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Schriever Wargame 2010 - Air Force Space Command

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A factor related to economies of scale is the consideration of<br />

economies of geography. A global constellation, whether low<br />

Earth orbital or geostationary, will provide coverage of broad<br />

areas that may or may not align with the geographical interests<br />

of its user base. Economies of geography may relate to the<br />

capacity of space assets being optimized in all of their geographic<br />

areas of operation, and may extend to the provision of anchor<br />

station services from one partner to another. It would be fair to<br />

say that a global constellation that serves a group of European<br />

partners might not achieve such economies of geography (with<br />

some areas of operation being highly contended and others being<br />

underutilized); whereas a group of users whose interests are<br />

spread across the areas of coverage may take far better advantage<br />

of the full extent of the space capability.<br />

Cooperation tends to be more effective when there is some level<br />

of convergence of the strategic interests of the partner nations.<br />

Such convergence may mean that there is greater responsiveness<br />

to changing requirements. Real partnerships in space need to be<br />

based around a model of trust and mutual support, in which the<br />

burden of ownership is shared but is not simply contractual and<br />

inflexible. Whereas convergence of interest may at times create<br />

situations in which there is competition for scarce assets (i.e.,<br />

when these similar interests bring the partners to the same location<br />

at the same time in response to a situation), a partnership<br />

based upon trust and strategic convergence should facilitate a reasonable<br />

outcome in the management of priorities.<br />

Another advantage of cooperation in space, as in cyber, is<br />

that such arrangements mean that multiple nations are dependent<br />

upon shared systems, are responsive to other partners’ needs, and<br />

comply with uniform codes of behavior. Whereas space is often<br />

referred to as the ‘commons,’ in such cooperative situations these<br />

shared systems truly are a commons. Together with more incidental<br />

situations of entanglement (e.g., when services are shared<br />

on a commercial bearer), these common systems create a real potential<br />

for deterrence and stability.<br />

Having said that, with each nation having different approaches<br />

to how it manages its dependencies upon space capabilities<br />

in contingencies, there is the real possibility that the impact of<br />

degradation, contention, or unavailability of space assets may be<br />

different for each partner. This may then lead to a level of ‘disentanglement,’<br />

in which the partners have different positions or<br />

desired responses to a common problem.<br />

As space capabilities typically represent segments in end-toend<br />

systems, the benefits of a space partnership in isolation may<br />

be limited. There are considerable benefits and synergies that<br />

may be exploited with broader existing arrangements in areas<br />

such as information exchange, cyber defense, communications,<br />

and interoperability.<br />

Australia currently is involved in space-related cooperation<br />

with our allies across a number of lines, including the WGS partnership<br />

and exchange of narrowband satellite communications,<br />

as well as access to the products of other satellite systems. Additionally,<br />

the 2009 Defence White Paper recognized Australia’s<br />

need for a synthetic aperture radar satellite capability, as well as<br />

improved space situational awareness. Given the benefits I have<br />

described, there is a strong presumption that new capabilities in<br />

these areas should be developed within a cooperative framework.<br />

Challenges<br />

In developing the future space arrangements, our levels of cooperation<br />

could exist along a continuum from sharing information<br />

to shared systems. There is a high level of uncertainty about<br />

how shared systems should be managed; nevertheless there seems<br />

to be a general agreement between the close allies on a concept<br />

in which the space partnership starts with modest steps, but on a<br />

path that leads towards an objective situation that might offer far<br />

greater benefits.<br />

Given the sort of discussions and mutually beneficial activities<br />

we already undertake at the <strong>Schriever</strong> <strong>Wargame</strong>s, it could be<br />

said that we are already on this path. However there are substantial<br />

further steps we could be taking, such as the creation of<br />

the Combined <strong>Space</strong> Operations Center (CSpOC). The CSpOC<br />

might begin as a virtual center, enabling greater integration of our<br />

national space operations centers to share situational awareness<br />

and other mutually beneficial data, whilst maintaining protection<br />

of national information.<br />

Building upon this framework could include improvements in<br />

the way space assets are utilized in terms of mutual support and<br />

tasking. An ultimate objective may be the standing up of an allied<br />

task force commander for space, who either manages coalition<br />

space assets or is assigned them as required by national authorities.<br />

If we assume the existence of an allied space task force commander<br />

in future, as indeed is integral to the <strong>Schriever</strong> <strong>Wargame</strong>,<br />

we experience the real challenges that we need to address to make<br />

such an approach work. Each nation has policies, laws, interpretations<br />

of laws, and rules of engagement. Their differentiation<br />

across the allied partners can be managed if we are in a predictable<br />

environment.<br />

However, they become problematic in situations that involve<br />

unexpected events and a highly dynamic environment. In such<br />

situations, each nation’s interests and equities cannot be resolved<br />

as quickly as decisions need to be made.<br />

Additionally, there is the possibility that in certain contingencies,<br />

the partner nations might not have consensus and there then<br />

becomes a difference between the steady state coalition and the<br />

coalition in a particular contingency. There has been some discussion<br />

that the steady state arrangement should be an alliance,<br />

although the term alliance can have specific implications or interpretations<br />

that need to be considered. Whether it is called an<br />

alliance or some other term, the partnership may evolve with an<br />

understanding by the member nations of the respective standing<br />

commitments to mutual support as they relate to space. Coalitions<br />

might be a better reference to temporal arrangements, including<br />

the invitation of additional nations into partnership arrangements<br />

as circumstances arise.<br />

Our biggest challenge will be for national equities and interests<br />

to support the timely and appropriate decisions made by an<br />

allied space commander, rather than being an obstacle to such<br />

decision-making. I expect that we can overcome this quandary<br />

through comprehensive deliberate planning that effectively provides<br />

some level of national pre-clearance of decisions under certain<br />

conditions. It is too late to embark on the planning journey<br />

as events unfold.<br />

As there is the very real prospect of hasty decisions leading to<br />

High Frontier 20

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