Protector or predator? - Institute for Security Studies

Protector or predator?
A five-month investigation by the Public Protector and Special Investigating Unit
(SIU) into the allegations found that both the Minister of Public Works, Gwen
Mahlangu-Nkabinda, and Cele had acted improperly and illegally by approving
funds for the leases of two buildings without it going out to tender, and that police
deliberately manipulated the needs analyses to align them with Shabangu’s
building. 89
Less than two weeks after the release of the Public Protector’s first report,
SAPS intelligence officials arrived at the office of the Public Protector and requested
documents pertaining to the report. Their actions were widely perceived
as police intimidation. The officers involved were briefly suspended before being
reinstated in their positions as Crime Intelligence officials. These findings of
integrity-related shortcomings involving the most senior of police officials are
sure to damage the confidence of both the pubic and many honest police officials
in the leadership of the SAPS. It also raises serious questions about political interference
in the SAPS, and throws the organisation’s independence into doubt.
At the time of writing the President had not yet acted on the recommendations of
the Public Protector that action be taken against those involved in the maladministration
and illegal behaviour related to the leases in question.
OrGANiSATiONAl CHAllENGES OF trANSFOrmATiON
To understand current corruption within the SAPS, it is useful to briefly examine
the history and transformation of the organisation and the current ‘task environment’
in which it operates. During apartheid, the police force was not constituted
to provide services to all communities equally. 90 Its main concern was to suppress
popular resistance to the apartheid state and enforce its racist laws. As a
result, the organisation was highly centralised and secretive. Although there is
no way of knowing the full extent to which corruption was occurring, there is
evidence that it existed throughout the organisation. 91
Democracy in South Africa was predicated upon political agreements that
prevented radical transformation of the police force. The ‘sunset clause’, through
which apartheid public servants were guaranteed their jobs for five years following
the 1994 elections, was one such agreement. There was also agreement on
mass recruitment of individuals from subsidiary and informal policing structures
such as the ‘kitskonstabels’ 92 , and the railway and municipal police. Many of
those recruited into the new police service had received little or no professional
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