MARCH

Point
Out
»»
Launch of INS SINDHURATNA
MoD in 2004 that submarine forcelevels
were declining and would reach
criticality by 2015 if approved plans
were not implemented. But decisions
kept getting stalled at the political level
for reasons unknown. The Scorpene
submarine contract was delayed and
then production was delayed on
account of a serious decision-making
deficiency in Defence Ministry.
All, one has seen so far is a 27 page
Defence Ministry press release detailing
Antony’s “achievements” as the longest
serving Defence Minister.
Naval analyst Commodore Uday
Bhaskar admits that “Admiral Joshi's
resignation draws attention to the
texture of India's higher defence
management. The last decade has been
less than satisfactory for the Indian
military. Ineptitude and turpitude has
permeated the civil-military combine
and the political leadership across the
divide has not been able to extricate
itself from the Bofors shadow and the
trading of allegations.”
Worse still the gap between the civil
and the military is growing. It’s not so
The navy will learn from current mishaps
and apply suitable correctives. But it
cannot remedy the dysfunctional nature
of the higher defence organization
much a trust deficit as a lack of interest/
awareness on the part of the politicians,
and the bureaucracy takes it cue from
there. This situation compounds the
navy’s problems. It is short of assets,
especially submarines. Today it cannot
send more than one submarine for refit/
modernization/ upgrade at any time. It
is comparatively better off with surface
vessels but here some of the Russian
origin ships are quite old and need
careful handling.
The navy will learn from current
mishaps and apply suitable correctives.
But it cannot remedy the dysfunctional
nature of the higher defence
organization.
10
MARCH 2014