Paul Grice and the philosophy of language

PAUL GRICE AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 531
an itinerary for his upcoming vacation to France. A wants to see his friend
C, if so doing would not require too much additional traveling. A asks B
"Where does C live" B replies "Somewhere in the South of France". B
knows that A would like more specific information but he is not in a
position to be more specific. So B is faced with violating either a maxim
of Quality or a maxim of Quantity. Quality wins out. As the following
passages make clear, it is Grice's view that the maxims of Quality have a
very special status within his overall theory:
It is obvious that the observance of some of these maxims is a matter of less urgency than
is the observance of others; a man who has expressed himself with undue prolixity would,
in general, be open to milder comment than would a man who has said something he believes
to be false. Indeed, it might be felt that the importance of at least the first maxim of Quality
is such that it should not be included in a scheme of the kind I am constructing; other
maxims come into operation only on the assumption that this maxim of Quality is satisfied.
(p. 27)
The maxims do not seem to be coordinate. The maxim of Quality, enjoining the provision
of contributions which are genuine rather than spurious (truthful rather than mendacious),
does not seem to be just one among a number of recipes for producing contributions; it
seems rather to spell out the difference between something's being, and (strictly speaking)
failing to be, any kind of contribution at all. False information is not an inferior kind of
information; it just is not information. (p. 371)
These remarks suggest very strongly that the maxims of Quality (or at
least the first maxim of Quality) should not be thought of as admitting of
degree or varying across cultures. In some sense this is of course an
empirical matter; but unlike the maxims of Quantity and Manner, it does
not seem very plausible to suppose that there are thriving cultures in
which standardly people do not behave (for particular reasons to be determined
by anthropologists) as if they are observing the maxims of Quality. 2s
Turning now to the second question, Grice is not satisfied with the
answer that "it is just a well-recognized empirical fact that people do
behave in these ways; they learned to do so in childhood and have not
lost the habit of doing so" (p. 29):
I am, however, enough of a rationalist to want to find a basis that underlies these facts,
undeniable though they may be; I would like to be able to think of the standard type of
conversational practice not merely as something that all or most do in fact follow but as
something that it is reasonable for us to follow, that we should not abandon. (p. 29)
Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of disconnected remarks, and
would not be rational if they did. They are characteristically, to some degree at least,
cooperative efforts; and each participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a common
purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction. (p. 26)
28 The question of the extent to which the observance of any of the maxims should be seen
as determined by cultural factors is taken up by Keenan (1976), Gazdar (1979), and Wilson
and Sperber (1981).