Italian Fascist War Crimes in Ethiopia - Societa italiana di storia ...
Italian Fascist War Crimes in Ethiopia - Societa italiana di storia ...
Italian Fascist War Crimes in Ethiopia - Societa italiana di storia ...
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130 Richard Pankhurst<br />
<strong>Ethiopia</strong>n Government Marshal Badoglio and Marshal Graziani. It is further<br />
requested that the Imperial <strong>Ethiopia</strong>n Legation <strong>in</strong> London may be<br />
advised as to the results of the representations made by the Ambassadors<br />
to the <strong>Italian</strong> Government. 68<br />
Foreign Office Reaction<br />
The British Government had, as we have seen, no wish to help <strong>Ethiopia</strong>, and<br />
thereby <strong>in</strong>cur <strong>Italian</strong> wrath, quite the contrary. A Foreign Office official,<br />
Francis Brown, stated frankly, <strong>in</strong> a m<strong>in</strong>ute of 30 November 1948, that the<br />
Legation’s letter raised “two ma<strong>in</strong> questions”: Firstly, “whether we should, as<br />
requested, pass on the <strong>Ethiopia</strong>n request to the <strong>Italian</strong> Government”; and, secondly,<br />
“whether we should do anyth<strong>in</strong>g more to persuade the <strong>Ethiopia</strong>n<br />
Government not to demand the surrender of Marshals Badoglio and Graziani.”<br />
As regards the first question it was “clear,” he declared, that “we have taken<br />
the l<strong>in</strong>e that this question is one to be settled by the <strong>Ethiopia</strong>n and <strong>Italian</strong><br />
Governments <strong>di</strong>rect.” Not<strong>in</strong>g that the <strong>Ethiopia</strong>n Government was “not <strong>in</strong> <strong>di</strong>plomatic<br />
relations with the <strong>Italian</strong> Government,” he cont<strong>in</strong>ued:<br />
I understand that we have <strong>in</strong> the past, <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>or matters, acted as a channel<br />
b e t ween the two Governments. In the present case, howeve r, I th<strong>in</strong>k that it<br />
would be ex t remely unwise to act as a channel, s<strong>in</strong>ce the <strong>Italian</strong>s wo u l d<br />
i n evitably feel that we we re to some extent at least, back<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>Ethiopia</strong>ns’<br />
request, and that this would come at a particularly unfavo u rable juncture<br />
when the question of the <strong>di</strong>sposal of Eritrea is already embitter<strong>in</strong>g Anglo-<br />
<strong>Italian</strong> re l a t i o n s .<br />
As regards the second question, whether to <strong>di</strong>ssuade the <strong>Ethiopia</strong>ns, Brown<br />
felt that the British Government should leave the matter alone, “and not br<strong>in</strong>g<br />
pressure to bear, even if we could, on the <strong>Ethiopia</strong>n Government.” He conceded<br />
that the latter had “a perfect right” to “demand the hand-over” of the two marshals,<br />
under Article 45 of the Peace Treaty, but argued that if it succeeded <strong>in</strong><br />
communicat<strong>in</strong>g with the <strong>Italian</strong> Government, and the latter refused to hand<br />
over the accused, thereby creat<strong>in</strong>g a “<strong>di</strong>spute <strong>in</strong> terms of the Treaty,” the matter<br />
would come to the four Ambassadors <strong>in</strong> Rome. In such an event the Foreign<br />
Office would have to make up its m<strong>in</strong>d “what l<strong>in</strong>e to adopt.” 69