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WILMARTH<br />

4/1/2011 1:11 PM<br />

1034 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89, 951<br />

with the result that “the largest banks’ [derivatives] operations are<br />

largely left intact.” 363<br />

The requirement that banks must clear their trades of CDS to be<br />

exempt from the Lincoln Amendment is potentially significant, in<br />

view of the new clearing requirements set <strong>for</strong>th in other provisions of<br />

Dodd-Frank. 364 However, there is no clearing requirement <strong>for</strong> other<br />

derivatives (e.g., interest and currency rate swaps) that reference<br />

assets permissible <strong>for</strong> investment by national banks (“bank-eligible”<br />

derivatives). Consequently, banks may continue to trade and deal in<br />

OTC derivatives (except <strong>for</strong> CDS) without any interference from the<br />

Lincoln Amendment, as long as those derivatives are bank-eligible. 365<br />

As discussed above, all “proprietary trading” by banks in derivatives<br />

must also comply with the Volcker Rule as implemented by<br />

regulators. 366<br />

2. Banks Controlled by Financial Holding Companies Should<br />

Operate as “Narrow Banks” so That They Cannot Transfer Their<br />

Federal Safety Net Subsidies to Their Nonbank Affiliates<br />

A fundamental purpose of both the Volcker Rule and the Lincoln<br />

Amendment is to prevent LCFIs from using the federal safety net<br />

subsidies to support their speculative activities in the capital markets.<br />

As enacted, however, both provisions have numerous gaps and<br />

exemptions that undermine their stated purpose. 367 Given the greatly<br />

weakened versions of both statutes, Paul Volcker was undoubtedly<br />

363 Keoun & Kopecki, supra note 339 (quoting analyst Nancy Bush).<br />

364 Title VII of Dodd-Frank establishes comprehensive clearing, reporting, and margin<br />

requirements <strong>for</strong> a wide range of derivatives. See S. REP.NO. 111-176, at 29–35, 92–101<br />

(2010) (discussing Title VII as proposed in the Senate committee bill); Alison Vekshin &<br />

Phil Mattingly, <strong>Law</strong>makers Reach Compromise on Finanical Regulation, BLOOMBERG<br />

(June 25, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-25/lawmakers-reach<br />

-compromise-on-financial-regulation.html (summarizing Title VII as approved by the<br />

House-Senate conference committee). A detailed analysis of Title VII is beyond the scope<br />

of this Article. Major financial institutions have already engaged in heavy lobbying to<br />

influence the adoption of regulations that will implement Title VII. See Asjylyn Loder &<br />

Phil Mattingly, Wall Street Lobbyists Besiege CFTC to Shape Derivatives Rules,<br />

BLOOMBERG (Oct. 13, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-14/wall-street<br />

-lobbyists-besiege-cftc-to-influence-regulations-on-derivatives.html.<br />

365 Dodd-Frank Act § 716(d)(2); see also Andrew Leonard, How the World Works: The<br />

Dodd-Frank Bank Re<strong>for</strong>m Bill: A Deeply Flawed Success, SALON.COM, June 25, 2010.<br />

366 See supra Part V.D.1.b.<br />

367 See supra Part IV.D.1.b & 1.c.

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