Kultur in Gefahr - ITI

70 Artistic Expression in a Corporate World
Artistic Expression in a Corporate World 71
is no reason to treat the digital world any differently from the world we
know thus far. The fact is that strong violent imaginations construct the
moral make-up of viewers and users, and also that of games, and this
influences indirectly their day-to-day behaviour. Not only are regulations
desirable from this perspective, but also because of the immanent threat
for diversity as a consequence of market developments. Actually, the field
of games is very much conglomerated. There are three major industrial
players who dominate the market, and it is not inconceivable that this
number will be reduced to two in the near future. Of course, there are many
others who are trying to find a place under the digital sun, but they are
pushed away more and more from public attention by the omnipresence of
the big three.
What to do? Where is the access for regulations? There is an
urgent need for public authorities to support, with subsidies and other
facilities, the production of a great diversity of games. Otherwise this
interesting interactive cultural field will be left to a couple of dominant
market forces. On the side of outlets the question is less easy to answer.
Actually, there are two equally important instances of distribution.
Potential players buy a game in a shop, then adapt it to their requirements
on the internet and pay there a second time accordingly. To regulate the
internet in this field, as in the digital examples given up here by Garry Neil
would not make sense. Players, who have bought a game in a shop will
steer their mouse straightforwardly to the site of the company from which
they have bought the game. Would this then mean that the only remaining
starting-point for regulating is the shop? Until now we have tried to avoid
taking shops as the point of regulation, because in the case of publishing,
it would prove difficult to get a grip on the stock in shops. In the case of
games, one can buy them in a number of different outlets. Getting a grip on
them is nearly a mission impossible; a limited number of outlets are
relatively easier to regulate, monitor and assess than dispersed ones. So,
the question how to regulate the distribution of games stays, thus far,
unanswered, but is nevertheless relevant.
(b) After this exposé on the at least variable content regulations, the
second option of content regulations is the must carry system, that might
also be called the essential facility doctrine under US law that says that an
enterprise that controls a specific channel of communication must open it
up to more suppliers than just the owner of the essential facility (Germann
2003: 121). This approach requires monopolists or dominant players on the
cultural market to give third-party access to rivals on terms that are fair
and non-discriminatory. (Doyle 2002: 169). If a cultural enterprise in the
field of production, distribution or promotion (or all of them at the same
time) is very strongly present on the cultural market (at the moment this
cannot be avoided) then it should get a public task to fulfil. This will
ensure that cultural diversity continues to exist, despite the market
dominant position of this specific enterprise. The public task is to be the
carrier of diversity without interfering editorially or otherwise in the artistic
choice of what selected independent producers and distributors wish to
offer to the public.
The must carry system is a crucial one because it regulates that
access to all different kinds of content is available and possible.
Obviously, all the social and cultural objectives of other regulations in
favour of cultural diversity through such mechanisms as quotas,
subsidies, tax systems and so on could not be met if viewers or listeners
cannot find access to this content.
(c) Maybe one of the most challenging forms of content regulations is
the system clearly defining that cultural products from one foreign country
may not have a market share larger than, for example, ten, twenty or twenty
five per cent. One may call this the no more than alternative. It limits the
market share. This is an attractive form because it keeps the cultural market
open for cultural creations from everywhere in the world. However, there
should not be one foreign source that overwhelms local cultural life
substantially. The basic principle here is that: this regulation is not about
exclusion, but does make sure that there is space for the presentation of a
wide range of diverse cultural options.
For instance, in South Korea the Broadcasting Act limits foreign
content to 20 per cent for terrestrial channels, 30 per cent for cable
channels, or up to 50 per cent if the cable programs concern technology
and science, culture, or sports. However, Daeho Kim and Seok-Keyong
Hong remark that the ratio of foreign content does not even reach this
level. ‘Thus, it can be said that the quota is a normative line rather than a
practical restraint.’ (Kim 2001: 79).
The no more than alternative is not directed against one specific
country, or any specific cultural enterprise. It just signals that foreign
content, or productions coming from one other single source, have a too
dominant presence on the local cultural market and push aside the variety