Italian Fascist War Crimes in Ethiopia - Societa italiana di storia ...

116 Richard Pankhurst
Garner then recalled that it had been decided, as early as 1943, that it would
be “undesirable” for Ethiopia to join the commission. The Ethiopian
Government, since then, had not pressed the matter that, he claimed, had fallen
into “abeyance.” He advised his colleagues not to change this state of affairs,
and declared: “we should do our best to keep out of this matter that would certainly
be difficult and controversial.” By this he meant that involvement would
involve “difficult” relations with the Italian government.
Realizing, however, that in view of the Italian Peace Treaty it might no
longer be possible to oppose the prosecution of Italians accused of war crimes
in Ethiopia, he offered an entirely new policy option, which had by then
become possible, as a result of Italy’s return to the international community. He
wrote: “if the matter is pressed we should take the line that the Ethiopians must
take the question up with the Italians.” 50
Ethiopia, as a result of the termination of hostilities, was thus no longer to be
c o n s i d e red by Britain as an Ally, but was instead to be left to fend for herself.
Conclusion of the Italian Peace Treaty
Britain’s opposition to Ethiopia’s inclusion, and the argument that consideration
of war crimes committed prior to the opening of hostilities in Euro p e
would be unacceptable to other Governments, now ran into difficulties. The
British position was undermined by events in Paris, where the Conference on
the Italian Peace Treaty re - c o n vened on 29 July. The gathering opened with
ex t e n s i ve Great Power wrangling, after which it decided that decisions should be
reached by a two - t h i rds majority. This decision, Professor Spencer explains, put
the West in a difficult position. “A ny neophyte in diplomacy,” he observe s ,
“ would have instantly perc e i ved that by picking up one vo t e, the six Communist
bloc delegations (U.S.S.R., Bye l o - Russia, Ukra i n e, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and
Yu g o s l avia) had a blocking veto of one-third of the vo t e s . ”
The result, the Ethiopians discovered to their surprise, was that they possessed
a “swing vote.” Instead of being spurned, as they had been for so long by
the Foreign Office, they found themselves treated with unaccustomed respect.
Moreover, since votes were by roll-call, taken in alphabetical order, once
Ethiopia had voted it was clear whether any item would obtain the necessary
two-thirds approval. 51