Public Economics Lectures Part 1: Introduction

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Subsides for Private Provision of PGs: Charitable Giving Alternative to distortionary taxes is subsiding private provision. E.g. in the U.S., charitable contributions are tax deductible ($20 bil tax expenditure). Theoretical questions: Should we have such a subsidy? How large should such a subsidy be? What are the key determinants of the optimal subsidy? Empirical questions: How sensitive is charitable giving w.r.t. tax subsidies? Where does the money end up going (social value)? Public Economics Lectures () Part 7: Public Goods and Externalities 70 / 138
Subsidies for Charity: Setup Warm-glow model. Individual maximizes U(c, g) s.t. c + g = y − τ(y − θg) where θ measures degree of deductibility of charitable insurance. Price of giving $1 to charity is $1 − θτ. Define price and income elasticities: β = 1 − θτ g γ = y g · ∂g ∂y · ∂g = price elasticity of charitable giving ∂(1 − θτ) = income elasticity of charitable giving Public Economics Lectures () Part 7: Public Goods and Externalities 71 / 138
Page 1 and 2:
Public Economics Lectures Part 1: I
Page 3 and 4:
Motivation 1: Practical Relevance I
Page 5 and 6:
Motivation 2: Academic Interest Pub
Page 7 and 8:
Methodological Themes 1 Micro-based
Page 9 and 10:
Federal Government Revenue and Expe
Page 11 and 12:
Federal Revenues (% of total revenu
Page 13 and 14:
Federal Spending (% of total spendi
Page 15 and 16:
Government Intervention in the Econ
Page 17 and 18:
First Role for Government: Improve
Page 19 and 20:
First Welfare Theorem Private marke
Page 21 and 22:
Failure 2: Asymmetric Information a
Page 23 and 24:
Individual Failures Recent addition
Page 25 and 26:
Why Limit Government Intervention?
Page 27 and 28:
Three Types of Questions in Public
Page 29 and 30:
Page 31 and 32:
References on Tax Incidence Kotliko
Page 33 and 34:
Economic vs. Statutory Incidence Eq
Page 35 and 36:
Overview of Literature Ideally, we
Page 37 and 38:
Partial Equilibrium Model: Setup Tw
Page 39 and 40:
Partial Equilibrium Model: Supply P
Page 41 and 42:
Tax Levied on Producers Price S+t $
Page 43 and 44:
Perfectly Inelastic Demand Price D
Page 45 and 46:
Formula for Tax Incidence Implicitl
Page 47 and 48:
Tax Incidence with Salience Effects
Page 49 and 50:
Chetty et al.: Empirical Framework
Page 51 and 52:
Chetty et al.: Strategy 1 Experimen
Page 53 and 54:
TABLE 1 Evaluation of Tags: Classro
Page 55 and 56:
Period Effect of Posting TaxInclu
Page 57 and 58:
Period Effect of Posting TaxInclu
Page 59 and 60:
Chetty et al.: Strategy 2 Compare e
Page 61 and 62:
Per Capita Beer Consumption and Sta
Page 63 and 64:
Page 65 and 66:
Page 67 and 68:
Evaluating Empirical Studies Consid
Page 69 and 70:
Cigarette Taxation: Background Ciga
Page 71 and 72:
Evans, Ringel, and Stech (1999) Exp
Page 73 and 74:
Public Economics Lectures () Part 2
Page 75 and 76:
Triple Difference Some studies use
Page 77 and 78:
Fixed Effects Include time and stat
Page 79 and 80:
Evans, Ringel, and Stech (1999) Imp
Page 81 and 82:
Evans, Ringel, and Stech: Incidence
Page 83 and 84:
Evans, Ringel, and Stech: Demand El
Page 85 and 86:
Evans, Ringel, and Stech: Long Run
Page 87 and 88:
Page 89 and 90:
Hastings and Washington 2008 Questi
Page 91 and 92:
Page 93 and 94:
Page 95 and 96:
Rothstein 2008 How does EITC affect
Page 97 and 98:
Page 99 and 100:
Rothstein: Empirical Strategy Two m
Page 101 and 102:
DFL Reweighting Widely used method
Page 103 and 104:
Page 105 and 106:
Page 107 and 108:
Rothstein: Results Basic DFL compar
Page 109 and 110:
Rothstein: Results Ultimately uses
Page 111 and 112:
Extensions of Basic Partial Equilib
Page 113 and 114:
Extensions of Basic Partial Equilib
Page 115 and 116:
Harberger 1962 Two Sector Model 1 F
Page 117 and 118:
Harberger Model: Effect of Tax Incr
Page 119 and 120:
Harberger Model: Main Effects 2. Ou
Page 121 and 122:
Harberger Model: Main Effects 3. Su
Page 123 and 124:
Computable General Equilibrium Mode
Page 125 and 126:
Criticism of CGE Models Findings ve
Page 127 and 128:
Open Economy Application: Framework
Page 129 and 130:
Open Economy Application: Empirics
Page 131 and 132:
Feldstein and Horioka 1980 Second s
Page 133 and 134:
Open Economy Applications: Empirics
Page 135 and 136:
Capitalization and the Asset Price
Page 137 and 138:
Empirical Applications 1 [Cutler 19
Page 139 and 140:
Cutler 1988 First, compute excess r
Page 141 and 142:
Cutler: Results Cutler finds ˆb =
Page 143 and 144:
Page 145 and 146:
Page 147 and 148:
Linden and Rockoff: Results Find ho
Page 149 and 150:
Excess Returns Around Drug Approval
Page 151 and 152:
Distribution of Excess Returns arou
Page 153 and 154:
Mandated Benefits We have focused u
Page 155 and 156:
Mandated Benefits: Simple Model Lab
Page 157 and 158:
Mandated Benefit Wage Rate S w 1 B
Page 159 and 160:
Mandated Benefits: Incidence Formul
Page 161 and 162:
Gruber 1994 Studies state mandates
Page 163 and 164:
Page 165 and 166:
Acemoglu and Angrist 2001 Look at e
Page 167 and 168:
Acemoglu and Angrist 2001 Acemoglu
Page 169 and 170:
Page 171 and 172:
Public Economics Lectures Part 3: E
Page 173 and 174:
Definition Incidence analysis: effe
Page 175 and 176:
Effi ciency Cost: Introduction Gove
Page 177 and 178:
Partial Equilibrium Model: Setup Tw
Page 179 and 180:
Price Excess Burden of Taxation S $
Page 181 and 182:
Effi ciency Cost: Marshallian Surpl
Page 183 and 184:
Page 185 and 186:
Page 187 and 188:
EB Increases with Square of Tax Rat
Page 189 and 190:
P P 3 P 2 P 1 S+t 1 +t 2 S+t 1 E B
Page 191 and 192:
Tax Policy Implications With many g
Page 193 and 194:
General Model: Demand and Indirect
Page 195 and 196:
Path Dependence Problem Initial pri
Page 197 and 198:
Consumer Surplus: Conceptual Proble
Page 199 and 200:
Compensating and Equivalent Variati
Page 201 and 202:
Equivalent Variation Measures utili
Page 203 and 204:
Effi ciency Cost Formulas with Inco
Page 205 and 206:
Compensating vs. Equivalent Variati
Page 207 and 208:
Marshallian Surplus p h(V(p 1 ,Z))
Page 209 and 210:
Excess Burden Deadweight burden: ch
Page 211 and 212:
p h(V(p 1 ,Z)) ~ h(V(p 0 ,Z)) p 1 M
Page 213 and 214:
Implementable Excess Burden Formula
Page 215 and 216:
Harberger Formula Without pre-exist
Page 217 and 218:
Goulder and Williams 2003 Show that
Page 219 and 220:
Goulder and Williams Formula Obtain
Page 221 and 222:
Goulder and Williams Results Calibr
Page 223 and 224:
Harberger vs. Hausman Approach Unde
Page 225 and 226:
Primitives Sufficient Stats. Welfar
Page 227 and 228:
Heterogeneity Benefit of suff stat
Page 229 and 230:
Discrete Choice Model Recast as pla
Page 231 and 232:
Effi ciency Cost: Applications 1 [I
Page 233 and 234:
Feldstein Model: Setup Government l
Page 235 and 236:
Taxable Income Formula Simplicity o
Page 237 and 238:
Excess Burden with Transfer Costs L
Page 239 and 240:
Gorodnichenko, Martinez-Vazquez, an
Page 241 and 242:
Page 243 and 244:
Poterba 1992 Estimates effi ciency
Page 245 and 246:
Page 247 and 248:
Porterba: Results Tax reforms in 19
Page 249 and 250:
Page 251 and 252:
Price and Tax Elasticities By Year
Page 253 and 254:
Welfare Analysis in Behavioral Mode
Page 255 and 256:
Behavioral Welfare Economics: Two A
Page 257 and 258:
Behavioral Welfare Economics: Two A
Page 259 and 260:
Bernheim and Rangel 2009: Choice Se
Page 261 and 262:
Bernheim and Rangel 2009: Compensat
Page 263 and 264:
Bernheim and Rangel 2009: Refinemen
Page 265 and 266:
Welfare Analysis with Salience Effe
Page 267 and 268:
Welfare Analysis with Salience Effe
Page 269 and 270:
Preference Recovery Assumptions A1
Page 271 and 272:
Excess Burden with No Income Effect
Page 273 and 274:
Effi ciency Cost with Income Effect
Page 275 and 276:
Directions for Further Work on Beha
Page 277 and 278:
Outline 1 Commodity Taxation I: Ram
Page 279 and 280:
Second Welfare Theorem Starting poi
Page 281 and 282:
Four Central Results in Optimal Tax
Page 283 and 284:
Ramsey Model: Key Assumptions 1 Lum
Page 285 and 286:
Ramsey Model: Consumer Behavior Lag
Page 287 and 288:
Ramsey Model: Government’s Proble
Page 289 and 290:
Ramsey Formula: Perturbation Argume
Page 291 and 292:
Ramsey Formula: Compensated Elastic
Page 293 and 294:
Special Case 1: Inverse Elasticity
Page 295 and 296:
Special Case 2: Uniform Taxation Th
Page 297 and 298:
Diamond 1975: Many-Person Model H i
Page 299 and 300:
Diamond: Many-Person Optimal Tax Fo
Page 301 and 302:
Diamond: Optimal Transfer In this m
Page 303 and 304:
Lipsey and Lancaster (1956): Theory
Page 305 and 306:
Diamond and Mirrlees Model Two good
Page 307 and 308:
Consumer’s Offer Curve Public Eco
Page 309 and 310:
Production Set with Revenue Require
Page 311 and 312:
Second Best: Optimal Distortionary
Page 313 and 314:
Diamond and Mirrlees: General Model
Page 315 and 316:
Proof of Production Effi ciency Res
Page 317 and 318:
Policy Consequences: Public Sector
Page 319 and 320:
Policy Consequences: No Taxation of
Page 321 and 322:
Policy Consequences: No Taxation of
Page 323 and 324:
Diamond and Mirrlees: Optimal Tax R
Page 325 and 326:
Diamond and Mirrlees Result: Limita
Page 327 and 328:
Key Concepts for Taxes/Transfers Le
Page 329 and 330:
Optimal Income Tax with No Behavior
Page 331 and 332:
Mirrlees 1971: Incorporating Behavi
Page 333 and 334:
Mirrlees: Subsequent Work Mirrlees
Page 335 and 336:
Revenue-Maximizing Tax Rate: Laffer
Page 337 and 338:
Page 339 and 340:
Optimal Top Income Tax Rate { } dM
Page 341 and 342:
Optimal Top Income Tax Rate In US t
Page 343 and 344:
Connection to Revenue Maximizing Ta
Page 345 and 346:
Page 347 and 348:
General Non-Linear Income Tax Optim
Page 349 and 350:
Numerical Simulations of Optimal Ta
Page 351 and 352:
Numerical Simulations Use formula e
Page 353 and 354:
Commodity vs. Income Taxation Now c
Page 355 and 356:
Atkinson and Stiglitz: Commodity Ta
Page 357 and 358:
Atkinson-Stiglitz: Proof Revenue un
Page 359 and 360:
Atkinson-Stiglitz: Intuition With s
Page 361 and 362:
Atkinson-Stiglitz: Implications for
Page 363 and 364:
Chamley-Judd: Capital Taxation Judd
Page 365 and 366:
Taxation and Savings: Evidence Key
Page 367 and 368:
Page 369 and 370:
Optimal Transfer Programs Several t
Page 371 and 372:
Optimal Transfers: Mirrless Model M
Page 373 and 374:
Saez 2002: Participation Model Mode
Page 375 and 376:
Page 377 and 378:
Page 379 and 380:
Saez 2002: Optimal Tax Formula Smal
Page 381 and 382:
Page 383 and 384:
Page 385 and 386:
Page 387 and 388:
Mankiw and Weinzierl 2009 Tagging w
Page 389 and 390:
Nichols and Zeckhauser 1982: In-Kin
Page 391 and 392:
Soup Kitchen without Wait: Cash Tra
Page 393 and 394:
Income Taxation as Insurance (Varia
Page 395 and 396:
Varian Model: Private Insurance Var
Page 397 and 398:
Page 399 and 400:
References Surveys in labor economi
Page 401 and 402:
Baseline Labor-Leisure Choice Model
Page 403 and 404:
Labor Supply Behavior First order c
Page 405 and 406:
Econometric Problem 1: Unobserved H
Page 407 and 408:
Measurement Error and Division Bias
Page 409 and 410:
Extensive vs. Intensive Margin Rela
Page 411 and 412:
Progressive Taxes and Labor Supply
Page 413 and 414:
Example 1: Progressive Income Tax P
Page 415 and 416:
Example 3: Social Security Payroll
Page 417 and 418:
Progressive Taxes and Labor Supply
Page 419 and 420:
Non-Linear Budget Set Estimation: V
Page 421 and 422:
Likelihood Function: Located at the
Page 423 and 424:
Hausman (1981) Application Hausman
Page 425 and 426:
Saez 2009: Bunching at Kinks Saez o
Page 427 and 428:
Public Economics Lectures ()Part 5:
Page 429 and 430:
Earnings Density and the EITC: Wage
Page 431 and 432:
Taxable Income Density, 1960-1969:
Page 433 and 434:
Friedberg 2000: Social Security Ear
Page 435 and 436:
Friedberg: Estimates Estimates elas
Page 437 and 438:
Page 439 and 440:
Why not more bunching at kinks? 1 T
Page 441 and 442:
Page 443 and 444:
Chetty et al. 2009: Model Firms pos
Page 445 and 446:
Cost of Bunching at Bracket Cutoff
Page 447 and 448:
Marginal Tax Rates in Denmark in 19
Page 449 and 450:
All Wage Earners: Top Tax Bracket C
Page 451 and 452:
Married Women Frequency 0 10000 200
Page 453 and 454:
Married Female Professionals with A
Page 455 and 456:
Married Women, 1994 Frequency 0 100
Page 457 and 458:
Page 459 and 460:
Page 461 and 462:
Page 463 and 464:
Married Women at the Middle Tax: 10
Page 465 and 466:
Married Women at the Middle Tax: 8%
Page 467 and 468:
Distribution of Individuals’Deduc
Page 469 and 470:
Teachers Wage Income: 1998 Frequenc
Page 471 and 472:
Wage Earnings: Teachers with Deduct
Page 473 and 474:
Distribution of Modes in Occupation
Page 475 and 476:
SelfEmployed: Distribution around
Page 477 and 478:
Estimates of Hours and Participatio
Page 479 and 480:
Page 481 and 482:
Page 483 and 484:
Problems with Experimental Design E
Page 485 and 486:
Instrumental Variable Methods Anoth
Page 487 and 488:
Mroz 1987: Setup and Results Uses b
Page 489 and 490:
Page 491 and 492:
Page 493 and 494:
Eissa 1995: Caveats Does the common
Page 495 and 496:
Bianchi, Gudmundsson, and Zoega 200
Page 497 and 498:
Page 499 and 500:
Bianchi, Gudmundsson, and Zoega 200
Page 501 and 502:
Overall Costs of Anti Poverty Progr
Page 503 and 504:
Monthly Welfare Case Loads: 1963-20
Page 505 and 506:
Behavioral Responses to the EITC 1
Page 507 and 508:
Eissa and Liebman 1996 Study labor
Page 509 and 510:
Eissa and Liebman: Results Find a s
Page 511 and 512:
Page 513 and 514:
Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001 Analyze th
Page 515 and 516:
Eissa and Hoynes 2004 EITC based on
Page 517 and 518:
Meyer and Sullivan 2004 Examine the
Page 519 and 520:
Relative Consumption: single women
Page 521 and 522:
Meyer and Sullivan: Results Materia
Page 523 and 524:
Changing Elasticities: Blau and Kah
Page 525 and 526:
Intertemporal Models and the MaCurd
Page 527 and 528:
Life Cycle Model: Time Separability
Page 529 and 530:
Dynamic Life Cycle Model: Frisch El
Page 531 and 532:
Page 533 and 534:
Frisch vs. Compensated vs. Uncompen
Page 535 and 536:
Card Critique of ITLS models Critiq
Page 537 and 538:
Blundell, Duncan, and Meghir 1998 C
Page 539 and 540:
Blundell, Duncan, and Meghir: Resul
Page 541 and 542:
Page 543 and 544:
Farber 2005: Division Bias Argues t
Page 545 and 546:
Manoli and Weber 2009 Use variation
Page 547 and 548:
Distribution of Tenure at Retiremen
Page 549 and 550:
US Income Taxation: Trends The bigg
Page 551 and 552:
Bottom 99% Tax Units 40% $40,000 35
Page 553 and 554:
Feldstein 1995 First study of taxab
Page 555 and 556:
Feldstein: Results Feldstein obtain
Page 557 and 558:
Feldstein: Econometric Criticisms S
Page 559 and 560:
18% 16% Wages SCorp. Partner. Sol
Page 561 and 562:
Page 563 and 564:
Gruber and Saez 2002 First study to
Page 565 and 566:
Gruber and Saez: Results Find an el
Page 567 and 568:
Imbens et al. 2001: Income Effects
Page 569 and 570:
Taxable Income Literature: Summary
Page 571 and 572:
Prescott 2004 Uses data on hours wo
Page 573 and 574:
Davis and Henrekson 2005 Run regres
Page 575 and 576:
Page 577 and 578:
Optimization Frictions Many frictio
Page 579 and 580:
Page 581 and 582:
Setup Consider a static demand mode
Page 583 and 584:
Optimization Frictions Define agent
Page 585 and 586:
Construction of Choice Set 151 150
Page 587 and 588:
Identification with Optimization Fr
Page 589 and 590:
Identification with Optimization Fr
Page 591 and 592:
Calculation of Bounds on Structural
Page 593 and 594:
) Lower Bound on Structural Elastic
Page 595 and 596:
Application to Taxation and Labor S
Page 597 and 598:
4.0 Bounds on IntensiveMargin Lab
Page 599 and 600:
4.0 3.5 Bounds on IntensiveMargin
Page 601 and 602:
Chetty and Saez 2009: Experimental
Page 603 and 604:
Year 2 Earnings Distributions: 1 De
Page 605 and 606:
Year 2 Wage Earnings Distributions:
Page 607 and 608:
Labor Supply Elasticities: Implicat
Page 609 and 610:
Chetty: Formula for Risk Aversion L
Page 611 and 612:
u c ,u l w 0 u c (w 0 l,l) Case A:
Page 613 and 614:
Chetty 2006: Results Labor supply e
Page 615 and 616:
Outline 1 Motivations for Social In
Page 617 and 618:
Growth of Social Insurance in the U
Page 619 and 620:
Unemployment Benefit Systems in Dev
Page 621 and 622:
Useful Background Reading 1 Institu
Page 623 and 624:
Adverse Selection as a Motivation f
Page 625 and 626:
Rothschild-Stiglitz: Key Assumption
Page 627 and 628:
Rothschild-Stiglitz: Equilibrium De
Page 629 and 630:
Page 631 and 632:
Rothschild-Stiglitz: Second Best So
Page 633 and 634:
Page 635 and 636:
Page 637 and 638:
Page 639 and 640:
Adverse Selection: Empirical Eviden
Page 641 and 642:
Page 643 and 644:
Aggregate Shocks as a Motivation fo
Page 645 and 646:
Unemployment Insurance Start with U
Page 647 and 648:
Replacement Rate Common measure of
Page 649 and 650:
Baily-Chetty model Canonical analys
Page 651 and 652:
Baily-Chetty model: Setup Static mo
Page 653 and 654:
Baily-Chetty model: First Best Prob
Page 655 and 656:
Baily-Chetty model: Second Best Pro
Page 657 and 658:
Two Approaches to Optimal Social In
Page 659 and 660:
Envelope Condition Why can ∂e ∂
Page 661 and 662:
Suffi cient Statistic Approach to K
Page 663 and 664:
Baily-Chetty model: Second Best Sol
Page 665 and 666:
Baily-Chetty Consumption-Based Form
Page 667 and 668:
Empirical Estimates: Duration Elast
Page 669 and 670:
Hazard Models Define hazard rate h
Page 671 and 672:
Meyer 1990 Meyer includes log UI be
Page 673 and 674:
Consumption Smoothing Benefits of U
Page 675 and 676:
Consumption Smoothing Benefits of U
Page 677 and 678:
Calibrating the Model b ∗ Results
Page 679 and 680:
Homeowners’Consumption around Une
Page 681 and 682:
Commitments and Risk Aversion How d
Page 683 and 684:
Commitments Model: Implications for
Page 685 and 686:
Chetty 2008: Moral Hazard vs. Liqui
Page 687 and 688:
Chetty 2008: Job Search Technology
Page 689 and 690:
Chetty 2008: Value Functions Value
Page 691 and 692:
Chetty 2008: Moral Hazard vs. Liqui
Page 693 and 694:
Chetty 2008: Formula for Optimal UI
Page 695 and 696:
Moral Hazard vs. Liquidity: Evidenc
Page 697 and 698:
Figure 3a Effect of UI Benefits on
Page 699 and 700:
Figure 3c Effect of UI Benefits on
Page 701 and 702:
log UI ben 0.527 (0.267) TABLE 2
Page 703 and 704:
Figure 5 Effect of Severance Pay on
Page 705 and 706:
Figure 6b Effect of Severance Pay o
Page 707 and 708:
Chetty 2008: Implications for Optim
Page 709 and 710:
Figure 3 Frequency of Layoffs by Jo
Page 711 and 712:
Figure 4 Selection on Observables M
Page 713 and 714:
TABLE 3a Effects of Severance Pay a
Page 715 and 716:
Shimer and Werning 2007: Reservatio
Page 717 and 718:
Figure 5a Effect of Severance Pay o
Page 719 and 720:
Figure 10b Effect of Severance Pay
Page 721 and 722:
Effect of Extended Benefits on Subs
Page 723 and 724:
Spike at Benefit Exhaustion Most st
Page 725 and 726:
Job Finding vs. Unemployment Exit H
Page 727 and 728:
Effect of Benefit Expiration on Haz
Page 729 and 730:
Experience Rating in Washington, 20
Page 731 and 732:
Feldstein 1978: Empirical Results F
Page 733 and 734:
UI Savings Accounts Alternative to
Page 735 and 736:
Feldstein and Altman 2007 Calculati
Page 737 and 738:
Black, Smith, Berger, and Noel 2003
Page 739 and 740:
Page 741 and 742:
Black, Smith, Berger, and Noel 2003
Page 743 and 744:
Dynamics: Path of UI Benefits Class
Page 745 and 746:
Workers Compensation Insurance agai
Page 747 and 748:
Theory of Workers’Compensation Fo
Page 749 and 750:
Page 751 and 752:
Effects of Benefits on Injuries Pot
Page 753 and 754:
Page 755 and 756:
Effect on Equilibrium Wage Workers
Page 757 and 758:
Disability Insurance See Bound et.
Page 759 and 760:
Two Views on the Rise in DI Trend h
Page 761 and 762:
Theory of Disability Insurance Key
Page 763 and 764:
Empirical Evidence: Bound-Parsons D
Page 765 and 766:
Empirical Evidence: Bound-Parsons D
Page 767 and 768:
Gruber 2000 Exploits differential l
Page 769 and 770:
Page 771 and 772:
Autor and Duggan 2003 Focus on inte
Page 773 and 774:
Page 775 and 776:
Employment Shocks and DI Applicatio
Page 777 and 778:
Employment Shocks and DI Applicatio
Page 779 and 780:
Health Insurance Arrow (1963): semi
Page 781 and 782:
Health Care Spending in OECD Nation
Page 783 and 784:
Americans’Source of Health Insura
Page 785 and 786:
Growing Health Expenditures: Key Fa
Page 787 and 788:
Market Failures and Government Inte
Page 789 and 790:
Measuring Health Before discussing
Page 791 and 792:
Page 793 and 794:
Optimal Govt. Intervention in Healt
Page 795 and 796:
Feldstein 1973 x = non-medical cons
Page 797 and 798:
Feldstein 1973: First Best Solution
Page 799 and 800:
Price of each visit $200 A B S=MC $
Page 801 and 802:
Page 803 and 804:
Page 805 and 806:
Finkelstein 2006 Impact of Medicare
Page 807 and 808:
Ellis and McGuire 1986 Previous ana
Page 809 and 810:
Ellis and McGuire: Compensation Sch
Page 811 and 812:
Ellis and McGuire: Optimal Payment
Page 813 and 814:
Ellis and McGuire: Optimal Payment
Page 815 and 816:
Ellis and McGuire Model: Limitation
Page 817 and 818:
Crowdout of Private Insurance So fa
Page 819 and 820:
Currie and Gruber 1995: Benefits of
Page 821 and 822:
Public Economics Lectures Part 7: P
Page 823 and 824:
Public vs. Private Goods Private go
Page 825 and 826:
Public Good Person 1’s Consumptio
Page 827 and 828:
Public Goods Model: Setup Economy w
Page 829 and 830:
First Best if G is Private To ident
Page 831 and 832:
First Best if G is a Pure Public Go
Page 833 and 834:
Samuelson (1954) Rule Condition for
Page 835 and 836:
Model of Private Provision: Setup P
Page 837 and 838:
Lindahl Equilibrium How to achieve
Page 839 and 840: Lindahl Equilibria: Key Properties
Page 841 and 842: Voting Model: Setup Suppose that pu
Page 843 and 844: Arrow (1951) and Single-Peaked Pref
Page 845 and 846: Median Voter Theorem With single-pe
Page 847 and 848: Median Voter Choice: Effi ciency In
Page 849 and 850: Public Economics Lectures () Part 7
Page 851 and 852: Optimal Second Best Provision of PG
Page 853 and 854: Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986)
Page 855 and 856: Bergstrom-Blume-Varian Model: Crowd
Page 857 and 858: BBV Model: Additional Results 1 Tot
Page 859 and 860: Empirical Evidence on Crowd-Out Two
Page 863 and 864: Hungerman 2005 Studies crowdout of
Page 865 and 866: Hungerman 2005 Estimates imply that
Page 867 and 868: Andreoni and Payne 2003 OLS still y
Page 869 and 870: Andreoni and Payne 2003 $1000 incre
Page 873 and 874: Andreoni 1988 Isaac, McCue, and Plo
Page 875 and 876: Andreoni 1993 Uses lab experiment t
Page 879 and 880: Andreoni 1993 Public good levels ar
Page 881 and 882: Financing PGs with Distortionary Ta
Page 883 and 884: PGs with Distortionary Taxes: Setup
Page 885 and 886: PGs with Distortionary Taxes: 1st B
Page 887 and 888: PGs with Distortionary Taxes: 2nd B
Page 889: Kreiner and Verdelin 2009 Consider
Page 893 and 894: Optimal Subsidies for Charity Resul
Page 895 and 896: Optimal Subsidies for Charity (Saez
Page 897 and 898: Empirical Evidence Existing studies
Page 899 and 900: Externalities: Outline 1 Definition
Page 901 and 902: Externalities: Main Questions 1 The
Page 903 and 904: Model of Externalities: Equilibrium
Page 905 and 906: Model of Externalities: Deadweight
Page 907 and 908: Remedies for Externalities 1 Coasia
Page 909 and 910: Coasian Solution: Limitations 1 Cos
Page 911 and 912: Price Pigouvian Tax SMC=PMC+MD S=PM
Page 913 and 914: Permits: Cap-and-Trade Cap total am
Page 915 and 916: Weitzman 1974: Market for Pollution
Page 917 and 918: Weitzman Model: Policy without Unce
Page 919 and 920: MB steep, Quantity regulation Publi
Page 921 and 922: Quantity Regulation Price Regulatio
Page 923 and 924: MB Flat, Quantity Regulation Public
Page 925 and 926: Quantity regulation Price Regulatio
Page 927 and 928: Optimal Second-Best Taxation with E
Page 929 and 930: Sandmo 1975: Setup Individual maxim
Page 931 and 932: Sandmo 1975: Additivity Result Main
Page 933 and 934: Double Dividend Debate Claim: gas t
Page 935 and 936: Externalities: Empirical Measuremen
Page 941 and 942:
Brookshire et al. 1982 Infer willin
Page 943 and 944:
Page 945 and 946:
Chay and Greenstone 2005 Conclusion
Page 947 and 948:
Page 949 and 950:
Page 951 and 952:
Page 953 and 954:
Diamond and Hausman 1994 Describe p
Page 955 and 956:
Becker and Murphy 1988 Show that ad
Page 957 and 958:
Bernheim and Rangel 2004 Model of
show all

Public Economics Lectures Part 1: Introduction

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?