the february 2009 fires - 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission

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2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission—Interim Report 1 THE FEBRUARY 2009 FIRES 1.75 1.76 1.77 Towns in the heart of the fire area were Kinglake, Kinglake West, St Andrews and Wandong, all with a population of about 1500. Smaller towns affected included Toolangi, Dixons Creek, Chum Creek, Hazeldene and Clonbinane, each with a population between 500 and 900. The fires came close to Yarra Glen (population 2600) and Whittlesea (population 4500). 154 At 11:49 the Emergency Services Telecommunications Agency (ESTA) took a call for a fire at Saunders Road, Kilmore East, in undulating pasture country interspersed with native vegetation alongside cleared and standing plantations. Initial reports were from the Mount Hickey fire tower, together with reporting on the ground through Triple Zero calls. 155 At 12:08 the Kangaroo Ground fire tower operator sighted the fire and reported it to the Kangaroo Ground ICC. 156 As the point of origin was on private land, the CFA was identified as the control agency for this fire. 157 The Kilmore East fire was managed from the Kilmore ICC located at the Kilmore fire station. 158 The Incident Controller was initially the local CFA Brigade Captain. 159 He was relieved by a career staff member at 16:30. 160 The Kangaroo Ground ICC operated as a Divisional Command on 7 February but overnight the management of the Kilmore East and Murrindindi fires was rearranged. 161 According to the evidence of Mr Rees, from the morning of 8 February, Kilmore and Kangaroo Ground ICCs managed the Kilmore East fire and Alexandra and Woori Yallock ICCs managed the Murrindindi fire. 162 The fuel loads in and around areas where the Kilmore East fire burned — Mount Disappointment, Humevale, Strathewen, Kinglake and Glenvale — were extremely high. Senior, highly experienced CFA volunteer officers inspected these areas 3 to 4 weeks before 7 February. They were horrified by the fuel loadings; 40 to 50 tonnes per hectare. There was a recognition they would be unable to control fire in these areas. 163 The first phase of the fire 164 1.78 Mr Rees defined the first phase of the fire as ‘that period before it has crossed the Hume Freeway’. 1.79 1.80 1.81 At about 11:50 5 local brigades (Kilmore, Broadford, Clonbinane, Wandong and Wallan) were paged to respond to the fire. 165 At 11:51 the Kilmore Brigade received a second pager message to respond to a second fire on the Wandong–Kilmore Highway, 3 kilometres south of Kilmore. One pumper was deployed. 166 At 12:02 a further 7 brigades were deployed, including the Midway Forest Industry Brigade. 167 A strike team of 5 tankers responded about 30 minutes later. 168 Aircraft were also requested; however, due to the conditions at the time, aircraft were ineffective in direct attack and were used to protect assets. 169 A fire-spotting aircraft operated from about 12:30 to 13:30. 170 Two aerial line scans were conducted at 12:45 and 12:55, leading to the production at the iECC of a fire prediction map at 13:40. 171 A further map based on the line scan was produced at 17:43. The line scans were not passed to the ICC at Kilmore. 172 According to Mr Rees, further line scans were not able to be completed until 21:45 that evening. 173 Initial efforts were directed at controlling the fire before it crossed the Hume Highway into more open country; however, this was unsuccessful. 174 At 12:45 it was requested that the Hume Highway be closed. 175 The fire crossed the Hume Highway at Heathcote Junction at 13:58. 176 At that time, the firefront was reported to be 3 kilometres wide, between Clonbinane Road and the Broadford–Wandong Road. 177 The fire had a very elongated shape under the influence of north-westerly winds, with a length to breadth ratio of approximately 7:1. 178 Given the terrain and fuel conditions, it was difficult for many appliances to access the fire edge from the north. 179 Significant resources were deployed to the southern edge of the fire to protect townships from Whittlesea into the Yarra Valley and Healesville area. 180 At the Kangaroo Ground fire tower, local weather observations at 13:45 were 47°C and relative humidity of 7 per cent. 181 At about 14:30 winds were gusting 60–70 kilometres per hour and the temperature was 43°C. 182 Burnt leaves were falling on the fire tower as early as 14:13. 183 56
The February 2009 Fires The second phase of the fire 1.82 1.83 Mr Rees defined the second phase of the fire as the period after it crossed the Hume Highway and went into the slopes of Mount Disappointment. 184 Between 14:00 and 17:00 the firefront travelled another 6 kilometres under the influence of a 60–90 kilometres per hour north-westerly wind, through timber plantations and agricultural land, before entering forest areas. It then travelled across the Great Dividing Range at Mount Disappointment (reaching the base of Mount Disappointment at 15:30), and then onto the Whittlesea–Yea Road, just south of the settlement of Kinglake West. 185 Spotting was reported at Smith Gully at 16:00. 186 Between Wandong and Kinglake, the forest fuels of Stringybark and Peppermint species, with pockets of Manna Gum, Grey Gum and Mountain Ash, resulted in significant spotting. 187 The fire travelled at up to 8 kilometres per hour to the crest of Mount Disappointment. 188 189 1.84 On 7 February Arthurs Creek and Whittlesea CFA Brigades were not attached to strike teams. They were operating independently in their areas of responsibility. 190 The Arthurs Creek–Strathewen Brigade Captain learnt of the Kilmore East fire from his Group Officer ‘some time after midday’. 191 He did not receive any advice on the fire from the Kilmore ICC or the Kangaroo Ground Divisional Control Centre. 192 His brigade first responded to fire (after several false alarms) at 15:43. 193 He received a ‘red flag’ warning at 17:45 of a pending ‘very strong southerly change...in the next 10 minutes’. 194 Once spotting commenced he was unable to access Strathewen but eventually drove into the hamlet at about 19:00. 195 Nearly every structure in the hamlet was burnt. 196 Analysis by the Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre (Bushfire CRC) suggests that the fires reached Strathewen from a north-westerly wind and also via a major firefront approaching from the south. 197 1.85 At Kinglake, power failed across the town at 16:55 and soon after smoke was heavily entering the town from the direction of St Andrews. 198 By 17:30 Kinglake was under heavy ember attack with spot fires occurring close to the CFA station. It was dark. 199 Embers started burning in the town at 17:45. Ms Sharon McCulloch, owner and operator of the National Park Hotel described the experience: ‘Embers were now hailing down and being blown with such force onto the hotel roof that I thought there was every chance of something in or around the hotel catching fire’. 200 Ms McCulloch and her husband managed to save their hotel, although this meant they could not actively protect their home. It survived. On reflection, she said: There really didn’t seem to be any rhyme or reason why some buildings burnt and others didn’t. The firestorm was indiscriminate. Some people stayed to fight the fire and lost, some people evacuated and their houses remain standing. 201 1.86 By the time the fire had reached the Whittlesea–Yea Road, it was reported to be approximately 6 kilometres wide. 202 Between 17:00 and 18:00 spot fires were reported at Humevale, St Andrews (at 17:46) and Steels Creek. 203 The Kangaroo Ground fire tower operators, Ms Colleen Keating and Mr Gavin McCormack, made the following observations: … it just appeared out of nowhere … It appeared to have, like, jumped 10, 15 km, just the spotting … Then it took off like basically a main fire … It took off like a rocket. 204 And subsequently: A spotfire … is normally a gradual development. These were almost a spontaneous development into a large fire. 205 1.87 Residents defending their homes described the fires from inside their houses. Mr John O’Neill, of Steels Creek, described the experience of his family: Almost immediately, the fire front hit us … Burning embers slapped into our windows and the rest of the house ... it was like being inside a washing machine on spin cycle, and full of fire and embers … the firefront lasted about 45 minutes … we spent the following seven hours fighting the fires and defending our main house. 206 57
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