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CLE Materials for Panel #1 - George Washington University Law ...

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WILMARTH<br />

4/1/2011 1:11 PM<br />

2011] The Dodd-Frank Act 1033<br />

compromise that significantly weakened the Lincoln Amendment. 355<br />

As enacted, the Lincoln Amendment allows an FDIC-insured bank to<br />

act as a swaps dealer with regard to (1) “[h]edging and other similar<br />

risk mitigating activities directly related to the [bank’s] activities”; (2)<br />

swaps involving interest rates, currency rates, and other “reference<br />

assets that are permissible <strong>for</strong> investment by a national bank,”<br />

including gold and silver but not other types of metals, energy, or<br />

agricultural commodities; and (3) credit default swaps that are cleared<br />

pursuant to Dodd-Frank and carry investment-grade ratings. 356 In<br />

addition, the Lincoln Amendment allows banks up to five years to<br />

divest or spin off noncon<strong>for</strong>ming derivatives operations into separate<br />

affiliates. 357<br />

Analysts estimate that the compromised Lincoln Amendment will<br />

require major banks to spin off only 10-20% of their existing<br />

derivatives activities into separate affiliates. 358 In addition, banks<br />

will able to argue <strong>for</strong> retention of derivatives that are used <strong>for</strong><br />

“hedging” purposes, an open-ended standard that will require<br />

elaboration by regulators. 359 As in the case of the Volcker Rule,<br />

commentators concluded that the Lincoln Amendment was “greatly<br />

diluted,” 360 “significantly weakened,” 361 and “watered down,” 362<br />

355 See Barrett & Paletta, supra note 354; David Cho et al., <strong>Law</strong>makers Guide Wall<br />

Street Re<strong>for</strong>m into Homestretch: Industry Left Largely Intact, WASH.POST, June 26, 2010,<br />

at A1; see also supra notes 329–31 and accompanying text (discussing the last-minute<br />

compromise that weakened the Volcker Rule).<br />

356 Dodd-Frank Act § 716(d); see also Hill, supra note 342; Heather Landy, Derivatives<br />

Compromise Is All About En<strong>for</strong>cement, AM. BANKER, June 30, 2010, at 1; Wyatt &<br />

Herszenhorn, supra note 354. It is highly ironic that Congress chose to rely on credit<br />

ratings as a reliable basis <strong>for</strong> exempting CDS from the Lincoln Amendment. Congress<br />

declared in section 931(5) of Dodd-Frank that inaccurate credit ratings on structured<br />

financial products “contributed significantly to the mismanagement of risks by financial<br />

institutions and investors, which in turn adversely impacted the health of the economy in<br />

the United States and around the world.” Dodd-Frank Act § 931(5); see also supra Part<br />

III.B. (describing conflicts of interest that encouraged CRAs to assign inaccurate and<br />

misleading credit ratings to structured financial products).<br />

357 See Dodd-Frank Act § 716(h) (providing that the Lincoln Amendment will take<br />

effect two years after Dodd-Frank’s effective date); id. § 716(f) (permitting up to three<br />

additional years <strong>for</strong> banks to divest or cease noncon<strong>for</strong>ming derivatives operations).<br />

358 Harper & Keoun, supra note 330; Smith & Lucchetti, supra note 260.<br />

359 Wyatt & Herszenhorn, supra note 354.<br />

360 Johnson, supra note 309.<br />

361 Hill, supra note 342 (quoting the Consumer Federation of America).<br />

362 Smith & Lucchetti, supra note 260.

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