Italian Fascist War Crimes in Ethiopia - Societa italiana di storia ...

92 Richard Pankhurst
criminals.” This principle was embodied in Article 29 of the final surrender
terms, which declared:
Benito Mussolini, his chief Fascist associates and all persons suspected of
having committed war crimes or analogous offenses whose names appear
on lists to be communicated by the United Nations will forthwith be
apprehended and surrendered into the hands of the United Nations. Any
instructions given by the United Nations for this purpose will be complied
with.
To meet Italian susceptibilities this article—which later provided the basis for
Ethiopia’s attempt to try Italian war criminals—was not, however, published
for many weeks. 22
Italy’s alliance with Nazi Germany came to an end on 8 September. That day
Badoglio, doubtless pleased by British acceptance of the principle of “honourable
capitulation,” declared it was impossible to continue the “unequal
struggle” and agreed to “unconditional surrender.” Allied landings on the
Italian peninsula followed immediately. The Times commented: “The Italy
which has surrendered is the Italy which has been defeated on every battlefield,
a people left helpless and confused, with few arms, united only in the desire for
peace.” 23
The UN War Crimes Commission: Creech Jones’s
Parliamentary Question on Ethiopia’s Exclusion
Within a few weeks of Badoglio’s switch of allegiance it became apparent
that Ethiopia had been excluded from the seventeen-country UN War Crimes
Commission, set up by Britain, on 20 October 1943. Ten days later a banner
headline in New Times and Ethiopia News read: “Why is Ethiopia Excluded?”
British friends of Ethiopia found this exclusion disturbing. Towa rds the end
of the month, a Labour MP, Creech Jones, put down a Parliamentary Question.
Learning that Ethiopia was virtually the only Allied state not re p resented on the
commission, he asked the Fo reign Secretary whether it was “proposed to invite
Ethiopia to serve with members of the United Nations on the commission . . . ?”
This question was as embarrassing to the Foreign Office as Major Adams’s
one about Badoglio. This was because the British Government had decided to