Pasha Bulker 243 - Independent investigation into the grounding of ...

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Figure 8: Section of navigational chart Aus 207 indicating Pasha Bulker’s track on 8 June 2007. Images (to scale) of the ship, aligned to its heading at various positions, have been superimposed on its track - 17 -
At 0906, just as the ship’s heading returned to 140º, the master ordered it to 160º. In response, the helmsman applied nearly full starboard rudder and the ship’s head started to swing rapidly to starboard. The wind which had been ahead was now on the port bow. At the time, the master remarked to the chief engineer that a ship’s heading of 140º was ‘face to face’ with the wind and ‘not good’. As the ship’s heading approached 160º, the helmsman put the rudder amidships then gradually applied port rudder as the ship continued to turn. By 0908, the ship’s heading was 180º and still turning to starboard with the rudder 27º to port. At 0909, with the ship’s heading at 200º and the rudder hard-over to port, the helmsman informed the master that the ship was still turning to starboard. The master told him that he should ‘take action quickly’ when steering. The ship’s course made good had now become westerly, towards the coast. At 0910, VTIC informed Santa Isabel’s master that the ship was approaching the restricted area which it should clear if it was safe to do so. The ship’s master was also advised that Sea Confidence nearby was experiencing difficulties. Santa Isabel’s master advised VTIC that the cable fouling his ship’s anchor would need to be cut to clear it. Pasha Bulker’s master heard this communication and remarked that both of these ships were not close to Pasha Bulker. At 0912, VTIC informed Pasha Bulker’s master that the ship should leave the restricted area and go to sea. The master thanked VTIC saying that he was ‘proceeding to sea’ and ‘don’t worry’. On its 220º heading, the ship was rolling heavily, beam-on to the large swell and the wind and it began to approach the coast at more than 2.5 knots. From his cabin’s porthole on the ship’s starboard side, the second mate could see the coast. He had been unable to sleep since earlier that morning because of the heavy rolling. When the ship got underway, he had, briefly, been on the bridge and knew the ship was headed to sea. He did not understand why the coast was now on the ship’s starboard side so he went up to the bridge. At 0915, the ship’s heading was still south-westerly and it was making good a westerly course at 3.7 knots towards Nobbys Beach, which was only 1.2 miles away. The master asked for an increase of engine speed and the chief engineer then left the bridge and went to the engine room to oversee engine room operations. As the engine speed was gradually increased to 77 rpm, the ship’s head finally swung to port with the maximum port rudder being applied. At 0923, the ship’s heading was approaching 180º when the helmsman reduced the rudder applied to 23º for a few seconds. The swing to port stopped and he immediately put the rudder hard-over to port again. By 0925, the ship’s head was turning slowly to starboard despite the maximum port rudder being applied and the engine speed at 80 rpm. The wind, at times, was now gusting to more than 55 knots. The master telephoned the chief engineer and asked for maximum possible engine speed. At 0927, VTIC called Pasha Bulker’s master to advise that the ship was getting closer to the coast and asked if any assistance was required. The master declined assistance, stating that in ‘about 10 minutes’ the situation should improve. As the engine speed increased, the ship’s heading, which had reached 205º, started to return slowly to port. At 0931, the ship’s heading was 185º with the main engine at 91 rpm and Nobbys Beach was eight cables (about 1500 m) away. One of the - 18 -
Page 2 and 3: ATSB TRANSPORT SAFETY INVESTIGATION
Page 4 and 5: CONTENTS DOCUMENT RETRIEVAL INFORMA
Page 6 and 7: DOCUMENT RETRIEVAL INFORMATION Repo
Page 8 and 9: THE AUSTRALIAN TRANSPORT SAFETY BUR
Page 10 and 11: TERMINOLOGY USED IN THIS REPORT Occ
Page 12 and 13: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY At 0742 1 on 23 M
Page 14 and 15: A number of masters had deployed in
Page 16 and 17: 1 FACTUAL INFORMATION 1.1 Pasha Bul
Page 18 and 19: een to Newcastle many times. The th
Page 20 and 21: Figure 3: Section of navigational c
Page 22 and 23: particular, with their extended fet
Page 24 and 25: At 0742, Pasha Bulker’s starboard
Page 26 and 27: oarding ground for its scheduled be
Page 28 and 29: By 0600, only 27 ships remained and
Page 30 and 31: Figure 6: Section of VTIC radar scr
Page 34 and 35: mates suggested to the master that
Page 36 and 37: Figure 10: An aerial view of Pasha
Page 38 and 39: Figure 11: A visualisation of Pasha
Page 40 and 41: 2 ANALYSIS 2.1 Evidence From 9 to 1
Page 42 and 43: anchor dragged. The decision was ba
Page 44 and 45: enough and ascertain the effect of
Page 46 and 47: No one on the bridge, at any time,
Page 48 and 49: 2.2.3 The critical decisions A numb
Page 50 and 51: severe weather at the time, it is l
Page 52 and 53: While a number of masters probably
Page 54 and 55: and continued for about 12 hours wi
Page 56 and 57: the angle increases, the holding po
Page 58 and 59: For a bulk carrier, the tension in
Page 60 and 61: It is good practice for bulk carrie
Page 62 and 63: Along with its safety functions, NP
Page 64 and 65: decided to remain anchored in adver
Page 66 and 67: ‘afraid’ because the ‘wind wa
Page 68 and 69: In early 2004, when the ship queue
Page 70 and 71: While the coal producers pay demurr
Page 72 and 73: 3 FINDINGS 3.1 Context On 23 May 20
Page 74 and 75: minimum considered to be acceptable
Page 76 and 77: 4 SAFETY ACTIONS 4.1 Safety action
Page 78 and 79: assumed, incorrectly, that the appr
Page 80 and 81: MS20080018 A number of masters at N
Page 82 and 83:
APPENDIX A: EVENTS AND CONDITIONS -
Page 84 and 85:
APPENDIX B: SHIP INFORMATION Pasha
Page 86 and 87:
APPENDIX C: SOURCES AND SUBMISSIONS
Page 88 and 89:
Seamanship International Limited, B
Page 90 and 91:
APPENDIX D: METEOROLOGICAL INFORMAT
Page 92 and 93:
Table 4: Swell condition Descriptio
Page 94 and 95:
APPENDIX E: SURVEY INFORMATION AND
Page 96 and 97:
Question 4: When the weather worsen
Page 98 and 99:
Factors considered in deciding to l
Page 100 and 101:
Question 11: Where can you get the
Page 102 and 103:
Comparison 2a One of the 42 masters
Page 104 and 105:
APPENDIX F: MEDIA RELEASE ATSB rele
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