ISSUE 70 : May/Jun - 1988 - Australian Defence Force Journal

The Management of Australia's Defence
A Critique of the Report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and
Trade
By Gary Brown, Department of the
Parliamentary Library
Introduction
POLITICIANS, it is frequently asserted by
those not closely associated with Government
or Parliament, are overpaid, underworked
and frequently ignorant about matters on which
they are nevertheless prepared to speak. It is
not the purpose of this article specifically to
refute such opinions, but those who hold them
could be rewarded by a scrutiny of the work
of the Defence subcommittee of the Joint Parliamentary
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence
and Trade over the last decade or more.
During this period, despite changes in its membership
and in the Government, this committee
has produced a series of reports significant in
the defence and national security field which
demonstrate conclusively that MPs' take seriously
their role in a Westminster democracy of
scrutinising and commenting on the performance
of the Executive Government. The Committee's
reports on defence industry (1977), defence
procurement (1979), threats to Australia's
security (1981), the aircraft carrier question
(1982) and Australian Defence Force (ADF)
capabilities (1984) each made a substantial contribution
to the defence debate in Australia.
Governments have, from time to time, picked
up recommendations from these reports and
implemented them (with or without acknowledgement)
to the benefit of Australian defence
administration. Moreover, by bringing senior
Defence Department and ADF personnel to the
witness table to explain written submissions to
the committee, it has been possible to place on
the public record a mass of material invaluable
to serious students in the field and of considerable
benefit to individuals and organisations
with an interest in defence and national security.
The "Defence Management" Report
The Committee's most recent contribution to
the defence debate is its report The Management
of Australia's Defence, 2 released at the end of
the 1987 sittings of Parliament. This report is
a critical survey and analysis, with recommendations,
of the higher defence machinery
on both the uniformed and civilian sides. Its
earlier chapters will form an indispensable reference
for those seeking a useful summary of
the organisation's development since World War
II and in particular since the Tange reorganisation
of 1973-6. What follows will attempt
briefly to summarise the committee's principal
recommendations, but readers are advised to
examine the report itself to obtain a complete
picture.
The report deals in depth with three main
issues. These are:
(a) the level of political control of the higher
defence machinery, whether it is adequate to
the task;
(b) the distribution of power and responsibility
inside the ADF, particularly the relative
responsibilities of the single Services and their
Chiefs, on the one hand, and the Chief of the
Defence Force (CDF), on the other; and
(c) the distribution of power and responsibility
between the civilian and uniformed elements
of the defence organisation, headed by
the Secretary of the Defence Department and
the CDF, respectively.
On the first issue, the committee has come
to conclusions similar to those reached by inquiries
as far back as the 1958 Moreshead Report,
namely that the size and complexity of a
unified Department of Defence (DoD) is such
as to overtax unacceptably even the most able
Minister, and that additional Ministerial assistance
should be provided. The Fraser Government's
inquiry into Commonwealth Government
administration generally — the Reid
Report of 1983 — concluded, and not only for
defence administration but across the spectrum
of Government, that there was a need for the
provision of Ministerial assistance to Ministers
in charge of large and complex Departments
and recommended a referendum with bipartisan
support to remove apparent constitutional im-