Italian Fascist War Crimes in Ethiopia - Societa italiana di storia ...

Italian Fascist War Crimes in Ethiopia 125
to defend the Marshal (as we have seen, a British protégé), on both counts. He
doubted whether Fascist bombing of the Red Cross was “committed upon the
instructions or the knowledge of the accused so as to implicate him as personally
responsible.” As for poison-gas, he sought to shift the responsibility from
Badoglio, by declaring that “it appeared to him” that “practically the whole”
Italian policy in Ethiopia had been “planned between Mussolini and Graziani.”
Continuing this argument, he added: “Technically, Badoglio must be held
responsible for everything Graziani did, but the situation being as it was at the
time . . . there was no doubt that the leader in the field—Graziani—was the one
who was primarily responsible.” He recalled that the Japanese commander
Yamashito had been held responsible for all the acts of his inferiors, and
inquired whether Badoglio could likewise be considered “responsible at least
for negligence.” To this he replied that the Italian case was different, as “it was
questionable whether Badoglio was, in fact, in a position to control Graziani.”
This defense of Badoglio was highly disingenuous: Gas had in fact been used
mainly on Ethiopia’s northern front, under the direct command of Badoglio,
and Graziani, the commander of the southern front, had no responsibility for
operations in the north.
The next to speak was the commission’s chairman, Lord Wright, who represented
Australia. By implication rejecting Sir Robert’s contention, he declared
that the Ethiopian charges concerned “not merely individual offenses,” but “a
continuous policy, in which case it would appear difficult to see how a man in
Badoglio’s position—as commander-in-chief—could free himself from complicity,
or want of foresight, or control.”
Dr. Aars Rynning, of Norway, took a similar view. He “felt quite certain that
Badoglio as chief in command and responsible for carrying out the whole campaign,
must in some way have been implicated in the decision to use poison-gas,
since it was a decision which must have been taken at a very high level.”
Dr. Zeman, of Czechoslovakia, supported Rynning’s statement. He believed
that “the whole policy of the subjugation of Ethiopia must have been worked
out in advance, and since all equipment etc. must have been assembled in
Eritrea from where the attack was to take place, it was difficult to believe that
Badoglio did not take part in those plans and preparations.”
Faced with these strongly argued statements, Sir Robert moved to the defensive.
He observed that he was “prepared to list Badoglio as a Suspect, but was