Public Economics Lectures Part 1: Introduction

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Diamond and Sheshinski 1995 Individuals have different disutilities of working ψ i To max social welfare, not desirable for those with high ψ i to work. First best: Individual i works iff Marginal product > ψ i But govt observes only an imperfect signal of ψ i → sets a higher threshold for disability Result: lower benefit rate if screening mechanism has higher noise to signal ratio Public Economics Lectures () Part 6: Social Insurance 149 / 207
Empirical Evidence: Bound-Parsons Debate Question: Did increase in DI benefits cause decline in labor supply? Well-known debate between Bound & Parsons in 1980s Parsons (1980) Uses cross-sectional variation in replacement rates Data on men aged 45-59 in 1966-69 NLSY OLS regression: LFP i = α + βDIreprate i + ε i where DIreprate is calculated using wage in 1966 Finds elasticity of 0.6 Simulations using this elasticity imply that increase in DI can completely explain decline in elderly labor force participation Public Economics Lectures () Part 6: Social Insurance 150 / 207
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Public Economics Lectures Part 1: I
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Motivation 1: Practical Relevance I
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Motivation 2: Academic Interest Pub
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Methodological Themes 1 Micro-based
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Federal Government Revenue and Expe
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Federal Revenues (% of total revenu
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Federal Spending (% of total spendi
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Government Intervention in the Econ
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First Role for Government: Improve
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First Welfare Theorem Private marke
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Failure 2: Asymmetric Information a
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Individual Failures Recent addition
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Why Limit Government Intervention?
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Three Types of Questions in Public
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References on Tax Incidence Kotliko
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Economic vs. Statutory Incidence Eq
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Overview of Literature Ideally, we
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Partial Equilibrium Model: Setup Tw
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Partial Equilibrium Model: Supply P
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Tax Levied on Producers Price S+t $
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Perfectly Inelastic Demand Price D
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Formula for Tax Incidence Implicitl
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Tax Incidence with Salience Effects
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Chetty et al.: Empirical Framework
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Chetty et al.: Strategy 1 Experimen
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TABLE 1 Evaluation of Tags: Classro
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Period Effect of Posting TaxInclu
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Period Effect of Posting TaxInclu
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Chetty et al.: Strategy 2 Compare e
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Per Capita Beer Consumption and Sta
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Evaluating Empirical Studies Consid
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Cigarette Taxation: Background Ciga
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Evans, Ringel, and Stech (1999) Exp
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Public Economics Lectures () Part 2
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Triple Difference Some studies use
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Fixed Effects Include time and stat
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Evans, Ringel, and Stech (1999) Imp
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Evans, Ringel, and Stech: Incidence
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Evans, Ringel, and Stech: Demand El
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Evans, Ringel, and Stech: Long Run
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Hastings and Washington 2008 Questi
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Rothstein 2008 How does EITC affect
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Rothstein: Empirical Strategy Two m
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DFL Reweighting Widely used method
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Rothstein: Results Basic DFL compar
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Rothstein: Results Ultimately uses
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Extensions of Basic Partial Equilib
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Extensions of Basic Partial Equilib
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Harberger 1962 Two Sector Model 1 F
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Harberger Model: Effect of Tax Incr
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Harberger Model: Main Effects 2. Ou
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Harberger Model: Main Effects 3. Su
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Computable General Equilibrium Mode
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Criticism of CGE Models Findings ve
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Open Economy Application: Framework
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Open Economy Application: Empirics
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Feldstein and Horioka 1980 Second s
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Open Economy Applications: Empirics
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Capitalization and the Asset Price
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Empirical Applications 1 [Cutler 19
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Cutler 1988 First, compute excess r
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Cutler: Results Cutler finds ˆb =
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Linden and Rockoff: Results Find ho
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Excess Returns Around Drug Approval
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Distribution of Excess Returns arou
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Mandated Benefits We have focused u
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Mandated Benefits: Simple Model Lab
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Mandated Benefit Wage Rate S w 1 B
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Mandated Benefits: Incidence Formul
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Gruber 1994 Studies state mandates
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Acemoglu and Angrist 2001 Look at e
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Acemoglu and Angrist 2001 Acemoglu
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Public Economics Lectures Part 3: E
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Definition Incidence analysis: effe
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Effi ciency Cost: Introduction Gove
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Partial Equilibrium Model: Setup Tw
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Price Excess Burden of Taxation S $
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Effi ciency Cost: Marshallian Surpl
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EB Increases with Square of Tax Rat
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P P 3 P 2 P 1 S+t 1 +t 2 S+t 1 E B
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Tax Policy Implications With many g
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General Model: Demand and Indirect
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Path Dependence Problem Initial pri
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Consumer Surplus: Conceptual Proble
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Compensating and Equivalent Variati
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Equivalent Variation Measures utili
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Effi ciency Cost Formulas with Inco
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Compensating vs. Equivalent Variati
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Marshallian Surplus p h(V(p 1 ,Z))
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Excess Burden Deadweight burden: ch
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p h(V(p 1 ,Z)) ~ h(V(p 0 ,Z)) p 1 M
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Implementable Excess Burden Formula
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Harberger Formula Without pre-exist
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Goulder and Williams 2003 Show that
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Goulder and Williams Formula Obtain
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Goulder and Williams Results Calibr
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Harberger vs. Hausman Approach Unde
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Primitives Sufficient Stats. Welfar
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Heterogeneity Benefit of suff stat
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Discrete Choice Model Recast as pla
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Effi ciency Cost: Applications 1 [I
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Feldstein Model: Setup Government l
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Taxable Income Formula Simplicity o
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Excess Burden with Transfer Costs L
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Gorodnichenko, Martinez-Vazquez, an
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Poterba 1992 Estimates effi ciency
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Porterba: Results Tax reforms in 19
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Price and Tax Elasticities By Year
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Welfare Analysis in Behavioral Mode
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Behavioral Welfare Economics: Two A
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Behavioral Welfare Economics: Two A
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Bernheim and Rangel 2009: Choice Se
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Bernheim and Rangel 2009: Compensat
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Bernheim and Rangel 2009: Refinemen
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Welfare Analysis with Salience Effe
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Welfare Analysis with Salience Effe
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Preference Recovery Assumptions A1
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Excess Burden with No Income Effect
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Effi ciency Cost with Income Effect
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Directions for Further Work on Beha
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Outline 1 Commodity Taxation I: Ram
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Second Welfare Theorem Starting poi
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Four Central Results in Optimal Tax
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Ramsey Model: Key Assumptions 1 Lum
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Ramsey Model: Consumer Behavior Lag
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Ramsey Model: Government’s Proble
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Ramsey Formula: Perturbation Argume
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Ramsey Formula: Compensated Elastic
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Special Case 1: Inverse Elasticity
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Special Case 2: Uniform Taxation Th
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Diamond 1975: Many-Person Model H i
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Diamond: Many-Person Optimal Tax Fo
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Diamond: Optimal Transfer In this m
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Lipsey and Lancaster (1956): Theory
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Diamond and Mirrlees Model Two good
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Consumer’s Offer Curve Public Eco
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Production Set with Revenue Require
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Second Best: Optimal Distortionary
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Diamond and Mirrlees: General Model
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Proof of Production Effi ciency Res
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Policy Consequences: Public Sector
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Policy Consequences: No Taxation of
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Policy Consequences: No Taxation of
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Diamond and Mirrlees: Optimal Tax R
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Diamond and Mirrlees Result: Limita
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Key Concepts for Taxes/Transfers Le
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Optimal Income Tax with No Behavior
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Mirrlees 1971: Incorporating Behavi
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Mirrlees: Subsequent Work Mirrlees
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Revenue-Maximizing Tax Rate: Laffer
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Optimal Top Income Tax Rate { } dM
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Optimal Top Income Tax Rate In US t
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Connection to Revenue Maximizing Ta
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General Non-Linear Income Tax Optim
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Numerical Simulations of Optimal Ta
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Numerical Simulations Use formula e
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Commodity vs. Income Taxation Now c
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Atkinson and Stiglitz: Commodity Ta
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Atkinson-Stiglitz: Proof Revenue un
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Atkinson-Stiglitz: Intuition With s
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Atkinson-Stiglitz: Implications for
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Chamley-Judd: Capital Taxation Judd
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Taxation and Savings: Evidence Key
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Optimal Transfer Programs Several t
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Optimal Transfers: Mirrless Model M
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Saez 2002: Participation Model Mode
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Saez 2002: Optimal Tax Formula Smal
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Mankiw and Weinzierl 2009 Tagging w
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Nichols and Zeckhauser 1982: In-Kin
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Soup Kitchen without Wait: Cash Tra
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Income Taxation as Insurance (Varia
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Varian Model: Private Insurance Var
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References Surveys in labor economi
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Baseline Labor-Leisure Choice Model
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Labor Supply Behavior First order c
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Econometric Problem 1: Unobserved H
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Measurement Error and Division Bias
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Extensive vs. Intensive Margin Rela
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Progressive Taxes and Labor Supply
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Example 1: Progressive Income Tax P
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Example 3: Social Security Payroll
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Progressive Taxes and Labor Supply
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Non-Linear Budget Set Estimation: V
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Likelihood Function: Located at the
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Hausman (1981) Application Hausman
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Saez 2009: Bunching at Kinks Saez o
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Public Economics Lectures ()Part 5:
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Earnings Density and the EITC: Wage
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Taxable Income Density, 1960-1969:
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Friedberg 2000: Social Security Ear
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Friedberg: Estimates Estimates elas
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Why not more bunching at kinks? 1 T
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Chetty et al. 2009: Model Firms pos
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Cost of Bunching at Bracket Cutoff
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Marginal Tax Rates in Denmark in 19
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All Wage Earners: Top Tax Bracket C
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Married Women Frequency 0 10000 200
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Married Female Professionals with A
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Married Women, 1994 Frequency 0 100
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Married Women at the Middle Tax: 10
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Married Women at the Middle Tax: 8%
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Distribution of Individuals’Deduc
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Teachers Wage Income: 1998 Frequenc
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Wage Earnings: Teachers with Deduct
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Distribution of Modes in Occupation
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SelfEmployed: Distribution around
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Estimates of Hours and Participatio
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Problems with Experimental Design E
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Instrumental Variable Methods Anoth
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Mroz 1987: Setup and Results Uses b
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Eissa 1995: Caveats Does the common
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Bianchi, Gudmundsson, and Zoega 200
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Bianchi, Gudmundsson, and Zoega 200
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Overall Costs of Anti Poverty Progr
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Monthly Welfare Case Loads: 1963-20
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Behavioral Responses to the EITC 1
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Eissa and Liebman 1996 Study labor
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Eissa and Liebman: Results Find a s
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Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001 Analyze th
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Eissa and Hoynes 2004 EITC based on
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Meyer and Sullivan 2004 Examine the
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Relative Consumption: single women
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Meyer and Sullivan: Results Materia
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Changing Elasticities: Blau and Kah
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Intertemporal Models and the MaCurd
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Life Cycle Model: Time Separability
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Dynamic Life Cycle Model: Frisch El
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Frisch vs. Compensated vs. Uncompen
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Card Critique of ITLS models Critiq
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Blundell, Duncan, and Meghir 1998 C
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Blundell, Duncan, and Meghir: Resul
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Farber 2005: Division Bias Argues t
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Manoli and Weber 2009 Use variation
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Distribution of Tenure at Retiremen
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US Income Taxation: Trends The bigg
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Bottom 99% Tax Units 40% $40,000 35
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Feldstein 1995 First study of taxab
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Feldstein: Results Feldstein obtain
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Feldstein: Econometric Criticisms S
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18% 16% Wages SCorp. Partner. Sol
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Gruber and Saez 2002 First study to
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Gruber and Saez: Results Find an el
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Imbens et al. 2001: Income Effects
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Taxable Income Literature: Summary
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Prescott 2004 Uses data on hours wo
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Davis and Henrekson 2005 Run regres
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Optimization Frictions Many frictio
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Setup Consider a static demand mode
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Optimization Frictions Define agent
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Construction of Choice Set 151 150
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Identification with Optimization Fr
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Identification with Optimization Fr
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Calculation of Bounds on Structural
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) Lower Bound on Structural Elastic
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Application to Taxation and Labor S
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4.0 Bounds on IntensiveMargin Lab
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4.0 3.5 Bounds on IntensiveMargin
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Chetty and Saez 2009: Experimental
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Year 2 Earnings Distributions: 1 De
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Year 2 Wage Earnings Distributions:
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Labor Supply Elasticities: Implicat
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Chetty: Formula for Risk Aversion L
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u c ,u l w 0 u c (w 0 l,l) Case A:
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Chetty 2006: Results Labor supply e
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Outline 1 Motivations for Social In
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Growth of Social Insurance in the U
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Unemployment Benefit Systems in Dev
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Useful Background Reading 1 Institu
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Adverse Selection as a Motivation f
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Rothschild-Stiglitz: Key Assumption
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Rothschild-Stiglitz: Equilibrium De
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Rothschild-Stiglitz: Second Best So
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Adverse Selection: Empirical Eviden
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Aggregate Shocks as a Motivation fo
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Unemployment Insurance Start with U
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Replacement Rate Common measure of
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Baily-Chetty model Canonical analys
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Baily-Chetty model: Setup Static mo
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Baily-Chetty model: First Best Prob
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Baily-Chetty model: Second Best Pro
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Two Approaches to Optimal Social In
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Envelope Condition Why can ∂e ∂
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Suffi cient Statistic Approach to K
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Baily-Chetty model: Second Best Sol
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Baily-Chetty Consumption-Based Form
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Empirical Estimates: Duration Elast
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Hazard Models Define hazard rate h
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Meyer 1990 Meyer includes log UI be
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Consumption Smoothing Benefits of U
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Consumption Smoothing Benefits of U
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Calibrating the Model b ∗ Results
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Homeowners’Consumption around Une
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Commitments and Risk Aversion How d
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Commitments Model: Implications for
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Chetty 2008: Moral Hazard vs. Liqui
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Chetty 2008: Job Search Technology
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Chetty 2008: Value Functions Value
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Chetty 2008: Moral Hazard vs. Liqui
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Chetty 2008: Formula for Optimal UI
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Moral Hazard vs. Liquidity: Evidenc
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Figure 3a Effect of UI Benefits on
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Figure 3c Effect of UI Benefits on
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log UI ben 0.527 (0.267) TABLE 2
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Figure 5 Effect of Severance Pay on
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Figure 6b Effect of Severance Pay o
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Chetty 2008: Implications for Optim
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Figure 3 Frequency of Layoffs by Jo
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Page 721 and 722: Effect of Extended Benefits on Subs
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Page 725 and 726: Job Finding vs. Unemployment Exit H
Page 727 and 728: Effect of Benefit Expiration on Haz
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Page 743 and 744: Dynamics: Path of UI Benefits Class
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Page 747 and 748: Theory of Workers’Compensation Fo
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Page 755 and 756: Effect on Equilibrium Wage Workers
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Page 761: Theory of Disability Insurance Key
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Page 779 and 780: Health Insurance Arrow (1963): semi
Page 781 and 782: Health Care Spending in OECD Nation
Page 783 and 784: Americans’Source of Health Insura
Page 785 and 786: Growing Health Expenditures: Key Fa
Page 787 and 788: Market Failures and Government Inte
Page 789 and 790: Measuring Health Before discussing
Page 793 and 794: Optimal Govt. Intervention in Healt
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Ellis and McGuire: Optimal Payment
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Ellis and McGuire Model: Limitation
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Crowdout of Private Insurance So fa
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Currie and Gruber 1995: Benefits of
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Public Economics Lectures Part 7: P
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Public vs. Private Goods Private go
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Public Good Person 1’s Consumptio
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Public Goods Model: Setup Economy w
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First Best if G is Private To ident
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First Best if G is a Pure Public Go
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Samuelson (1954) Rule Condition for
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Model of Private Provision: Setup P
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Lindahl Equilibrium How to achieve
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Lindahl Equilibria: Key Properties
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Voting Model: Setup Suppose that pu
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Arrow (1951) and Single-Peaked Pref
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Median Voter Theorem With single-pe
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Median Voter Choice: Effi ciency In
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Optimal Second Best Provision of PG
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Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986)
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Bergstrom-Blume-Varian Model: Crowd
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BBV Model: Additional Results 1 Tot
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Empirical Evidence on Crowd-Out Two
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Hungerman 2005 Studies crowdout of
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Hungerman 2005 Estimates imply that
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Andreoni and Payne 2003 OLS still y
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Andreoni and Payne 2003 $1000 incre
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Andreoni 1988 Isaac, McCue, and Plo
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Andreoni 1993 Uses lab experiment t
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Andreoni 1993 Public good levels ar
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Financing PGs with Distortionary Ta
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PGs with Distortionary Taxes: Setup
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PGs with Distortionary Taxes: 1st B
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PGs with Distortionary Taxes: 2nd B
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Kreiner and Verdelin 2009 Consider
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Subsidies for Charity: Setup Warm-g
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Optimal Subsidies for Charity Resul
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Optimal Subsidies for Charity (Saez
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Empirical Evidence Existing studies
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Externalities: Outline 1 Definition
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Externalities: Main Questions 1 The
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Model of Externalities: Equilibrium
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Model of Externalities: Deadweight
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Remedies for Externalities 1 Coasia
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Coasian Solution: Limitations 1 Cos
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Price Pigouvian Tax SMC=PMC+MD S=PM
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Permits: Cap-and-Trade Cap total am
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Weitzman 1974: Market for Pollution
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Weitzman Model: Policy without Unce
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MB steep, Quantity regulation Publi
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Quantity Regulation Price Regulatio
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MB Flat, Quantity Regulation Public
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Quantity regulation Price Regulatio
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Optimal Second-Best Taxation with E
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Sandmo 1975: Setup Individual maxim
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Sandmo 1975: Additivity Result Main
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Double Dividend Debate Claim: gas t
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Externalities: Empirical Measuremen
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Brookshire et al. 1982 Infer willin
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Chay and Greenstone 2005 Conclusion
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Diamond and Hausman 1994 Describe p
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Becker and Murphy 1988 Show that ad
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Bernheim and Rangel 2004 Model of
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Public Economics Lectures Part 1: Introduction

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