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WILMARTH<br />

4/1/2011 1:11 PM<br />

2011] The Dodd-Frank Act 993<br />

B. Dodd-Frank Establishes a Special Resolution Regime <strong>for</strong><br />

Systemically Important Financial Institutions but Allows the FDIC to<br />

Provide Full Protection <strong>for</strong> Favored Creditors of Those Institutions<br />

1. Dodd-Frank’s Orderly Liquidation Authority Does Not Preclude<br />

Full Protection of Favored Creditors of SIFIs<br />

During the financial crisis—as shown by the FRB’s emergency<br />

assistance <strong>for</strong> Chase’s acquisition of Bear, the traumatic bankruptcy<br />

of Lehman, and the federal government’s massive bailout of AIG—<br />

federal regulators confronted a “Hobson’s choice of bailout or<br />

disorderly bankruptcy” when they decided how to respond to a SIFI’s<br />

potential failure. 169 Dodd-Frank establishes an “orderly liquidation<br />

authority” (OLA) <strong>for</strong> SIFIs. The OLA seeks to provide a “viable<br />

alternative to the undesirable choice... between bankruptcy of a large,<br />

complex financial company that would disrupt markets and damage<br />

the economy, and bailout of such financial company that would<br />

expose taxpayers to losses and undermine market discipline.” 170 In<br />

some respects, Dodd-Frank’s OLA <strong>for</strong> SIFIs—which is similar to the<br />

FDIC’s existing resolution regime <strong>for</strong> failed depository<br />

institutions 171 —resembles my proposal <strong>for</strong> a special resolution<br />

regime <strong>for</strong> SIFIs. 172 However, contrary to the statute’s stated purpose<br />

of ending bailouts, 173 Dodd-Frank’s OLA does not preclude future<br />

rescues of favored creditors of TBTF institutions.<br />

Dodd-Frank establishes the FSOC as an umbrella organization with<br />

systemic risk oversight authority. The FSOC’s voting members<br />

include the leaders of nine major federal banking agencies and an<br />

independent member with insurance experience. 174 By a two-thirds<br />

169 Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, U.S. Fed. Reserve Bd., Financial Regulatory Re<strong>for</strong>m,<br />

Speech at the U.S. Monetary Policy Forum (Feb. 26, 2010), available at<br />

http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20100226a.htm.<br />

170 S. REP.NO. 111-176, at 4 (2010).<br />

171 See CARNELL ET. AL., supra note 118, ch. 13 (describing the FDIC’s resolution<br />

regime <strong>for</strong> failed banks); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking<br />

Implementing Certain Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall<br />

Street Re<strong>for</strong>m and Consumer Protection Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 64,173, 64,175 (Oct. 19, 2010)<br />

[hereinafter FDIC Proposed OLA Rule] (stating that “[p]arties who are familiar with the<br />

liquidation of insured depository institutions . . . will recognize many parallel provisions in<br />

Title II” of Dodd-Frank).<br />

172 See Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 754–57.<br />

173 See Dodd-Frank Act pmbl. (stating that the statute is designed “to end ‘too big to<br />

fail’ [and] to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts”).<br />

174 The FSOC is chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury and includes the following<br />

additional voting members: the chairmen of the FRB and the FDIC, the Comptroller of the

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