Schriever Wargame 2010 - Air Force Space Command

The more our space systems can be integrated with those of our allies and the more they
can be integrated into the fabric of global commerce, the harder they will be politically to
attack in all but the most extreme of conflicts.
be rapidly upgraded—all platforms and sensors would be individually
addressable, essentially a giant iPhone in space.
A mission in this model is essentially an application (app)
that addresses a set of the available platforms/capabilities.
“Anchor” apps are the traditional mission areas (PNT, communications,
missile warning, etc.) but just like the iPhone which
began with four anchor apps (telephone, text, email, and calendar)
and now has over 250,000 available, most never imagined
by the iPhone creators, the space constellation would be opened
up to a network of space application designers across the national
security community who could pick and choose what
space capabilities to include in their applications and how to interface
them to data sources and capabilities in other mediums.
What an explosion of never-dreamed-of capability this could
produce! The space medium, with robotic platforms in predictable
locations, is uniquely suited to this model of distributed
development. Anchor apps could undergo rigid requirements
processes while simultaneously the network could be set loose,
innovating a host of unanticipated capabilities.
Finally, the iPhone offers an example of how this model can
actually increase robustness. While the device generally uses
GPS to develop position, it also searches out signals of opportunity
from cell phone towers and local Wi-Fi networks for a
robust solution which degrades gracefully. Exiting the Metro
at Crystal City in Arlington, a 16 year old can use her iPhone
to navigate the tunnels where no GPS receiver will work—not
as accurately as but better than nothing. Opening a distributed,
open, holistic space infrastructure to the vast network of developers
will yield similarly-innovative solutions to many space
missions rendering them more robust than current purposebuilt
single point of failure systems.
International – A Case for Foreign Entanglements
Would you rather declare war against one nation or against
10? Multi-national satellite systems are safer from attack than
those owned by a single nation.
Would you burn down the local Costco if your wife was the
primary breadwinner in the family and she worked there? Dual-use
satellite systems that benefit all nations are safer from attack
than those that benefit only DoD. GPS, upon which global
commerce and so much more depend, is much harder to attack
than a classified spy satellite.
The more our space systems can be integrated with those of
our allies and the more they can be integrated into the fabric of
global commerce, the harder they will be politically to attack in
all but the most extreme of conflicts. This integration should be
a stated goal and benefits all parties, not to mention the peoples
of the world.
Space and Time – Think Navy
During combat, the US Air Force usually will define a certain
portion of airspace above the conflict zone and attempt to
control it—controlling it generally means trying to track every
object flying through it.
The Navy’s task is quite different. Even in peacetime, the
Navy is attempting to maintain some influence over the vastness
of the world’s oceans. Since there is no Airborne Warning and
Control System/Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
equivalent for the entire ocean, this task generally entails a deep
understanding of the medium, where its choke points are (i.e.,
Straits of Malacca), what types of systems are operating in it
(i.e., Exocet missile), and the directions from which attacks can
come (i.e., submarine firing depth). In this way, space is more
like the sea than the air. Relative to the maritime domain, space
control is complicated by its greater vastness but is simplified
by the laws of Kepler.
Transitioning from a sanctuary to a contested environment
mindset will require a much deeper understanding of the medium
of space. How do antisatellite weapons approach their
targets in low Earth orbit/medium Earth orbit/highly elliptical
orbit/GEO given the laws of Kepler? What is the equivalent
of an aircraft carrier’s keep-out zone given the laws of Kepler?
Are there choke points like geosynchronous transfer orbit or
GEO? Which orbits are safer? Which are not? All space operators,
designers, decision-makers, acquisition professionals,
and policy makers need to be able to answer these types of
questions as a matter of basic training. Yet many of the answers
to these questions are not well understood today by anybody.
Satellite Communications Industry – Tell Them What
You Want and You Will Get It
Western companies are now the largest operators of spacecraft
on orbit. SES, Intelsat, and Eutelsat alone have over 100
operating GEO spacecraft and 20 more on order. 3 Commercial
operators have become critical to national security operations
as varied as flying remotely piloted vehicles and Pacific naval
maneuvers. Industry benefits from economies of scale and a
dramatically more efficient acquisition system—satellite operators
can acquire systems at lower cost and on much more
rapid timelines.
DoD’s approach to the space industry assumes a benign environment
and a glut of supply, which is basically what we have
seen the past 10 years for a number of reasons, none of which
are likely to repeat themselves. Most capacity is purchased on
the spot market at high cost, although there have been moves
recently to purchase more capacity in bulk to obtain larger discounts.
51 High Frontier