged relative values. This<br />

creates many investment opportunities which add value<br />

through macro based portfolio construction rather than<br />

stock selection.


2 | The DBI investment process<br />

DBI takes into account the observed characteristics of<br />

markets and indices described earlier, and uses them to<br />

create a more diversified index. The strategy’s investment<br />

process has four steps:<br />

1 | Assign all stocks to risk units defined by the key drivers<br />

of risk: country and industry<br />

2 | Identify highly correlated risk units, and group them in a<br />

single “cluster”<br />

3 | Weight the clusters and the risk units in them equally.<br />

The objective of equal weighting is to achieve a high<br />

level of diversification<br />

4 | Rebalance the index to capture changes in market<br />

dynamics<br />

These four steps are described in more detail.<br />

<strong>FTSE</strong> DBI Page 8<br />

Step 1 | Partition<br />

Figure 6: All Risk Units and example of two within the <strong>FTSE</strong> DBI Developed Index<br />

Australia<br />

Austria<br />

Belgium<br />

Canada<br />

Denmark<br />

Finland<br />

France<br />

Germany<br />

Greece<br />

Hong Kong<br />

Ireland<br />

Italy<br />

Japan<br />

Netherlands<br />

Norway<br />

Portugal<br />

Singapore<br />

Spain<br />

Sweden<br />

Switzerland<br />

United Kingdom<br />

United States<br />

Basic<br />

Materials<br />

Consumer<br />

Goods<br />

Consumer<br />

Services<br />

Financial<br />

Services<br />

Risk Unit 1<br />

The objective of this step is to group stocks with common<br />

drivers of return. As the country that a company resides in<br />

and the industry they compete in are the key drivers of risk<br />

in a diversified portfolio, we use <strong>FTSE</strong>’s categorization of<br />

stocks to partition each stock in to a single country/industry<br />

“risk unit”, for example Netherlands Financial Services or<br />

Japanese Utilities. Every stock in the relevant <strong>FTSE</strong> index,<br />

e.g. <strong>FTSE</strong> Developed Markets, is assigned to one of these<br />

risk units. Figure 6 shows all Risk Units and highlights these<br />

two examples.<br />

Health<br />

Care Industrials<br />

Oil &<br />

Gas Technology<br />

Telecommunications<br />

Utilities<br />

Risk Unit 2


Step 2 | Cluster<br />

In this step, we cluster the risk units to identify diversification<br />

potential. Once a year, we use statistical analysis based on<br />

correlations over the last five years to identify risk units that<br />

are highly correlated to each other. We group highly<br />

correlated risk units in to clusters so as to maximize the<br />

correlation of risk units within clusters and minimize the<br />

correlations between clusters. Each cluster can be thought<br />

of as a risk theme in the market. If investors have viewed<br />

risk units as being highly correlated or driven by a common<br />

risk factor, then the correlations will be high and these risk<br />

units will be grouped into the same cluster. Two examples of<br />

clusters in 2010 are illustrated in Figure 7: Cluster 1, global<br />

financial services/cyclical stocks; and Cluster 2, Japanese noncyclical<br />

stocks.<br />

Figure 7: Example of two clusters in <strong>FTSE</strong> DBI Developed Index<br />

Australia<br />

Austria<br />

Belgium<br />

Canada<br />

Denmark<br />

Finland<br />

France<br />

Germany<br />

Greece<br />

Hong Kong<br />

Ireland<br />

Italy<br />

Japan<br />

Netherlands<br />

Norway<br />

Portugal<br />

Singapore<br />

Spain<br />

Sweden<br />

Switzerland<br />

United Kingdom<br />

United States<br />

Source: <strong>QS</strong> <strong>Investors</strong> LLC<br />

For illustrative purposes only<br />

<strong>FTSE</strong> DBI Page 9<br />

Basic<br />

Materials<br />

Consumer<br />

Goods<br />

Consumer<br />

Services<br />

Financial<br />

Services<br />

Cluster 1<br />

Financials Svcs/<br />

Cyclical<br />

Some clusters are based primarily around sectors, while<br />

others are determined more by geography. In the above<br />

example, Financial Services are more globally integrated and<br />

reside in cluster 1 while there are only Japanese risk units in<br />

cluster two. In total DBI targets 10 clusters. At times there is<br />

not enough difference between risk units to form 10 clusters<br />

so that 9 clusters are the optimal number. For example, if<br />

the 10th cluster only has one or two risk units in it, it means<br />

that there is not enough difference between risk units in the<br />

10th cluster and another cluster. If this occurs, we rerun the<br />

process targeting 9 clusters and the index will only have 9<br />

clusters for that year.<br />

Health<br />

Care Industrials<br />

Oil &<br />

Gas Technology<br />

Telecommunications<br />

Utilities<br />

Cluster 2<br />

Japan<br />

Non Cyclical


Step 3 | Weight<br />

The objective is to engineer a diversified exposure to the key<br />

drivers of risk and return. By design each cluster has a low<br />

correlation to other clusters, and from an intuitive standpoint<br />

describes a risk theme in the market such as global<br />

commodities, financial services/cyclical stocks or Japanese<br />

non-cyclicals. Market capitalization indexes may have high<br />

weights to a particular risk theme such as cyclical stocks, and<br />

low weights to other risk themes such as Japanese noncyclicals.<br />

In contrast, DBI seeks a more diversified exposure<br />

to risk themes in the market by equal weighting all clusters.<br />

In effect, DBI avoids forecasting which risk theme will do<br />

better than others. This diversification approach forms the<br />

Figure 8: Example of three “Clusters” within <strong>FTSE</strong> DBI Developed Index<br />

Portfolio<br />

Weight<br />

As of September 30th, 2010.<br />

Source: <strong>QS</strong> <strong>Investors</strong> LLC. For illustration purposes only<br />

<strong>FTSE</strong> DBI Page 10<br />

11% Cluster 1<br />

0.36% Australia Industrials<br />

0.36% Australia Financial Services<br />

0.36% Austria Financial Services<br />

0.36% Belgium Financial Services<br />

0.36% Canada Industrials<br />

0.36% Canada Financial Services<br />

0.36% Switzerland Financial Services<br />

0.36% Denmark Financial Services<br />

0.36% Germany Consumer Goods<br />

0.36% Germany Technology<br />

0.36% Spain Financial Services<br />

0.36% Finland Basic Materials<br />

0.36% Finland Financial Services<br />

0.36% Finland Technology<br />

0.36% France Financial Services<br />

0.36% France Technology<br />

0.36% Great Britain Financial Services<br />

0.36% Greece Financial Services<br />

0.36% Ireland Industrials<br />

0.36% Italy Consumer Goods<br />

0.36% Italy Financial Services<br />

0.36% Netherlands Industrials<br />

0.36% Netherlands Financial Services<br />

0.36% Sweden Consumer Goods<br />

0.36% Sweden Financial Services<br />

0.36% United States Basic Materials<br />

0.36% United States Industrials<br />

0.36% United States Consumer Goods<br />

0.36% United States Consumer Services<br />

0.36% United States Financial Services<br />

0.36% United States Technology<br />

Portfolio<br />

Weight<br />

heart of DBI’s portfolio construction process. As risk units<br />

within a cluster are highly correlated, there is no reason to<br />

overweight one compared to the other. Thus each risk unit<br />

is equally weighted in each cluster. Figure 8 illustrates three<br />

cluster examples as of September 30th, 2010. At this time,<br />

the DBI process for the <strong>FTSE</strong> DBI Developed Index created 9<br />

clusters so each cluster had a 11.1% weight (i.e. 100% ÷<br />

9). Risk units in clusters that contain many risk units have<br />

relatively smaller weights in the portfolio. By construction,<br />

risk units in larger clusters will be highly correlated with more<br />

of the other risk units; therefore, they are not good portfolio<br />

diversifiers and should have a lower weight.<br />

11% Cluster 2<br />

2.78% Japan HealthCare<br />

2.78% Japan Consumer Services<br />

2.78% Japan Telecommunications<br />

2.78% Japan Utilities<br />

Portfolio<br />

Weight<br />

11% Cluster 3<br />

0.85% Australia Oil and Gas<br />

0.85% Australia Basic Materials<br />

0.85% Canada Oil and Gas<br />

0.85% Canada Basic Materials<br />

0.85% France Oil and Gas<br />

0.85% France Basic Materials<br />

0.85% Great Britain Oil and Gas<br />

0.85% Great Britain Basic Materials<br />

0.85% Italy Oil and Gas<br />

0.85% Japan Oil and Gas<br />

0.85% Norway Oil and Gas<br />

0.85% Norway Basic Materials<br />

0.85% United States Oil and Gas


To further illustrate how good and bad diversifiers are<br />

weighted in the portfolio, figure 9 shows how Netherlands<br />

Financial Services (1 of 31 risk units in Cluster 1) and<br />

Japanese Utilities (1 of 4 risk units in Cluster 2) are<br />

correlated to all other risk units. Netherlands Financial<br />

Services shows relatively high correlations to almost all other<br />

risk units and is therefore not a good diversifier. Intuitively<br />

this means that there are many risk units that have a<br />

Correlation<br />

100%<br />

80%<br />

60%<br />

40%<br />

20%<br />

0%<br />

-20%<br />

-40%<br />

Step 4 | Implementation<br />

The objective of this step is to capture structural changes<br />

between countries and industries, while controlling turnover<br />

to keep transaction and market impact costs low. The<br />

clustering process occurs annually when the largest part of<br />

the relevant <strong>FTSE</strong> benchmark reconstitutes. For example, the<br />

<strong>FTSE</strong> DBI Developed Index reclustering is completed in<br />

December to coincide with the constituent review<br />

<strong>FTSE</strong> DBI Page 11<br />

Risk Units<br />

common risk exposure (cyclical/financial services). As a<br />

consequence, it is grouped in a Cluster with many risk units<br />

and gets a small total portfolio weight (0.36%). In contrast,<br />

Japanese Utilities is highly correlated to only a few other risk<br />

units and is negatively correlated with over half of the other<br />

risk units. Because of this, it is a good diversifier; it is<br />

therefore grouped in a cluster with fewer risk units and is<br />

allocated a higher weight (2.78%) as a consequence.<br />

Figure 9: Overweighting good diversifiers; correlation pair example – two risk units to every other risk unit<br />

Japan Utilities<br />

(1 of 4 Risk Units in Cluster)<br />

Netherlands Financial Services<br />

(1 of 31 Risk Units in Cluster)<br />

1<br />

4<br />

7<br />

10<br />

13<br />

16<br />

19<br />

22<br />

25<br />

28<br />

31<br />

34<br />

37<br />

40<br />

43<br />

46<br />

49<br />

52<br />

55<br />

58<br />

61<br />

64<br />

67<br />

70<br />

73<br />

76<br />

79<br />

82<br />

85<br />

88<br />

91<br />

94<br />

97<br />

100<br />

103<br />

106<br />

109<br />

112<br />

115<br />

118<br />

121<br />

As of September 30th, 2010.<br />

Source: <strong>QS</strong> <strong>Investors</strong> LLC. For illustration purposes only<br />

High Correlation<br />

Bad Diversifiers<br />

Low Correlation<br />

Good Diversifiers<br />

(reconstitution) that occurs in that index for North America.<br />

As constituent names will change in December, DBI changes<br />

clusters / risk unit weights / stock specific weights to coincide<br />

with that turnover. Immediately after that, market drift<br />

occurs. To maintain diversification, the DBI Indexes are<br />

rebalanced back to the original diversification weights once a<br />

quarter. This process is illustrated below in Figure 10.<br />

Figure 10: Implementation – Example of Clustering and Rebalancing timeline for <strong>FTSE</strong> DBI Developed Index<br />

Cluster<br />

Rebalance Rebalance Rebalance<br />

Cluster<br />

December March June September December


3 | Performance analysis<br />

In this section, we detail how <strong>FTSE</strong> DBI Indices performed for<br />

the 10-year period ending December 31, 2010.<br />

Performance and performance patterns<br />

The <strong>FTSE</strong> DBI indices have outperformed their respective<br />

capitalization weighted indexes by an average of over 3%<br />

per annum.<br />

<strong>FTSE</strong> DBI Page 12<br />

PERFORMANCE INFORMATION RATIO<br />

12M (%) 3YR (%pa) 5YR (%pa) 10YR (%pa) 10YR IR<br />

<strong>FTSE</strong> DBI Developed Index 10.97 -5.12 5.67 6.52 0.80<br />

<strong>FTSE</strong> Developed Index 12.28 -4.13 3.29 3.02<br />

<strong>FTSE</strong> DBI Developed ex Japan Index 8.28 -4.69 6.87 6.75 0.81<br />

<strong>FTSE</strong> Developed ex Japan Index 11.98 -4.09 3.97 3.23<br />

<strong>FTSE</strong> DBI Developed ex US Index 11.48 -1.07 8.46 8.43 1.36<br />

<strong>FTSE</strong> Developed ex US Index 9.85 -5.53 4.08 4.83<br />

As of December 31, 2010<br />

*<strong>Based</strong> on monthly annualized total returns.<br />

SOURCE: <strong>FTSE</strong> Group<br />

Historical outperformance in both up and down markets<br />

On average the <strong>FTSE</strong> DBI indices have outperformed their<br />

respective market capitalization benchmarks whether the<br />

market moved up or down. Figure 11 shows that each of the<br />

indices captured more positive stock movements than its<br />

benchmark, and declined less during the benchmark’s<br />

negative movements. Because of this, DBI’s diversification<br />

based approach has offered downside protection during<br />

Figure 11: Up market / Down market capture<br />

Up Market/Down Market Capture*<br />

Market participation<br />

<strong>FTSE</strong> DBI Developed<br />

112.0%<br />

Up Market<br />

Capture<br />

87.3%<br />

Down Market<br />

Capture<br />

Source: Zephyr StyleAdvisor based on quarterly returns for the 10 year period ending December 31, 2010.<br />

*Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. Performance is shown gross of fees and does not reflect investment advisory or other fees.<br />

Had such fees been deducted, returns would have been lower.<br />

falling markets. Falling markets are often driven by a<br />

segment of the market, or risk theme that has risen to be a<br />

large percentage of the index only to fall dramatically when<br />

investors realize that the rise was not justified. Examples<br />

would include Technology Stocks in the late 1990s and<br />

cyclical stocks such as Financials and Industrials in<br />

2005-2007 period.<br />

<strong>FTSE</strong> DBI Developed Ex-US <strong>FTSE</strong> DBI Developed Ex-Japan<br />

108.4%<br />

Up Market<br />

Capture<br />

86.5%<br />

Down Market<br />

Capture<br />

119.2%<br />

Up Market<br />

Capture<br />

96.7%<br />

Down Market<br />

Capture


Low correlation of excess returns to the benchmark and alternatively weighted equity index strategies<br />

Because DBI uses a differentiated top-down, diversification<br />

based portfolio construction process, the strategy has shown<br />

low correlation of excess returns to both its market<br />

capitalization benchmarks and alternative weighted equity<br />

index approaches that focus on stock selection. This makes<br />

DBI a good portfolio diversifier as the excess return<br />

complements market capitalization indices and stock<br />

selection alternatively weighted index strategies. Figure 12<br />

illustrates the correlation of the excess return of the <strong>FTSE</strong> DBI<br />

Figure 12: Low correlation of excess returns to other indexes<br />

1<br />

0<br />

-1<br />

Visa IPO on<br />

19/03/2008<br />

Data as of December 31, 2010<br />

Start dates: <strong>FTSE</strong> Developed Index-1/2001; <strong>FTSE</strong> RAFI Developed 1000 Index -4/2007; <strong>FTSE</strong> EDHEC Risk Efficient Developed Index - 1/2003<br />

*Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. Performance is shown gross of fees and does not reflect investment advisory or other fees.<br />

Had such fees been deducted, returns would have been lower. Source: <strong>FTSE</strong> Group, <strong>QS</strong> <strong>Investors</strong> analysis for longest available time frame.<br />

<strong>FTSE</strong> DBI Page 13<br />

0.04<br />

<strong>FTSE</strong> Developed Index<br />

Developed to the excess return of the <strong>FTSE</strong> RAFI Developed<br />

1000 Index, the <strong>FTSE</strong> EDHEC Risk Efficient Developed Index<br />

and to the <strong>FTSE</strong> Developed Index from inception through<br />

December 31, 2010. As can be seen, the correlation of the<br />

excess return generated by the DBI process has a low<br />

correlation to the market capitalization index, the <strong>FTSE</strong><br />

EDHEC Risk Efficient Developed Index and a negative<br />

correlation to the <strong>FTSE</strong> RAFI Developed 1000 Index.<br />

-0.13<br />

<strong>FTSE</strong> RAFI Developed 1000 Index<br />

0.04<br />

<strong>FTSE</strong> EDHEC Risk Efficient Developed Index


4 | Risk exposures<br />

Active risk exposures<br />

Over the last 10 calendar years, on average almost 90% of<br />

the active risk exposures for the <strong>FTSE</strong> DBI Index series came<br />

from country, industry and currency as illustrated in Figure 13<br />

which illustrates the active risk exposure of the <strong>FTSE</strong> DBI<br />

Developed Index compared to the <strong>FTSE</strong> Developed Index.<br />

As DBI specifically focuses on developing alternative weights<br />

Figure 13: <strong>FTSE</strong> DBI Developed Index active risk exposures over time<br />

29/12/2000 31/12/2001 31/12/2002 31/12/2003 31/12/2004 30/12/2005 29/12/2006 31/12/2007 31/12/2008 31/12/2009<br />

Specific % 12.1% 8.8% 8.0% 6.3% 4.2% 5.3% 8.6% 8.0% 11.3% 5.1%<br />

Common % 87.9% 91.2% 92.0% 93.7% 95.8% 94.7% 91.4% 92.0% 88.7% 94.9%<br />

Style % 19.0% 11.7% 18.0% 6.3% 3.6% 3.1% 2.3% 5.5% 14.3% 13.6%<br />

Size % 3.7% 5.5% 4.8% 3.2% 2.2% 1.2% 1.3% 1.9% 0.4% 0.7%<br />

Value % 0.5% 0.0% 0.4% 0.7% 0.1% 0.0% 0.2% 0.2% 0.9% 0.9%<br />

Country % 25.1% 35.1% 39.3% 49.8% 45.6% 54.7% 56.8% 60.7% 62.1% 58.4%<br />

Industry % 12.3% 7.2% 3.1% 3.4% 1.8% 3.4% 3.1% 1.5% 2.7% 3.1%<br />

Currency % 19.6% 32.1% 17.1% 47.7% 44.4% 36.4% 37.0% 27.8% 24.8% 36.4%<br />

Covar 11.9% 5.2% 14.6% -13.4% 0.4% -3.0% -7.7% -3.4% -15.2% -16.6%<br />

SOURCE: Axioma, <strong>QS</strong> <strong>Investors</strong> LLC<br />

5 | Summary<br />

Summary<br />

<strong>Diversification</strong> <strong>Based</strong> <strong>Investing</strong> (DBI) is an international or<br />

global approach to gaining exposure to equity markets that<br />

provides broad exposure and, over the long-term, seeks<br />

higher returns and higher risk-adjusted returns than its<br />

benchmark with less exposure to down markets.<br />

The DBI investment process is designed to capture the<br />

benefits of a higher level of diversification by taking into<br />

account the primary drivers of global equity returns:<br />

geography and industry. <strong>Diversification</strong> is maintained by<br />

taking in to account changing correlations in the countries<br />

and industries thereby reflecting changes in how investors<br />

think of the world and what parts have higher or lower<br />

interdependencies. By diversifying across risk themes or<br />

“clusters” of risk in the market, the more diversified<br />

exposure to the risk premium in these risk themes has on<br />

average led to higher absolute and risk adjusted returns.<br />

<strong>FTSE</strong> DBI Page 14<br />

at the country and industry level, it is not surprising that this<br />

is where the majority of active risk is generated. This is in<br />

contrast to some other alternative weighting approaches<br />

such as fundamental indexing that can generate significant<br />

small cap and value biases.<br />

Owing to its differentiated top down investment approach,<br />

DBI has generated excess return that has been uncorrelated<br />

to both their capitalization weighted benchmarks and some<br />

alternative weighted equity index strategies such as<br />

fundamental indexing. The DBI investment approach has<br />

also led to positive excess return in both rising and falling<br />

equity markets and has captured more than 100% of<br />

returns in up markets and less than 100% of returns in<br />

down markets. The primary drivers of DBI’s active risk<br />

exposures are from active country, currency and industry<br />

positions. The Developed Index strategy has exhibited no<br />

persistent size or style bias relative to its benchmark and only<br />

modest bias at any given time so is a good complement to<br />

both market capitalization weighted indices and alternatively<br />

weighted stock selection indices such as fundamental<br />

weighted indices.


About <strong>QS</strong> <strong>Investors</strong>, LLC<br />

<strong>QS</strong> <strong>Investors</strong>, LLC is an independent investment firm<br />

providing asset management and advisory services to a<br />

diverse array of institutional clients. The firm’s senior<br />

management team previously worked together for over<br />

10 years within Deutsche Asset Management’s<br />

Quantitative Strategies Group. During that time, the<br />

<strong>QS</strong> team pioneered approaches to integrating quantitative<br />

and qualitative investment insights and dynamically<br />

weighting key market drivers across a broad spectrum of<br />

strategies including global tactical asset allocation, US and<br />

Global equities.<br />

<strong>FTSE</strong> DBI Page 15<br />

<strong>Based</strong> in New York with more than 40 employees, <strong>QS</strong><br />

<strong>Investors</strong> is one of the largest majority woman owned asset<br />

management firms.<br />

www.qsinvestors.com<br />

For more information on the <strong>FTSE</strong> DBI Index Series,<br />

please visit www.ftse.com/Indices/<br />

<strong>FTSE</strong>_<strong>Diversification</strong>_<strong>Based</strong>_<strong>Investing</strong>_Index_Series/index.jsp<br />

•This paper does not constitute an offer or invitation to buy or sell any investment or participate in any investment activity. This paper has not been approved by a person authorised<br />

under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (“FSMA”) for the purposes of section 21 of FSMA.<br />

•Accordingly this paper and the information contained within it is only made to, and for the use of, persons whom <strong>FTSE</strong> believes to be investment professionals within the meaning of<br />

article 19(5) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005 or U.S. institutional investors and major U.S. institutional investors, as provided by Rule<br />

15a-6 under the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934. This paper should not be relied upon by anyone else. If you have not received this paper directly from <strong>FTSE</strong>, do not use or rely<br />

on it or forward it to anyone else.<br />

•All information is provided for information purposes only and is derived from historical data and information deemed to be reliable and generally available to the public in its primary<br />

form. Nothing in this presentation constitutes financial or investment advice. You should exercise your discretion in your use of the <strong>FTSE</strong> <strong>Diversification</strong> <strong>Based</strong> <strong>Investing</strong> Index Series<br />

and if you do not have the relevant professional expertise in relation to investments of the kind the <strong>FTSE</strong> <strong>Diversification</strong> <strong>Based</strong> <strong>Investing</strong> Index Series relates to, before using the <strong>FTSE</strong><br />

<strong>Diversification</strong> <strong>Based</strong> <strong>Investing</strong> Index Series you should consult an investment professional who does for advice. <strong>FTSE</strong> makes no claim, prediction, warranty or representation whatsoever,<br />

expressly or impliedly, either as to the results to be obtained from the use of the <strong>FTSE</strong> <strong>Diversification</strong> <strong>Based</strong> <strong>Investing</strong> Index Series or the fitness or suitability of the Index for any<br />

particular purpose to which it might be put. No responsibility or liability can be accepted by <strong>FTSE</strong> for any errors or for any loss from use of this presentation.<br />

•All figures and graphical representations in these slides refer to past performance and are sourced by <strong>FTSE</strong>. Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future results.<br />

•All rights in the <strong>FTSE</strong> <strong>Diversification</strong> <strong>Based</strong> <strong>Investing</strong> Index Series vest in <strong>FTSE</strong>. “<strong>FTSE</strong>®” is a trade mark of the London Stock Exchange and the Financial Times and is used by <strong>FTSE</strong><br />

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