CLE Materials for Panel #1 - George Washington University Law ...
CLE Materials for Panel #1 - George Washington University Law ...
CLE Materials for Panel #1 - George Washington University Law ...
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WILMARTH<br />
4/1/2011 1:11 PM<br />
2011] The Dodd-Frank Act 993<br />
B. Dodd-Frank Establishes a Special Resolution Regime <strong>for</strong><br />
Systemically Important Financial Institutions but Allows the FDIC to<br />
Provide Full Protection <strong>for</strong> Favored Creditors of Those Institutions<br />
1. Dodd-Frank’s Orderly Liquidation Authority Does Not Preclude<br />
Full Protection of Favored Creditors of SIFIs<br />
During the financial crisis—as shown by the FRB’s emergency<br />
assistance <strong>for</strong> Chase’s acquisition of Bear, the traumatic bankruptcy<br />
of Lehman, and the federal government’s massive bailout of AIG—<br />
federal regulators confronted a “Hobson’s choice of bailout or<br />
disorderly bankruptcy” when they decided how to respond to a SIFI’s<br />
potential failure. 169 Dodd-Frank establishes an “orderly liquidation<br />
authority” (OLA) <strong>for</strong> SIFIs. The OLA seeks to provide a “viable<br />
alternative to the undesirable choice... between bankruptcy of a large,<br />
complex financial company that would disrupt markets and damage<br />
the economy, and bailout of such financial company that would<br />
expose taxpayers to losses and undermine market discipline.” 170 In<br />
some respects, Dodd-Frank’s OLA <strong>for</strong> SIFIs—which is similar to the<br />
FDIC’s existing resolution regime <strong>for</strong> failed depository<br />
institutions 171 —resembles my proposal <strong>for</strong> a special resolution<br />
regime <strong>for</strong> SIFIs. 172 However, contrary to the statute’s stated purpose<br />
of ending bailouts, 173 Dodd-Frank’s OLA does not preclude future<br />
rescues of favored creditors of TBTF institutions.<br />
Dodd-Frank establishes the FSOC as an umbrella organization with<br />
systemic risk oversight authority. The FSOC’s voting members<br />
include the leaders of nine major federal banking agencies and an<br />
independent member with insurance experience. 174 By a two-thirds<br />
169 Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, U.S. Fed. Reserve Bd., Financial Regulatory Re<strong>for</strong>m,<br />
Speech at the U.S. Monetary Policy Forum (Feb. 26, 2010), available at<br />
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20100226a.htm.<br />
170 S. REP.NO. 111-176, at 4 (2010).<br />
171 See CARNELL ET. AL., supra note 118, ch. 13 (describing the FDIC’s resolution<br />
regime <strong>for</strong> failed banks); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking<br />
Implementing Certain Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall<br />
Street Re<strong>for</strong>m and Consumer Protection Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 64,173, 64,175 (Oct. 19, 2010)<br />
[hereinafter FDIC Proposed OLA Rule] (stating that “[p]arties who are familiar with the<br />
liquidation of insured depository institutions . . . will recognize many parallel provisions in<br />
Title II” of Dodd-Frank).<br />
172 See Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 754–57.<br />
173 See Dodd-Frank Act pmbl. (stating that the statute is designed “to end ‘too big to<br />
fail’ [and] to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts”).<br />
174 The FSOC is chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury and includes the following<br />
additional voting members: the chairmen of the FRB and the FDIC, the Comptroller of the