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70 THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND HOME, SWEET LOAN 71<br />

from $40,000 to $100,000 for each account. Those with more than<br />

that merely had to open several accounts, so, in reality, the sky was<br />

the limit. Clearly this had nothing to do with protecting the<br />

common man. The purpose was to prepare the way for brokerage<br />

houses to reinvest huge blocks of capital at high rates of interest<br />

virtually without risk. It was, after all, insured by the federal<br />

government.<br />

In 1979, Federal Reserve policy had pushed up interest rates,<br />

and the S&Ls had to keep pace to attract deposits. By December of<br />

1980, they were paying 15.8% interest on their money-market<br />

certificates. Yet, the average rate they were charging for new<br />

mortgages was only 12.9%. Many of their older loans were still<br />

crunching away at 7 or 8% and, to compound the problem, some of<br />

those were in default, which means they were really paying 0%.<br />

The thrifts were operating deep in the red and had to make up the<br />

difference somewhere.<br />

The weakest S&Ls paid the highest interest rates to attract<br />

depositors and they are the ones which obtained the large blocks of<br />

brokered funds. Brokers no longer cared how weak the operation<br />

was, because the funds were fully insured. They just cared about<br />

the interest rate.<br />

On the other hand, the S&L managers reasoned that they had to<br />

make those funds work miracles for the short period they had<br />

them. It was their only chance to dig out, and they were willing to<br />

take big risks. For them also, the government's insurance program<br />

had removed any chance of loss to their depositors, so many of<br />

them plunged into high-profit, high-risk real-estate developments.<br />

Deals began to go sour, and 1979 was the first year since the<br />

Great Depression of the 1930s that the total net worth of federally<br />

insured S&Ls became negative. And that was despite expansion<br />

almost everywhere else in the economy. The public began to<br />

worry.<br />

FULL FAITH AND CREDIT<br />

The protectors in Washington responded in 1982 with a joint<br />

resolution of Congress declaring that the full faith & credit of the<br />

United States government stood behind the FSLIC. That was a<br />

reassuring phrase, but many people had the gnawing feeling that<br />

somehow, we were going to pay for it ourselves. And they were<br />

right. Consumer Reports explained:<br />

Behind the troubled banks and the increasingly troubled<br />

insurance agencies stands "the full faith and credit" of the<br />

Government—in effect, a promise, sure to be honored by Congress,<br />

that all citizens will chip in through taxes or through inflation to make<br />

all depositors whole.<br />

The plight of the S&Ls was dramatically brought to light in<br />

Ohio in 1985 when the Home State Savings Bank of Cincinnati<br />

collapsed as a result of a potential $150 million loss in a Florida<br />

securities firm. This triggered a run, not only on the thirty-three<br />

branches of Home State, but on many of the other S&Ls as well. The<br />

news impacted international markets where overseas speculators<br />

dumped paper dollars for other currencies, and some rushed to<br />

buy gold.<br />

Within a few days, depositors demanding their money caused<br />

$60 million to flow out of the state's $130 million "insurance" fund<br />

which, true to form for all government protection schemes, was<br />

terribly inadequate. If the run had been allowed to continue, the<br />

fund likely would have been obliterated the next day. It was time<br />

for a political fix.<br />

Chi March 15, Ohio Governor Richard Celeste declared one of<br />

the few "bank holidays" since the Great Depression and closed all<br />

seventy-one of the state-insured thrifts. He assured the public there<br />

was nothing to worry about. He said this was merely a "cooling-off<br />

period . . . until we can convincingly demonstrate the soundness of<br />

our system." Then he flew to Washington and met with Paul<br />

Volcker, chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, and with Edwin<br />

Gray, chairman of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, to request<br />

federal assistance. They assured him it was available.<br />

A few days later, depositors were authorized to withdraw up to<br />

$750 from their accounts. On March 21, President Reagan calmed<br />

the world money markets with assurances that the crisis was over.<br />

Furthermore, he said, the problem was "limited to Ohio." 2<br />

This was not the first time there had been a failure of statesponsored<br />

insurance funds. The one in Nebraska was pulled down<br />

^ 1983 when the Commonwealth Savings Company of Lincoln<br />

failed. It had over $60 million in deposits, but the insurance fund<br />

1. "<br />

How Safe Are<br />

2. -<br />

Your Deposits?", Consumer Reports, August, 1988, p. 503.<br />

Ohio Bank Crisis That Ruffled World/' US. News & World Report, April 1, 1985,<br />

P-ll

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