Brown Cover OP 43 - The Watson Institute for International Studies

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sures be contained. The formation of a sound—if rudimentary—macroeconomic framework for reconstruction is thus a priority. 22 Both the damage limitation and the conflict transformation positions depart from classical understanding of impartiality and neutrality. The principle of impartiality—that assistance should be proportional to need—is replaced with the essentially political objective of shaping the processes of conflict. The principle of neutrality—that humanitarian actors should not take sides in political controversies—gives way to efforts by these actors to encourage belligerents to suspend their warfare. 23 The extreme form of consequentialism—the fourth position—is a complete rejection of impartiality and neutrality. This position may be referred to as the aid as a weapon. This view holds that the international community should identify the guilty party in a conflict and use assistance to punish the guilty and succour the innocent. As one analyst observed regarding the effort of humanitarians to sustain neutrality in the conflict on Bosnia-Herzegovina: Why should we fixate on neutrality? The Serbs are the guilty party. International engagement should recognize this. 24 From here it is only a small step to the suggestion that humanitarian assistance be allocated on the basis of political sympathy for one side or the other. This pattern of behavior was common in the pre-Cold War and Cold War eras, as described in Chapter 1. This monograph assesses the merits of these positions, particularly the two in the middle of the spectrum: damage limitation and conflict transformation. Chapter 1 examines the impact of aid on conflict from an historical perspective. Chapter 2 reviews the experience of humanitarian action in conflict settings during the 1990s. Chapter 3 discusses how humanitarian actors have sought to limit the potential conflict-fueling impacts of their activities. Chapter 4 discusses efforts to use aid to transform conflict. Throughout, the analysis seeks to provide a dispassionate review of the conflict connection in the hope of xiv
helping practitioners and policymakers gain perspective on this extremely complex and nettlesome issue. As is customary in the Humanitarianism and War Project, the analysis is inductive, drawing on the experiences of individual case studies to reach broader conclusions and recommendations. The Structure of the Conflict Connection International assistance can affect processes of conflict before, during, and after war takes place. In the pre-conflict phase, external assistance may contribute to the slide of conflict-prone societies toward war, or it may be neutral vis-à-vis incipient conflict. International assistance also may reflect the desire to “help prevent conflicts at their roots—before the toll of human and material destruction spirals and before an international response becomes vastly more difficult and costly.” 25 Recent analysis of pre-conflict situations has placed considerable emphasis on the conflict-inducing effects of insensitive development assistance. One observer stated: In some cases, if not many, inappropriate aid conditionality may have forced an unsustainable pace of change or weakened states to the point where basic social services and the rule of law could no longer be maintained. 26 Examples abound. Large-scale external funding of water projects in Bangladesh exacerbated relations between the government and hill tribes displaced from ancestral lands by the filling of reservoirs, contributing to the outbreak of a serious insurgency. 27 In pre-conflict Rwanda, pressures from donors for democratization and structural adjustment may have given the Hutu political and economic élite an incentive to provoke ethnic conflict with the Tutsi minority. 28 Failure to implement human rights conditionalities on development assistance may have sent a message that conditionalities were “preached but not practiced,” contributing to Rwanda’s atmosphere of impunity. 29 In the second stage—that of active conflict—humanitarian action may exacerbate or mitigate violence or it may have no significant effect. Generous international assistance to the disxv
Page 1 and 2: THOMAS J. WATSON JR. INSTITUTE FOR
Page 3 and 4: Occasional Paper #43 HUMANITARIAN A
Page 5: CONTENTS Foreword by Larry Minear .
Page 8 and 9: able. At the same time, he finds hu
Page 10 and 11: design. Recent practice suggests pr
Page 12 and 13: I am always tempted to reply that
Page 14 and 15: Other writers have echoed the same
Page 18 and 19: placed may cause conflict with near
Page 21 and 22: CHAPTER 1 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE Th
Page 23 and 24: women and children, but he insisted
Page 25 and 26: medicine than could be absorbed by
Page 27 and 28: diverting relief assistance intende
Page 29 and 30: The conflict-prolonging effect was
Page 31 and 32: supplies are needed for military pu
Page 33 and 34: CHAPTER 2 THE CONFLICT CONNECTION T
Page 35 and 36: transship illicit goods like narcot
Page 37 and 38: the troops as their logistics line
Page 39 and 40: Similar questions arise from the ca
Page 41 and 42: opposite effect. However, this conc
Page 43 and 44: shortfalls and modify its negotiati
Page 45 and 46: of aid imbalances favoring the refu
Page 47 and 48: MSF was confronted with displaced L
Page 49 and 50: Some donors—the United States was
Page 51: ties. In some cases belligerents ma
Page 54 and 55: for belligerents. The capacity of b
Page 56 and 57: support humanitarian operations wit
Page 58 and 59: In an indication of how difficult i
Page 60 and 61: antagonism. The key appears to be k
Page 63 and 64: CHAPTER 4 HUMANITARIAN ACTION AND C
Page 65 and 66: of a new police force and army, and
Page 67 and 68:
provided additional resources rapid
Page 69 and 70:
accords in Guatemala made the flow
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occurred in the absence of the inte
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work Agreement]—the return of dis
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tance of coordination of policy amo
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lines in this area. The Japanese, C
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UNDP operation, became involved in
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on conflict. Similar institutional
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION This monograph
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would have happened in the absence
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ut because the principal impacts ar
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NOTES Introduction 1. Clare Short,
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International Capabilities for Prev
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children through the International
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Forum, ICRC, Geneva, June 1998, 4.
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30. As quoted in Philip Gourevitch,
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Chapter 4 1. Michael Pugh has descr
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Conflict (Paris: OECD DAC Informal
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APPENDIX I ACRONYMS BRC CIDA CIS Co
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APPENDIX II RESOURCES FOR FURTHER R
Page 108 and 109:
action and peacekeeping, and the ro
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WIIS • 2 Stimson Ave. • Brown U
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