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Pasha Bulker 243 - Independent investigation into the grounding of ...

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No one on <strong>the</strong> bridge, at any time, discussed <strong>the</strong> emergency deployment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

anchors. It is unlikely that anyone considered using <strong>the</strong> anchors to turn <strong>the</strong> ship’s<br />

head <strong>into</strong> <strong>the</strong> wind and <strong>the</strong>reby arrest or reduce its progress towards <strong>the</strong> coast.<br />

When <strong>the</strong> master decided to turn to starboard, for <strong>the</strong> first time since <strong>the</strong> ship got<br />

underway, he gave rudder orders only because he could not order a course to steer.<br />

As <strong>the</strong> ship turned, it also closed on <strong>the</strong> coast rapidly. At 0935½, <strong>the</strong> engine<br />

shutdown almost certainly increased <strong>the</strong> master’s anxiety and his speech, recorded<br />

by <strong>the</strong> VDR, started to sound distressed.<br />

While <strong>the</strong> engine shutdown did not assist <strong>the</strong> turn, it is unlikely that it prevented <strong>the</strong><br />

stern passing through <strong>the</strong> wind. The shutdown probably did bring to <strong>the</strong> master’s<br />

attention that <strong>the</strong> ship was approaching Nobbys Beach, seven cables (about 1300 m)<br />

away, at 5.5 knots (Figure 16) because soon after he ordered <strong>the</strong> engine full astern.<br />

Figure 16: <strong>Pasha</strong> <strong>Bulker</strong>’s radar display at 0937<br />

At 0939, <strong>the</strong> master declined ano<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong>fer <strong>of</strong> assistance from VTIC. He advised<br />

that <strong>the</strong> ship was turning to starboard with <strong>the</strong> engine operating full astern. It is<br />

possible that he thought going astern would assist <strong>the</strong> starboard turn. However,<br />

nei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> transverse thrust from <strong>the</strong> right-hand turning propeller nor <strong>the</strong> stern<br />

seeking <strong>the</strong> wind under sternway could realistically, in <strong>the</strong> circumstances, be<br />

expected to assist <strong>the</strong> manoeuvre. The ship’s headway and <strong>the</strong> extreme wea<strong>the</strong>r<br />

made success very unlikely.<br />

It was only after <strong>the</strong> ship’s heading started to oscillate between 240º and 270º that<br />

<strong>the</strong> master realised that <strong>the</strong> starboard turn would not succeed. At 0945, <strong>the</strong> ship was<br />

rapidly approaching Nobbys Beach, less than three cables (555 m) away, and<br />

<strong>grounding</strong> was imminent. The master would have seen a view similar to that<br />

photographed from <strong>the</strong> ship’s bridge on 11 June (Figure 17). The howling wind,<br />

driving rain, sea spray and <strong>the</strong> ship uncontrollably approaching <strong>the</strong> beach, would<br />

have made <strong>the</strong> unmanageable situation even more distressing for him. At 0946, he<br />

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