Schriever Wargame 2010 - Air Force Space Command

We really need to understand how quickly cyber defense support of civil authorities might
be required, whether there is a physical dimension to that response, and who can add value
to the situation. We need to understand the interaction of things going wrong in cyber and
the physical consequence management aspects of the situation.
It was a clear sign of progress that we felt comfortable in
our knowledge of space systems and how they support our missions—but
it was equally clear that we lacked a fundamental
understanding of our digital lifelines.
So naturally I turned to the Cyber Command players, fully
expecting to deliver to them the insightful “request for information”
that would shift the responsibility for cyber dependency
awareness into their capable hands. But I was wrong. It turns
out I did not know enough to either ask the right question, or to
respond to their requests for clarification. What systems were
critical to my mission accomplishment? How did they map
out?
It was game play—and I am not the cyber expert in NORAD
and USNORTHCOM, but here is my take-away: answering
the questions about networks and critical information flow is a
shared responsibility between ourselves and Cyber Command.
And now life is imitating art. We have just spent the last two
days working with Strategic Command and Cyber Command
staff talking about these exact issues. These talks have been
underway for a little while, but SW 10 was definitely a catalyst
for progress, and it established both connections and even
friendships that will help us sort this out.
Third, during SW 10 we spoke often
about how cyber might play out with respect
to defense support of civil authorities
(DSCA). At that time I was fairly
dogmatic on the subject, “nothing in the
establishment of Cyber Command has
changed the DSCA mission assigned to
USNORTHCOM. It was ours. Title 10
forces assigned in a cyber DSCA role
would work for commander USNORTH-
COM.”
On my way home from the staff talks
yesterday I gave this a lot more thought,
and I think I am a little wiser. It is not so
clear, and certainly not black and white.
Depending on the scenario, and there are
many you can imagine, USNORTHCOM
could be supported, supporting, or working
in parallel with our colleagues in Cyber
Command. We really need to understand
how quickly cyber DSCA might
be required, whether there is a physical
dimension to that response, and who can
add value to the situation. We need to
understand the interaction of things going
wrong in cyber and the physical consequence
management aspects of the situation.
The answer is to think this through now and develop the
working relationships and responsibilities together.
Fourth, I cannot in good conscious end this short article
without mentioning a few observations from a Canadian perspective.
As I mentioned earlier, I have had the good fortune of playing
in Schriever Wargames for a number of years—the first few
as a result of my duties as the director of space development for
the Canadian military.
The notional space resources available from the US Air Force
during the early Schriever Wargames were virtually limitless.
There was a polite and respectful interaction with the Canadians,
Australians, and Brits that participated, and an attempt to
consider what value allied space resources might provide. But
given the tool kits available our potential contribution was insignificant.
The intent to engage the closest allies was genuine
enough—but the game by its early design reinforced a “go it
alone” approach for the US.
It is much different today. The game’s foundation nearer to
today’s reality has facilitated more substantive discussions of
Figure 1. Move 0 (wargame kickoff) of Schriever Wargame 2010: Deputy commander of the
North American Aerospace Defense Command, Lt Gen Marcel Duval.
17 High Frontier