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Brown Cover OP 43 - The Watson Institute for International Studies

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Although relief agencies were committed to assisting the<br />

most vulnerable people, the army and the civil service—and their<br />

extended families—were supplied first. As author John Stremlau<br />

said, “<strong>The</strong> only way <strong>for</strong> Ojukwu to placate the military and the<br />

civil service as conditions worsened was to allow them direct and<br />

ample access to relief materials.” This was possible because of<br />

poor agency control over distribution, the role of the government’s<br />

Directorate of Food Supply in the distribution of food, and the<br />

involvement of Biafrans sympathetic to the government in the<br />

distribution ef<strong>for</strong>t. “Unrestricted access” of government personnel<br />

to relief supplies ensured the continuation of the military<br />

ef<strong>for</strong>t and the functioning of the state structure.<br />

Finally, agencies extended activities from relief to the encouragement<br />

of self-sufficiency by expanding agricultural production<br />

and providing seed and agricultural implements to the<br />

population of rebel-held areas. Jointchurchaid, <strong>for</strong> example, set<br />

up food production committees in every province in the enclave<br />

to create demonstration plots, assess need <strong>for</strong> seeds, and oversee<br />

distribution of agricultural equipment. <strong>The</strong> nongovernmental<br />

organization CARITAS shipped 100 tons of maize seeds from<br />

Colombia to assist in the operation, and converted sports grounds<br />

around missions to food production. <strong>The</strong> particular focus on<br />

cassava—which Ojukwu referred to as Biafra’s “secret<br />

weapon”—sustained the population’s carbohydrate reserves<br />

much longer than was expected. 15<br />

<strong>The</strong> experience in Biafra exemplifies the most painful dilemmas<br />

faced by humanitarian agencies in dealing with the conflict<br />

connection. <strong>The</strong>ir activities sustained many people who would<br />

have died otherwise. Yet, they also sustained the rebel regime,<br />

provided cover <strong>for</strong> its arms import program, and prolonged the<br />

war.<br />

<strong>The</strong> airlift and the broader relief ef<strong>for</strong>t … was an act of<br />

un<strong>for</strong>tunate and profound folly. It prolonged the war by<br />

eighteen months … A great deal of postwar ef<strong>for</strong>t went<br />

into refuting the charge that the churches and NGOs<br />

prolonged the war. Because if it is true, they must also<br />

have prolonged the suffering, contributing to the deaths<br />

of 180,000 people or more. 16<br />

8

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