Review of Austrian Economics - The Ludwig von Mises Institute
Review of Austrian Economics - The Ludwig von Mises Institute
Review of Austrian Economics - The Ludwig von Mises Institute
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Benson: Evolutionary Contractarian Primitive Law 53<br />
<strong>The</strong> crossers' judgment was enforceable because there was an<br />
effective threat <strong>of</strong> total ostracism by the entire community <strong>of</strong> tribes.<br />
In the case <strong>of</strong> this Northern California society, if someone failed to<br />
pay the fine he automatically became the plaintiff's wage slave. If he<br />
refused to submit to this he became an outlaw which meant that<br />
anyone could kill him without any liability for the killing. In particular,<br />
if an <strong>of</strong>fender became an outlaw, the <strong>of</strong>fended individual's<br />
sweathouse group would back his effort for physical retribution. <strong>The</strong><br />
rest <strong>of</strong> the "community" would not interfere, again through reciprocal<br />
recognition that any member <strong>of</strong> the society might at some time<br />
require such community support in ostracizing a law breaker. Fear<br />
<strong>of</strong> this severe boycott sanction meant that the crossers'judgment<br />
tended to be accepted, <strong>of</strong> course. As in other societies, then, obeying<br />
the Yurok's laws led to relatively predictable consequences. Disobeying,<br />
and the resulting ostracism by the community, meant<br />
living outside the social order, and the added uncertainty that<br />
entailed provided strong incentives to obey the laws, or yield to<br />
whatever punishment the crossers' proposed in the case <strong>of</strong> a violation.<br />
Recognition <strong>of</strong> the authority <strong>of</strong> Yurok law and support <strong>of</strong> the<br />
adjudication procedure that they developed was, therefore at least<br />
in part, a consequence <strong>of</strong> the reduced uncertainty that legal system<br />
provided.<br />
If a victim chose not to follow the formal adjudicative procedures,<br />
then he violated the law and was liable for damages. Consider an<br />
example involving ownership rights to a beach. Owners had to allow<br />
seal hunters access to the water, but in exchange the land owner was<br />
to receive the flippers <strong>of</strong> all sea lions caught on his beach. A case which<br />
took place during the 1860s involved a wealthy and powerful individual<br />
who owned about four miles <strong>of</strong> beach around his village (see<br />
Hoebel 1954, pp. 54-55; or Spott and Kroeber 1943, pp. 182-99). A<br />
particular seal hunter disregarded the owner's property rights on<br />
several occasions by failing to give him the sea lion flippers he had a<br />
right to, but rather than follow the formal procedures <strong>of</strong> law, the<br />
beach owner took revenge by assaulting the hunter's father and<br />
wounding him. <strong>The</strong> hunter's support group, consisting <strong>of</strong> members <strong>of</strong><br />
his family in this case, then instituted a suit against the beach owner<br />
for damages. <strong>The</strong> crossers ruled that the assault damages were<br />
slightly less than the original damages that the beach owner could<br />
have claimed against the hunter, but under the circumstances both<br />
legal claims were nullified. Nonetheless, the hunter remained antagonistic<br />
against the beach owner, and two days later he cursed the<br />
beach owner. This was a violation <strong>of</strong> Yurok law, and the beach owner<br />
entered a legal claim. While the crossers were at work, however, a