the february 2009 fires - 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission

2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission—Interim Report
1 THE FEBRUARY 2009 FIRES
1.127 Marysville was most affected by this fire, with a resident population of 517. The area surrounding Marysville
has a population of 1200 people. 328
1.128 Just before 15:00 a fire at Murrindindi Mill was reported to the Broadford and Alexandra DSE offices from
the Mount Despair fire lookout tower. 329 The point of origin was estimated to be 2 kilometres south of
Murrindindi on private land within the fire protected area, 330 and while this was not clear in the early stages of
the fire, DSE became the control agency for this fire. 331 Fire control was through a DSE ICC at Alexandra. 332
DSE had already deployed IMT personnel from Alexandra to support the CFA IMT managing the Kilmore
East fire. 333 This included information and situation officers. Because of this, DSE advised that the Alexandra
IMT was initially under-resourced. 334
335
1.129 CFA resources were deployed from the Yea Group and were the first to arrive at the fire. All local DSE
fire line resources that had not been deployed to the Kilmore East fire (which was reported at 11:49), were
deployed to the Murrindindi fire (being crews from Toolangi, Alexandra and Broadford). 336 The Toolangi DSE
crew is recorded as responding at 15:00, with an estimated time of arrival of 15:30, although the first DSE
resources were recorded as arriving at the fire at around 16:15. 337 Care was taken not to direct crews to
take roads that might be affected by this fire, with the Alexandra crew taking a circuitous route. This initial
attack on the fire included 6 personnel, 1 tanker, 2 slip-on units and 1 ‘first attack’ dozer. 338
1.130 Early observations reported by the IMT were of severe fire behaviour, with flames 20 metres high and an
estimated rate of spread of 8 kilometres per hour. Spotting was estimated at 5 kilometres. 339 Post-fire
analysis indicated this was under-estimated — the likely spread of the fire was around 12 kilometres per
hour with spotting to 15 kilometres. 340 The Alexandra DSE Office estimated a rate of spread of 8 kilometres
per hour earlier in the day, based on the weather forecast. This was twice the speed of fire spread normally
experienced in forest fire. 341
1.131 The severity of the fire behaviour precluded direct attack, and both DSE and CFA resources concentrated
on community and asset protection. Aerial support was sought to manage fire spread. 342
1.132 The fire spread rapidly into the forests of the Black Range, between the Melba and Maroondah Highways,
and began spotting when it reached the top of the range. In fact, the fire was burning in forest 3 kilometres
from its point of origin, until it reached the outskirts of Narbethong, a further 17 kilometres away. Additional
response resources were mobilised. 343 The Mount Gordon tower observer reported that at 16:20 the fire
was crossing the Black Range. 344 The tower was abandoned at 16:30. 345
346
1.133 Two water-bombing aircraft and 1 light helicopter left Mansfield, arriving at the fire around 15:45. Water
bombing was ineffective, due to the weather conditions, and each aircraft only made one bombing run. 347
Additional dozers and graders were deployed from DSE and Murrindindi Shire for control line construction.
DSE ground crews were deployed to communities to the east and west of the Black Range. 348
1.134 The fire moved across the Black Range very quickly and was spotting long distances. At 16:30 spot fires
and ember attack were reported in the Narbethong area, and aircraft were forced to suspend operations
due to the increasingly hazardous flying conditions. 349 The Bushfire CRC Report indicates fire spread was
likely to have been the result of ‘substantial spotting’. 350
1.135 Fire crews were hampered by new fires created by spotting; these were moving towards the Marysville area.
Firefighters continued to work on asset protection under extremely difficult conditions. A back burn was
attempted around 18:00 east of Marysville, although it was quickly abandoned ‘when it became hazardous
and was going to be overrun by the main fire’. 351
1.136 After 18:30 the south-westerly wind change arrived. Advice from DSE indicates the wind change arrived
earlier and passed through the area with greater force than forecast. 352 The wind continued to change
direction during this period, making it difficult to identify the direction of spotting and firefront movement. 353
Lightning from intense smoke plumes and atmospheric interaction with the south-west change triggered
other fires between the Murrindindi and Bunyip fires. 354
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