Schriever Wargame 2010 - Air Force Space Command

maintain the initiative. This will require combined, cross-domain
command and control. It will also necessitate common
understanding among alliance or coalition political authorities
and commanders about different national policies, red lines,
and rules of engagement. Alliance or coalition forces must be
clear about strategic intentions, war aims, political-military objectives,
and the desired end state.
Self-defense measures will, of course, include the use of
force to respond to an infringement on our rights. Authorization
for employment of force may be pre-delegated to commanders,
in accordance with approved war plans or rules of
engagement. Such pre-delegations will have to be justified in
advance given that employment authority may be delegated,
but responsibility still rests with elected and confirmed political
officials. Pre-delegation of employment authority may be
necessary to enable forces to be postured properly for speed-oflight
warfare.
Planning must recognize that there will be no separate
“home” and “away” games in the event of conflict in space or
cyberspace. Such distinctions are neither meaningful nor useful.
The space and cyber domains, as noted, are extensions of
all nations’ homelands. Moreover, effects created in space or
cyberspace that impact the homelands of our allies or coalition
partners most assuredly are not “away” games for them.
Consequently, effective planning must encompass homeland
security and homeland defense.
Effective planning also will require improved space and
cyber intelligence and situational awareness. Foundational intelligence
is needed to help decision-makers and commanders
understand potential adversaries’ space and cyber capabilities
and intentions. This includes knowledge about an adversary’s
socio-cultural, historical, and other factors that influence how
they think and what they value. Such understanding is especially
critical for planning and executing shaping activities and
deterrence operations.
Strategic indications and warning are needed to enable anticipatory
self-defense and damage limitation options. Intelligence,
of course, is also essential to support operations planning.
This includes monitoring the space and cyber domains,
threat warning and attack reporting, characterization, attribution,
targeting, and combat effects assessment. The closest
coupling of operations and intelligence is essential to conduct
warfare at the speed-of-light. Indeed, information fusion out to
the tactical edge will enable operational agility.
Conclusion
The emergence of outer space and cyberspace as new dimensions
of competition and potential conflict has made the global
security environment more complex, dynamic, and dangerous.
SW 10 was valuable because it enhanced our understanding of
space and cyber threats, interdependencies, and opportunities.
In particular, it highlighted the need for the US to establish an
integrated planning process that employs a comprehensive,
whole of nations approach to protect and execute operations in
the interdependent space and cyber domains.
The comprehensive approach will enable the US, its allies,
and international partners to take concerted actions to shape the
space and cyber environments, deter aggression, control escalation,
and terminate conflict on favorable terms. Centralized
planning and decentralized execution of this approach will facilitate
implementation of a dynamic, multi-layered, defensein-depth
strategy to ensure an adversary cannot achieve its
political aims through the threat or use of force in space or cyberspace.
SW 10 should serve as a catalyst for the US national
security community to adjust its policies, processes, and structures
to ensure that it can conduct the complex lines of operations
needed to protect and advance our vital national interests
in space and cyberspace.
* The author served as the national security advisor for SW 10.
Mr. Marc J. Berkowitz (BA,
with Distinction, Security
Studies, George Washington
University, Washington, DC;
MA, National Security Studies,
Georgetown University,
Washington, DC) is a
vice president for situational
awareness at Lockheed Martin
Corporation. He is responsible
for the development of crosscorporate
business strategies
and advanced concepts for
integrated national security
space, intelligence, and information
mission solutions.
Prior to joining Lockheed
Martin in 2003, Mr. Berkowitz served in the Office of the Secretary
of Defense as a career senior executive in the positions of assistant
deputy under secretary of defense for space policy and director of
space policy where he lead the analysis, formulation, and oversight
of US Government and Defense Department policy guidance for
the conduct of defense and intelligence activities in outer space.
Mr. Berkowitz also was the director of space studies at National
Security Research, Inc., a professional staff member in the Foreign
Technology Center of SRI International, a foreign affairs analyst in
the Congressional Research Service’s Foreign Affairs and National
Defense Division, and an intelligence specialist in the Department
of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Since leaving the
Defense Department, he has also served as a consultant to the Defense
Department and the intelligence community.
Mr. Berkowitz was awarded the Defense Department’s highest
civilian award, the Defense Distinguished Civilian Service Award,
twice. His other awards include the National Reconnaissance Office
Medal for Distinguished Service, National Imagery and Mapping
Agency Medal for Distinguished Service, Presidential Rank
of Meritorious Executive, Defense Meritorious Civilian Service
Award, OSD Exceptional Civilian Service Award, and the OSD
Award for Excellence. In addition, he received the National Space
Club’s Robert H. Goddard Memorial Historical Essay Award.
Mr. Berkowitz writings have appeared in Peter L. Hays, et. al.,
eds., Spacepower for a New Millennium: Space and US National
Security, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2000), Airpower Journal,
Armed Forces Journal International, Comparative Strategy, Global
Affairs, High Frontier, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Jane’s Soviet
Intelligence Review, Journal of the British Interplanetary Society,
Naval Forces, RUSI Journal, Signal, Space Markets, Strategic Review,
US Naval Institute Proceedings, Space News, Defense News,
and The Washington Post.
47 High Frontier