ISSUE 70 : May/Jun - 1988 - Australian Defence Force Journal

THE MANAGEMENT OF AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE 9
Civilian/Military Power Distribution
The committee, like the Utz review before it,
received a great deal of evidence from present
and former ADF members to the effect that
the uniformed element in DoD was in a position
unjustifiably weak or inferior relative to that
of its civilian counterpart. It accepted that this
was so and observed that the important process
of defence guidance formulation and selection
of capabilities for inclusion in the FYDP "does
not have the complete confidence of the military
and that this lack of confidence is a major
contributing factor to the strained relations between
military and civilians within Russell
Hill"."
Force Development and Budgeting
Because the Force Development and Analysis
Division (FDA) of the Department plays an
important role in these processes, it has long
been a principal target of the uniformed staff's
resentment, and is recommended for substantial
change in the committee's report.
Two pertinent questions need consideration
in this context: why does FDA not have the
complete confidence of the military and, should
it be expected to have their confidence?
The answer to the first question is that FDA
does not enjoy the confidence of the military
because it frequently precipitates the overturn
or substantial modification of the military's bids
for major equipments. FDA does so because it
is tasked, in effect, with a "devil's advocate"
role — it is required to query, scrutinise and,
if need be, modify or even recommend rejection
of equipment proposals developed by the Services
if they fail to pass the tests of strategic
relevance, operation effectiveness and financial
feasibility.
Whatever can be said about the way FDA
has discharged this role, clearly the higher defence
organisation needs to carry it out. It is
axiomatic in the Defence Department (as
throughout large bureaucracies everywhere) that
elements within it will attempt always to maximise
their share of available resources. In the
case of the ADF and the Services, this translates
(frequently, though not always) to a desire to
obtain the biggest, best, most expensive equipment
available in the largest numbers which can
be obtained. Specifications can be "gold
plated", strategic justifications over-stated, or
financial implications minimised in documentation
originating with the bidding Service. The
process usually results in total bids substantially
in excess of resources indicated by financial
guidance, and bears some resemblance to the
"ambit claims" phenomenon in industrial relations.
Sometimes, though, it is an unconscious
process deriving directly from the relatively narrow
perspectives and lack of costing expertise
of those developing the proposal, but, conscious
or otherwise, it requires a substantial counterbalance
if the FYDP is not to be blown-out
with equipment programs and the ADF saddled
with equipments or projects glamorous but inessential
to Australia's national security requirements
and with high opportunity costs. Thus
(in answer to the second question posed above)
it is not to be expected that the organisation
which supplies the necessary balance, FDA, will
be popular with or enjoy the confidence of those
whose proposals it must critically scrutinise.
Something would be wrong if it did.
Even under existing arrangements there is
evidence that FDA has not always been able to
carry out its task as effectively as might be
desired. To give a single example, the dramatic
rundown in the Navy's mine countermeasures
(MCM) capability occurred because Navy itself
determined that it had higher priorities than
MCM (which is, after all, not nearly as attractive
as say, a new frigate or an aircraft carrier)
and there was no power in DoD's decision
making processes capable of placing a higher
priority on MCM than Navy itself had assigned.
It was only when the decline reached disastrous
proportions — Admiral Synnot as CDFS told
the Joint committee in 1981 that we would be
able to keep open only one port — that action
was taken and even seven years later, the MCM
project is only now getting into full stride. In
fact, Navy (in almost as many words) told the
Auditor-General in 1983 that the MCM project
simply did not have the priority necessary to
its timely completion. 16 Nevertheless, the Defence
Management report has as one of its principal
targets the transfer of control of FDA
from the Secretary (i.e. civilian) to CDF (i.e.
military). If carried through, this would — at
least in the short term — enhance the confidence
of the military in this area of DoD decision
making. But what could the longer term consequences
be?
There are two possibilities. One, the most
likely, is emasculation of FDA and effective
elimination of the "devil's advocate" in the
equipment selection and FYDP development
process. New major equipment proposals would