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CLE Materials for Panel #1 - George Washington University Law ...

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WILMARTH<br />

4/1/2011 1:11 PM<br />

2011] The Dodd-Frank Act 955<br />

Parts II and III of this Article briefly describe the consequences and<br />

causes of the financial crisis that led up to the enactment of the Dodd-<br />

Frank. As discussed in those sections, LCFIs were the primary<br />

private-sector catalysts <strong>for</strong> the crisis, and they received the lion’s<br />

share of support from government programs that were established<br />

during the crisis to preserve financial stability. Public alarm over the<br />

severity of the financial crisis and public outrage over government<br />

bailouts of LCFIs produced a strong consensus in favor of financial<br />

re<strong>for</strong>m. That public consensus pushed Congress to enact Dodd-<br />

Frank. As Part IV explains, governmental rescues of LCFIs<br />

highlighted the economic distortions created by TBTF policies, as<br />

well as the urgent need to reduce public subsidies created by those<br />

policies.<br />

In an article written a few months be<strong>for</strong>e Dodd-Frank was enacted,<br />

I proposed five re<strong>for</strong>ms that were designed to prevent excessive risk<br />

taking by LCFIs and to shrink TBTF subsidies. My proposed re<strong>for</strong>ms<br />

would have (1) strengthened existing statutory restrictions on the<br />

growth of LCFIs; (2) created a special resolution process to manage<br />

the orderly liquidation or restructuring of SIFIs; (3) established a<br />

consolidated supervisory regime and enhanced capital requirements<br />

<strong>for</strong> SIFIs; (4) created a special insurance fund, pre-funded by riskbased<br />

assessments paid by SIFIs, to cover the costs of resolving failed<br />

SIFIs; and (5) rigorously insulated FDIC-insured banks that are<br />

owned by LCFIs from the activities and risks of their nonbank<br />

affiliates. 10<br />

Part V of this Article compares the relevant provisions of Dodd-<br />

Frank to my proposed re<strong>for</strong>ms and evaluates whether the new statute<br />

is likely to solve the TBTF problem. Dodd-Frank includes provisions<br />

(similar to my proposals) that make potentially helpful improvements<br />

in the regulation of large financial conglomerates. The statute<br />

establishes a new umbrella oversight body (the Financial Stability<br />

Oversight Council) that will designate SIFIs and make<br />

recommendations <strong>for</strong> their regulation. The statute also authorizes the<br />

FRB to apply enhanced supervisory requirements to SIFIs. Most<br />

importantly, Dodd-Frank establishes a new systemic resolution<br />

regime (the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA)) that should<br />

provide a superior alternative to the choice of “bailout or bankruptcy”<br />

that federal regulators confronted when they dealt with failing SIFIs<br />

during the financial crisis.<br />

10 See Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 747–79.

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