Brown Cover OP 43 - The Watson Institute for International Studies

More documents

Recommendations

Info

societies, humanitarian action may have indirect impacts on relations between communities in conflict. One issue where this arises is disproportionality in delivery. 26 Past studies by the Humanitarianism and War Project have identified a structural tendency toward disproportionality in civil wars. One element of this problem concerns insurgent areas controlled by groups opposing the government. 27 The underserving of such areas and their populations may have significant implications for the course of conflict. First, disproportionality may affect the outcome of conflict, deliberately or inadvertently. In the civil war in Mozambique, difficulties encountered by international agencies in aiding people in areas controlled by insurgent Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) forces led to the concentration of assistance in government-held zones. This attracted people from insurgent-held areas and legitimized the role of the government in the eyes of affected groups. The Nagorno-Karabakh case suggests that failure to provide proportional assistance to insurgent areas may encourage a belief by the insurgents that they can rely only on themselves. By reducing international leverage, this may foster intransigence and impede political settlement. Moreover, where international organizations are attempting to mediate a settlement, the failure to engage humanitarian needs in insurgent areas in a proportional fashion encourages the belief by the party in question that international actors are biased in favor of state authorities. 28 In Liberia, At no time was an autonomous United Nations operation openly contemplated for rebel-held areas, a shortcoming with serious humanitarian and political consequences. It left many civilians outside the ECOMOG [Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group] security zone bereft of UN assistance and confirmed the suspicions of the NPFL [National Patriotic Front of Liberia] that UN humanitarian organizations, like their UN political counterparts, had an antiinsurgent bias. 29 Similar effects were reported in Rwanda, where perceptions 24
of aid imbalances favoring the refugee camps in Zaire contributed to deteriorating relations between the Rwandan government and international agencies. The resentment is evident in remarks of General (and later President) Paul Kagamé: You see, the experience of Rwanda since 1994 has left me with no faith in these international organizations. Very little faith. In fact, I think we should start accusing these people who actually supported the camps, spent a million dollars a day in these camps, gave support to these groups to rebuild themselves into a force, militarized refugees. 30 As one group of analysts stated, “[the refugee camps] represented for the Rwandan government not only a major affront but also a major security threat.” 31 A recent analysis of the impact of aid on conflict in Sri Lanka notes a similar perception of disproportionality and non-neutrality among the Sinhalese population of the island and advocates an island-wide approach to assistance. 32 Disproportionality in delivery affects the perceptions of the parties and may exacerbate violence. In Sudan, perceptions of disproportional assistance to particular groups have provoked other groups into raiding activity directed at the beneficiaries. In Somalia, aid imbalances fueled interfaction fighting in Mogadishu. Practitioners also expressed concern that the concentration of their activities in stable areas might provoke others to attack these areas. One diplomat said, “We don’t want to tip regional balances by overconcentrating in stable areas,” and added, “Will that be potentially destabilizing and create a target?” 33 Here too, however, the argument can be taken too far. With regard to the effects of disproportionality on perceptions of neutrality, it is worth noting that there is no necessary connection between neutrality and effectiveness in mediation: If the acceptance of mediation is based on a cost-benefit calculation, then the assumption that mediators must be perceived as impartial needs to be revised. The mediator’s impartiality is not as important to the adversaries’ decision 25
Page 1 and 2: THOMAS J. WATSON JR. INSTITUTE FOR
Page 3 and 4: Occasional Paper #43 HUMANITARIAN A
Page 5: CONTENTS Foreword by Larry Minear .
Page 8 and 9: able. At the same time, he finds hu
Page 10 and 11: design. Recent practice suggests pr
Page 12 and 13: I am always tempted to reply that
Page 14 and 15: Other writers have echoed the same
Page 16 and 17: sures be contained. The formation o
Page 18 and 19: placed may cause conflict with near
Page 21 and 22: CHAPTER 1 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE Th
Page 23 and 24: women and children, but he insisted
Page 25 and 26: medicine than could be absorbed by
Page 27 and 28: diverting relief assistance intende
Page 29 and 30: The conflict-prolonging effect was
Page 31 and 32: supplies are needed for military pu
Page 33 and 34: CHAPTER 2 THE CONFLICT CONNECTION T
Page 35 and 36: transship illicit goods like narcot
Page 37 and 38: the troops as their logistics line
Page 39 and 40: Similar questions arise from the ca
Page 41 and 42: opposite effect. However, this conc
Page 43: shortfalls and modify its negotiati
Page 47 and 48: MSF was confronted with displaced L
Page 49 and 50: Some donors—the United States was
Page 51: ties. In some cases belligerents ma
Page 54 and 55: for belligerents. The capacity of b
Page 56 and 57: support humanitarian operations wit
Page 58 and 59: In an indication of how difficult i
Page 60 and 61: antagonism. The key appears to be k
Page 63 and 64: CHAPTER 4 HUMANITARIAN ACTION AND C
Page 65 and 66: of a new police force and army, and
Page 67 and 68: provided additional resources rapid
Page 69 and 70: accords in Guatemala made the flow
Page 71 and 72: occurred in the absence of the inte
Page 73 and 74: work Agreement]—the return of dis
Page 75 and 76: tance of coordination of policy amo
Page 77 and 78: lines in this area. The Japanese, C
Page 79 and 80: UNDP operation, became involved in
Page 81 and 82: on conflict. Similar institutional
Page 83 and 84: CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION This monograph
Page 85 and 86: would have happened in the absence
Page 87 and 88: ut because the principal impacts ar
Page 89 and 90: NOTES Introduction 1. Clare Short,
Page 91 and 92: International Capabilities for Prev
Page 93 and 94: children through the International
Page 95 and 96:
Forum, ICRC, Geneva, June 1998, 4.
Page 97 and 98:
30. As quoted in Philip Gourevitch,
Page 99 and 100:
Chapter 4 1. Michael Pugh has descr
Page 101 and 102:
Conflict (Paris: OECD DAC Informal
Page 103 and 104:
APPENDIX I ACRONYMS BRC CIDA CIS Co
Page 105:
APPENDIX II RESOURCES FOR FURTHER R
Page 108 and 109:
action and peacekeeping, and the ro
Page 110:
WIIS • 2 Stimson Ave. • Brown U
show all

Brown Cover OP 43 - The Watson Institute for International Studies

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?