The agility imperative - a revelation in military affairs.indd
The agility imperative - a revelation in military affairs.indd
The agility imperative - a revelation in military affairs.indd
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nical capabilities to learn and exploit knowledge of the battlespace faster than an opponent, the objective be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to outpace, deceive, disrupt and if possible destroy the enemy’s Observe, Orient, Decide and Act (OODA)<br />
loop. If you destroy their OODA loop, you have effectively destroyed their ability to manage the <strong>in</strong>teraction<br />
between the physical and the cognitive realities of the battlespace. When they take action, it will be perceived<br />
as the wrong one; when they decide on actions based on their perceptions, they will be based on the wrong<br />
understand<strong>in</strong>gs.<br />
As battlespace <strong>agility</strong> is itself a function of knowledge over time and space and <strong>in</strong> an age of split-second<br />
knowledge development, the onus of be<strong>in</strong>g agile starts with a competent <strong>military</strong> <strong>in</strong>telligence capacity cont<strong>in</strong>uously<br />
develop<strong>in</strong>g and present<strong>in</strong>g the commander with opportunities to exploit knowledge. It also requires a<br />
completely synthesised work<strong>in</strong>g relationship between operational planners and <strong>in</strong>telligence providers <strong>in</strong> order<br />
to be agile and responsive to the war fight<strong>in</strong>g environment. And this <strong>agility</strong> must be tra<strong>in</strong>ed so that the process<br />
of discovery and learn<strong>in</strong>g about the environment one f<strong>in</strong>ds oneself <strong>in</strong> (the Observe and Orient phases of<br />
OODA) is not lost through the constant hand feed<strong>in</strong>g of scenarios for validation of exist<strong>in</strong>g organisation and<br />
doctr<strong>in</strong>e. Battlespace <strong>agility</strong> requires that we stop try<strong>in</strong>g to make the situation fit exist<strong>in</strong>g organisation and doctr<strong>in</strong>e<br />
and focus on our ability to adapt the organisation and doctr<strong>in</strong>e to the situation. Instead we should focus<br />
on build<strong>in</strong>g a <strong>military</strong> <strong>in</strong>telligence organisation that can observe and orient complex war fight<strong>in</strong>g environments<br />
with good speed and precision. Instead we should tra<strong>in</strong> for the validation of the <strong>military</strong> organisation’s ability<br />
to observe, learn, adapt, <strong>in</strong>novate, respond, and change to exploit the situation. Agility is the <strong>imperative</strong> for<br />
war fight<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the 21 st century, and tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to be agile is tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to fight and w<strong>in</strong>.<br />
Further read<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Alberts, D. (2011) <strong>The</strong> Agility Advantage. Wash<strong>in</strong>gton, DC: CCRP.<br />
Henrot<strong>in</strong>, J. & de Swielande, T. S. (2004) Ontological-Cultural Asymmetry and the Relevance of Grand<br />
Strategies. Journal of Military and Strategic Studies. 7 (2). 1-25.<br />
Libicki, M.C. and Johnson, S.E. (eds.) (1996) Dom<strong>in</strong>ant Battlespace Knowledge. April.<br />
Mann, P. (2001) Defence Reform Stresses Speed, Agility, Jo<strong>in</strong>tness. Aviation Week & Space Technology, 154 (25), 72.<br />
Mitchell, W. (2013) Battlespace Agility 201: <strong>The</strong> OODA Moment. Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defence College Press.<br />
NATO SAS-085, (Forthcom<strong>in</strong>g 2013) Operationaliz<strong>in</strong>g Agility.<br />
Rob<strong>in</strong>son, C.Jr. (2003) Military Marches Towards Agility. Signals Magaz<strong>in</strong>e. May.<br />
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