Brown Cover OP 43 - The Watson Institute for International Studies

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in the conflict connection that were apparent during the Cold War era have persisted. In the 1990s, the impact of aid on conflict has had to do less with the desire of donor states to take sides than it has with the character of war. Four aspects of the nature of current conflict are important here, most of them having been present in various forms and to varying degrees in pre-1990s conflict. As described in Politics and Humanitarian Action, the change from Cold War to post-Cold War conflict is a matter of degree rather than kind. Since the post-Cold War context is discussed in detail in other Occasional Papers, the discussion here is limited to how change in the landscape of humanitarian action has affected the conflict connection specifically. In the first place, the superpowers frequently used humanitarian assistance as an instrument of the Cold War. In many instances, this politicization of humanitarian assistance enhanced the capacity of their proxies to prosecute conflicts. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of bipolarity and of the global struggle between competing truths removed a major political impulse to deploy humanitarian assistance as an instrument of geopolitical struggle. This structural transformation in world politics created a wider space for impartial and neutral humanitarian action. While one might have expected that the connection between humanitarian action and conflict would have weakened, it did not, for reasons identified below. Second, changes in state perspectives concerning refugees have shifted international practice towards toward discouraging cross-border flight and instead servicing the needs of vulnerable populations within the borders of their state of origin. These changes have rendered relief agencies increasingly dependent on belligerents for access, creating significant potential for diversion of relief to military purpose. Victim populations are more vulnerable when they receive assistance and their exposure fosters leakage of goods to military forces at the local level. Such conflict-fueling effects are likely to be exacerbated in weak or failing states and fragmented societies. Since the logistics exercised by parties to such conflict are often weak and overextended, forces in the field have an incentive to steal relief, while those in authority often are too weak to stop them even if they wanted to. Indeed, as discussed in Politics and Humanitarian Action, belligerents on occasion move populations to areas where 10
supplies are needed for military purposes, replacing their own logistical chain with that of humanitarian agencies. Third, post-Cold War conflict has exacerbated the problem of distinguishing between civilians and combatants. Where conflict is not between states over territory or resources but between communities over identity if not even survival, the lines become blurred. People tend to alternate between civilian and military tasks. Where war takes place within rather than between states, violence tends to occur within areas populated by civilians. 18 They are in frequent contact with “military” units. Irregular units in a particular area may be composed of local people. The difficulty of distinguishing in war between combatant and noncombatant populations enhances the potential for diversion of assistance that sustains military forces, escalating and prolonging war. Much of the above reflects a more general proposition. The internal quality of war, its embeddedness in the civilian population, the difficulties of discriminating between military and civilian personnel, the breakdown of law and order, and weak lines of authority and the economic agendas of some combatants all contribute to the chaotic quality of modern conflict. The chaos inherent in this environment encourages outsiders to seek protection as they do their jobs. In this quest for protection, they frequently become dependent on the parties or on local military formations. The price is payment for the service. This applies not only to outsiders; local populations caught up in the violence also purchase protection. Humanitarian assistance is one way to pay. In both instances, such payment, in cash or kind, may increase the capacity of combat and political forces to sustain the conflict. Humanitarian organizations may be protected instead by international forces engaged in peace support operations. However, reliance on international military forces may jeopardize neutrality, since these forces are frequently linked to international political agendas. Conclusion Humanitarian action has frequently been manipulated by the parties in order to influence processes of conflict. Examples 11
Page 1 and 2: THOMAS J. WATSON JR. INSTITUTE FOR
Page 3 and 4: Occasional Paper #43 HUMANITARIAN A
Page 5: CONTENTS Foreword by Larry Minear .
Page 8 and 9: able. At the same time, he finds hu
Page 10 and 11: design. Recent practice suggests pr
Page 12 and 13: I am always tempted to reply that
Page 14 and 15: Other writers have echoed the same
Page 16 and 17: sures be contained. The formation o
Page 18 and 19: placed may cause conflict with near
Page 21 and 22: CHAPTER 1 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE Th
Page 23 and 24: women and children, but he insisted
Page 25 and 26: medicine than could be absorbed by
Page 27 and 28: diverting relief assistance intende
Page 29: The conflict-prolonging effect was
Page 33 and 34: CHAPTER 2 THE CONFLICT CONNECTION T
Page 35 and 36: transship illicit goods like narcot
Page 37 and 38: the troops as their logistics line
Page 39 and 40: Similar questions arise from the ca
Page 41 and 42: opposite effect. However, this conc
Page 43 and 44: shortfalls and modify its negotiati
Page 45 and 46: of aid imbalances favoring the refu
Page 47 and 48: MSF was confronted with displaced L
Page 49 and 50: Some donors—the United States was
Page 51: ties. In some cases belligerents ma
Page 54 and 55: for belligerents. The capacity of b
Page 56 and 57: support humanitarian operations wit
Page 58 and 59: In an indication of how difficult i
Page 60 and 61: antagonism. The key appears to be k
Page 63 and 64: CHAPTER 4 HUMANITARIAN ACTION AND C
Page 65 and 66: of a new police force and army, and
Page 67 and 68: provided additional resources rapid
Page 69 and 70: accords in Guatemala made the flow
Page 71 and 72: occurred in the absence of the inte
Page 73 and 74: work Agreement]—the return of dis
Page 75 and 76: tance of coordination of policy amo
Page 77 and 78: lines in this area. The Japanese, C
Page 79 and 80: UNDP operation, became involved in
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on conflict. Similar institutional
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION This monograph
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would have happened in the absence
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ut because the principal impacts ar
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NOTES Introduction 1. Clare Short,
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International Capabilities for Prev
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children through the International
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Forum, ICRC, Geneva, June 1998, 4.
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30. As quoted in Philip Gourevitch,
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Chapter 4 1. Michael Pugh has descr
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Conflict (Paris: OECD DAC Informal
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APPENDIX I ACRONYMS BRC CIDA CIS Co
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APPENDIX II RESOURCES FOR FURTHER R
Page 108 and 109:
action and peacekeeping, and the ro
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WIIS • 2 Stimson Ave. • Brown U
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Brown Cover OP 43 - The Watson Institute for International Studies

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