Schriever Wargame 2010 - Air Force Space Command

Senior Leader Perspective
Schriever Wargame 2010,
A Political Perspective
Hon. Thomas M. Davis
Director of Federal Relations
Delloitte
Arlington, Virginia
In May of this year, the Air Force held the Schriever
Wargames 2010 (SW 10), a major exercise focused on
space and cyber warfare issues. As in previous years, an international
array of players was assembled to provide political,
diplomatic, and military perspectives around an evolving geopolitical
and military scenario.
Based on my tenure as a member of Congress, I was invited
to play the role of the president of US. In this capacity, I tried
to bring a realistic political perspective to the games. While the
details of the wargame are classified, I can describe what I found
to be the most interesting lessons learned from the exercise.
A politician’s currency is credit and blame, which is ultimately
measured in their ability to either win reelection themselves
or to elect/reelect their allies. Public opinion is the key
barometer, which is most affected by the public’s sense of security—be
it physical security or economic security. This point
was on vivid display in the mid-term elections in November.
The anemic economic recovery and attending high unemployment
figures are leading most political pundits to the conclusion
that the Democratic Party, which currently controls both bodies
of Congress and the White House, is likely to suffer at the polls.
In the role of president at SW 10, I was therefore highly attuned,
not just to the political, but to the economic consequences
when considering potential courses of action. Indeed, it was
fascinating to observe the dominant role economics played in
influencing the game.
It is often said that government’s main responsibility is the
security of the people. Thus, when confronted with an attack
of any sort, the expectation is a swift, decisive response. As
is so frequently the case in the modern world, however, such
a response might not be an option. In the specific case of a
cyber attack, there are several key considerations with which
a commander-in-chief will have to deal. The most immediate
of these is the fact he likely will not initially know who
is initiating the assault. Scientific, third party validation of an
attack’s origin does not always exist. The world would recognize
a direct attack against a country’s soil or military forces
as an invasion of sovereignty, and would likely expect, if not
assist, retaliation. What would global reaction be to retaliation
if the identity of the aggressor was in doubt? It is safe to say
it would be unpredictable, at best. While some might argue
international acceptance would be unnecessary, it is reality that
political leaders would seek it when weighing a response. The
matter would be further clouded by the lack of protocols and
agreements pertaining to cyber attacks. Treaties between countries
offer support and deterrence in case of attacks on land, sea,
or in the air, but if an ally were attacked in cyberspace, would
we feel an obligation to attack the aggressor? Would they be
compelled to help us? I suspect aversion to economic damage
would certainly give pause.
A second and more significant consideration would be the
economic ramifications of a retaliation, cyber or otherwise, to
a cyber attack. The Internet over which a cyber attack would
come has given rise to the global economy in which we now
live, an economy in which the fortunes of developed and developing
nations are increasingly intertwined. This paradigm of
international corporations, interlocking contractual agreements,
cross-purchases of national debt, global supply chains, and the
expectation of goods and services provided through international
trade have created a web of international interdependence
that diminishes a purely nationalistic approach to world conflict.
Choosing to initiate an attack, cyber or otherwise, would
disrupt this web with inevitable—and potentially significant—
adverse effects to both aggressor and victim. From a military
perspective, a new form of mutually assured destruction—or at
least mutually assured disruption—has evolved.
Author and columnist Tom L. Friedman describes this dynamic
with his “McDonald’s Theory of Warfare,” which postulates
that no two countries with McDonald’s Restaurants have
ever gone to war with each other. Why? Because they are
too busy making burgers, eating burgers, and selling burgers.
They are making money. They have an elevated living standard
worth preserving. They have much to lose by going to war.
The presence of a McDonald’s in a country denotes a certain
level of development in their economy and an integration and
economic interdependence with the rest of the world.
One would hope thoughts of two all-beef patties, special
sauce, lettuce, cheese, pickles, onions on a sesame seed bun
would enter into the decision matrix of any developed state
contemplating a cyber attack on another member of the global
economy.
Figure 1. Hon. Thomas M. Davis acting as president of the US during
Move 0 (wargame kickoff) of Schriever Wargame 2010.
3 High Frontier