Pasha Bulker 243 - Independent investigation into the grounding of ...

severe weather at the time, it is likely that some of these six ships dragged their
anchors or used their engines to maintain position. Therefore, the majority of the
ships remaining at anchor in the gale did drag their anchors.
Figure 18:
Chart of ships at anchor and time underway during the incident
Ships remaining at anchor
56
42
Number of ships
28
14
0
16:00 20:00 00:00 04:00 08:00 12:00 16:00
Time scale: From 1600 on 7 June to 1700 on 8 June
Most of the ships got underway only after dragging their anchors (Appendix E,
Other results). While almost all of the masters surveyed indicated that weather was
a factor in deciding to get underway, more than half of them also indicated dragging
anchor as a factor (Appendix E, Question 7). The evidence strongly suggests that
dragging anchor was the main reason for most masters deciding to get underway.
Similarly, less than a third of the masters indicated that they already had, or took,
heavy weather ballast (Appendix E, Question 5).
The gale warning, weather related guidance in shipboard publications about
Newcastle anchorage, the ordinary practice of good seamanship and their level of
responsibility and experience would suggest that most masters should have left the
anchorage before the onset of gale force winds. However, it appears that many did
not consider the risks involved or take the gale warning seriously enough to
precipitate appropriate action at an early stage. In fact, at 0500 on 8 June, when
there were strong gale force winds, 41 ships were still at anchor.
The survey results do not indicate that the actions of masters were related to their
experience, either as masters, in general, or specifically at Newcastle anchorage
(Appendix E, Comparisons).
In general, the actions of masters indicate that they were reacting to events rather
than planning or setting limiting criteria upon which to make critical decisions. The
survey responses suggest that some masters may have been more comfortable
attributing their decisions and actions to a factor, such as the anchor dragging or
guidance received from VTIC. It is possible that they were avoiding a situation
where they might need to explain their independent decisions to their ships’
managers. None of the masters surveyed indicated that their place in the queue was
a factor that influenced any of their decisions.
While the consideration of operational and commercial aspects of a ship’s voyage
are necessary and valid, masters must carefully weigh such considerations in light
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