Italian Fascist War Crimes in Ethiopia - Societa italiana di storia ...

Italian Fascist War Crimes in Ethiopia 91
Kingdom feel obliged to call all neutral countries to refuse asylum to any
such persons, and to declare that they will regard shelter, assistance or
protection given to such persons as a violation of the principles for which
the United Nations are fighting . . . . 18
This was the first official British statement accepting that Mussolini and his
collaborators were “war criminals”—though it did not specify where their “war
crimes” had been committed.
Italy’s Surrender and Badoglio’s Continuation in Power
M e a nwhile in Italy, Mussolini’s fall was followed by the collapse of fascism.
The country’s future seemed to the British alarmingly uncertain. A Fo re i g n
Office memorandum of 7 August reported Communist demonstrations in Turin
and Milan, which “had to be put down by armed forc e,” and added “If the King
we re ove r t h rown there would be a blood bath.” A memorandum of 18 Au g u s t
s p o ke of “revolts . . . which could quite possibly terminate in revolution and
a n a rc hy. ” 1 9
Badoglio meanwhile was preparing to abandon the Germans and to negotiate
peace. He sent secret envoys to the Allies who, however, rejected his first
approaches. The British Government officially insisted instead on “unconditional
surrender.” This position, however, was soon qualified. Churchill told
Eden, on 10 August, that though the Italians had to make a “formal act of submission,”
Britain should “treat them with consideration so far as military exigencies
allow. Merely harping on ‘unconditional surrender’ with no prospect of
mercy held out even as an act of grace may well lead to no surrender at all.” He
therefore declared, following Roosevelt, that “unconditional surrender” should
be taken to mean “honourable capitulation.” 20
This was duly accepted by the British Cabinet. On 11 August, Eden declared
that “the Italian Government should place themselves in the hands of the Allied
Governments,” who would “then state their terms of peace.” These, however,
“would not be vindictive,” for Italy should “in due course. . . . occupy a
respected place in the New Europe.” 21
Though prepared to modify their earlier public insistence on “unconditional
surrender,” the Allies continued to press for the surrender of some fascist “war