Brown Cover OP 43 - The Watson Institute for International Studies

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able. At the same time, he finds humanitarian agencies more often to be bit players than lead actors in exacerbating, mitigating, or transforming conflict. The situation as he presents it varies, of course, from conflict to conflict and from humanitarian response to response. Those who have chastised aid organizations for fueling conflicts willy-nilly and those who have exonerated them because of their expressed humanitarian motivations will find MacFarlane’s analysis instructive. Those who believe that humanitarian actors should limit themselves to the relief of suffering, eschewing a broader agenda, and those who see the humanitarian imperative embracing the wider challenge of transforming conflict also will find much food for thought. This study concludes the publication of research that has been underway since late 1997 on institutional learning and change among humanitarian organizations in the post-Cold War period, comprising Phase 3 of the Humanitarianism and War Project. Phase 4, now under way, involves distilling the lessons identified since the beginning of the Project in 1991 and disseminating the Project’s findings more actively. We are committed to monitoring and addressing the issues framed in this study, and we welcome reactions from readers. We are reachable at our new home at Tufts University, as described in Appendix III. This Occasional Paper, like its predecessors, may be downloaded in full from the website at www.hwproject.tufts.edu. Larry Minear, Director Humanitarianism and War Project December 2000 vi
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This monograph considers the impact of humanitarian action on recent armed conflicts. The proposition that humanitarian initiatives fuel conflict has been an important element of the critique of international responses to war-related need, constituting indeed a fundamental challenge to the humanitarian imperative. Concern about exacerbating conflict through humanitarian action may also reduce the flow of resources from donors to aid agencies. But the connection can also be positive. The view that humanitarian action can and should be designed to promote peace has influenced the programs of agencies operating in complex emergencies. The monograph begins by articulating four viewpoints comprising what might be called the spectrum of opinion on the conflict connection: 1. Fidelity to the humanitarian imperative and suspicion of the intrusion of political factors into program design and implementation (that is, the classical humanitarian position); 2. Damage limitation (that is, the attempt to avoid doing harm in the process of providing assistance and protection); 3. Conflict transformation (that is, the use of humanitarian action to promote peace); and 4. Aid for victory (that is, the use of humanitarian action to secure the victory of one party or another). The study concentrates on the second and third positions, which represent the focus of recent debate. After a discussion of historical experience, the analysis turns to the ways in which humanitarian action can exacerbate or prolong conflict (position 2). The discussion places particular emphasis on the role of humanitarian assistance in the political economy of war, on issues related to protection of victims and humanitarian personnel, and on dilemmas of proportionality. This is followed by an evaluation of strategies for mitigating the negative impact of humanitarian action on conflict and for the promotion of conflict resolution through humanitarian assistance (position 3). With respect to the issue of damage limitation, the monograph concludes that aid can have significant conflict-fueling effects and that these should be taken into account in program vii
Page 1 and 2: THOMAS J. WATSON JR. INSTITUTE FOR
Page 3 and 4: Occasional Paper #43 HUMANITARIAN A
Page 5: CONTENTS Foreword by Larry Minear .
Page 10 and 11: design. Recent practice suggests pr
Page 12 and 13: I am always tempted to reply that
Page 14 and 15: Other writers have echoed the same
Page 16 and 17: sures be contained. The formation o
Page 18 and 19: placed may cause conflict with near
Page 21 and 22: CHAPTER 1 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE Th
Page 23 and 24: women and children, but he insisted
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Page 27 and 28: diverting relief assistance intende
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Page 31 and 32: supplies are needed for military pu
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Page 35 and 36: transship illicit goods like narcot
Page 37 and 38: the troops as their logistics line
Page 39 and 40: Similar questions arise from the ca
Page 41 and 42: opposite effect. However, this conc
Page 43 and 44: shortfalls and modify its negotiati
Page 45 and 46: of aid imbalances favoring the refu
Page 47 and 48: MSF was confronted with displaced L
Page 49 and 50: Some donors—the United States was
Page 51: ties. In some cases belligerents ma
Page 54 and 55: for belligerents. The capacity of b
Page 56 and 57: support humanitarian operations wit
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In an indication of how difficult i
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antagonism. The key appears to be k
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CHAPTER 4 HUMANITARIAN ACTION AND C
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of a new police force and army, and
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provided additional resources rapid
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accords in Guatemala made the flow
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occurred in the absence of the inte
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work Agreement]—the return of dis
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tance of coordination of policy amo
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lines in this area. The Japanese, C
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UNDP operation, became involved in
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on conflict. Similar institutional
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION This monograph
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would have happened in the absence
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ut because the principal impacts ar
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NOTES Introduction 1. Clare Short,
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International Capabilities for Prev
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children through the International
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Forum, ICRC, Geneva, June 1998, 4.
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30. As quoted in Philip Gourevitch,
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Chapter 4 1. Michael Pugh has descr
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Conflict (Paris: OECD DAC Informal
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APPENDIX I ACRONYMS BRC CIDA CIS Co
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APPENDIX II RESOURCES FOR FURTHER R
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action and peacekeeping, and the ro
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WIIS • 2 Stimson Ave. • Brown U
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Brown Cover OP 43 - The Watson Institute for International Studies

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