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Schriever Wargame 2010 - Air Force Space Command

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The two problems with the current model are:<br />

1. It will break down in a contested environment. As simultaneously<br />

capacity is reduced through attack or jamming<br />

and there is a clamor for bandwidth from militaries,<br />

media, and commercial interests due to crisis, DoD will<br />

likely find that it cannot secure the service required.<br />

2. It passes up a golden opportunity to greatly reduce cost by<br />

leveraging industry’s more efficient acquisition model.<br />

A better model would be to establish serious long-term contracts<br />

directly with satellite operators. These contracts could<br />

include clauses that would give DoD first rights to bandwidth<br />

during crisis (at a premium) and would lower peacetime costs<br />

through bulk buy. DoD should give industry specific requirements,<br />

such as anti-jam, in these contracts and guarantee a<br />

fixed level of purchase for a fixed number of years. This action<br />

would free industry to design and launch systems tailored to<br />

DoD’s needs at greatly reduced costs relative to acquiring additional<br />

government systems.<br />

International Traffic in Arms Regulation – Think the<br />

Traditional <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> that Flies Planes<br />

When our pilots encounter F-16s flown by a hostile nation,<br />

they have the advantage of understanding the characteristics of<br />

the system that they are facing—because we built it. This is not<br />

true facing MiGs or Mirages. Why on Earth would we not want<br />

the same advantage in space? In many ways, exporting satellites<br />

is better than exporting planes/tanks/ships/etc.—they tend<br />

to be on orbit when delivered and so cannot easily be reverseengineered.<br />

Export restriction on all but the most sensitive spacecraft<br />

systems should immediately be lifted and encouraged as much<br />

as possible. There is an added benefit in that nations that purchase<br />

our systems will be more likely to share them back with<br />

us in the case that ours are destroyed.<br />

<strong>Schriever</strong> <strong>Wargame</strong> 2012 – Think Tactical<br />

Five <strong>Schriever</strong> games in a row have provided great insight<br />

into the operational level of a space conflict. The placement of<br />

the <strong>Schriever</strong> V <strong>Wargame</strong> and SW 10 a year apart with common<br />

leadership between the two was highly successful—SW<br />

10 was in many ways a much richer, more nuanced version of<br />

the <strong>Schriever</strong> V <strong>Wargame</strong>. What is missing is the tactical aspect.<br />

The <strong>Schriever</strong> <strong>Wargame</strong> 2012 should be held in conjunction<br />

with a set of space exercises to explore the tactical nature<br />

of the game.<br />

<strong>Space</strong> Acquisition – Think Depth, Local Empowerment,<br />

and Stability<br />

The once mighty space acquisition system producing the<br />

greatest wonders of the classified security community, and directly<br />

responsible for America’s dominant information advantage,<br />

is now seen in many parts of the Pentagon as the worst<br />

performing of the troubled military procurement systems. “Oh,<br />

the most expensive page in DoD,” a recent offhand remark by<br />

one of DoD’s highest ranking officials when offered a one page<br />

summary of space programs by the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> in the presence of<br />

this author, illustrates the climate.<br />

Our collective inability to halt this decline has led to highly<br />

fragile systems and is pricing us out of the space business.<br />

For example, DoD once paid between $100 - $200 million a<br />

year to field a weather satellite program in two orbits (Defense<br />

Meteorological Satellite Program [DMSP]). Under National<br />

Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System<br />

(NPOESS), it would have paid $800 million to $1 billion for<br />

that same privilege. With DMSP, we routinely had multiple<br />

vehicles ready for launch, with NPOESS, we were one launch<br />

failure from a multi-year gap in capability.<br />

Much as we would like to wish it away, building satellites<br />

to survive the rigors of space without any human intervention<br />

is more art than science. Highly complex, with little design<br />

margin, unforgiving, temperamental, with thousands of oblique<br />

rules learned the hard way—from past failures. Building a satellite<br />

involves a thousand decisions any one of which can manifest<br />

itself either as a failure of the entire system on-orbit or as<br />

rework during the integration and test phase when a satellite’s<br />

“burn rate” is at its highest.<br />

The following difficult, perhaps impossible, changes are required<br />

to regain our ability to pioneer an Apollo, or a Corona:<br />

1. Government Program Office personnel and leadership<br />

need depth, not breadth. Ideally, a SPO director and<br />

his/her direct reports will spend his/her entire career not<br />

just in space acquisition but in the acquisition of space<br />

systems of a specific mission type (i.e., infrared missile<br />

warning or protected satellite communications).<br />

2. Contractor program office personnel and leadership need<br />

depth, not breadth. We must acknowledge to ourselves<br />

that there really isn’t competition in the space industry<br />

base. With two and one-half large primes, none “allowed<br />

to fail” and the government picking up the tab for the inevitable<br />

overruns, the only competition is that between<br />

creative proposal writers and innovative costing. Competition<br />

at the second and third tier suppliers is often nonexistent.<br />

There are few if any examples of an incumbent<br />

contractor/government team foundering on a follow-on<br />

Ideally, a SPO director and his/her direct reports will spend his/her entire career not just<br />

in space acquisition but in the acquisition of space systems of a specific mission type (i.e.,<br />

infrared missile warning or protected satellite communications).<br />

High Frontier 52

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