ISSUE 70 : May/Jun - 1988 - Australian Defence Force Journal

AUSTRALIA'S REACTION TO THE THREAT FROM JAPAN 1939-1943 41
No nation in the world is making a more
supreme war effort than Australia. 35
The Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway in
May and June 1942 were strategic victories for
American forces and Midway later came to be
recognized as the turning point in the Pacific
war. The American successes lifted the 'black
blanket of dispair' from the Australian people
and Curtin's major problem thereafter became
the maintenance of austerity and discipline to
support the Australian war effort.
After Midway, the allied effort in the South
West Pacific was directed to the expulsion of
the Japanese forces from Papua New Guinea
and the Melanesian islands and Australian
forces figured prominently in the campaign at
Milne Bay, the first allied land victory of the
theatre. By August 1942, Australian forces had
re-captured Kokoda and were forcing the Japanese
back to the northern coast near Popondetta.
MacArthur was becoming increasingly
disgruntled with Australian efforts to dislodge
the Japanese from Buna and Gona and his
criticisms were in marked contrast to his platitudes
of early 1942.
. . . these Australians won't fight . . . they
live off but not up to the name of Anzac. 36
After further American-Australian rivalry and
antagonism, Buna and Gona were finally cleared
in late December 1942. These battles marked
the end of Japanese hopes to dominate the
Owen Stanley Range and access to Port Moresby
and strategically, removed the threat of
invasion from Australia.
In summary then, what were the effects upon
Australia of the threat of Japanese invasion?
As indicated by the statistics at Appendix 1,
allocations to the war effort increased markedly
in terms of manpower, materiel and finance.
The 'conscription' of industry and Lend-Lease
aid resulted in the rapid acceleration of the
industrialization of Australia and established
the basis for an extremely viable post-war secondary
industry. The domestic initiatives of uniform
taxation and social security became permanent
features of the Australian lifestyle and
whilst not directly attributable to the threat,
were introduced under the guise of war-time
economics.
In terms of external affairs, the threat by
Japan resulted in the temporary transfer of
'dependence' from Britain to America, closer
regional collaboration, the development of a
more independent foreign policy and a desire
to participate in the maintenance of world stability.
The trauma of war also appears to have
created a greater public awareness of Australia's
place in the world and in world affairs generally,
and thus tended to reduce Australian insularity
and prejudice.
With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to
be cynical of the Australian reaction to the
threat of invasion. 37 Nevertheless, it is obvious
from contemporary accounts, particularly in the
period December 1941 to June 1942, that the
threat appeared genuine and that fears of invasion
were justified. One of the criticisms of
Curtin is that his Government exaggerated the
dangers from Japan in order to manipulate
public opinion to accept the implementation of
Labor 'socialist' policies. Curtin denies that this
occurred. He recognised that certain permanent
features would develop out of war-time controls
that would assist a Labor Government but was
adamant that he 'would not use the opportunity
of war to introduce socialist ideas'. 38
Throughout the period 1939-1943 though, the
recurring theme is not the fear of Japan but
the apathy of the Australian people. Some commentators
blame the Government for a lack of
direction but the underlying reason appears to
have been that for many Australians, the memories
of World War, 1 and the depression created
an abhorrence of war and a distrust of
government and they simply withdrew into the
confines of their environ. Curtin was especially
critical of such people.
His deep love of Australia clashed with the
belief that there was a big section with whom
Australia did not come first. 39
This statement epitomizes the beliefs of Curtin.
Whereas MacArthur's fundamental interest
was to defeat Japan, Curtin's was to protect
Australia. Although Curtin incurred the wrath
of many, he resolutely put the interests of Australia
ahead of all else, including the traditional
relationship with Britain and the aspirations of
his Party.
In conclusion then, it is contended that Curtin
and his Government deserve considerable credit
for their reactions to the threat of invasion by
Japan for, by their 'nationalism', they safeguarded
the ultimate aspirations of Australia
— her survival as a nation and her survival as
a democracy.
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