The_Holokaust_-_origins,_implementation,_aftermath

HITLER’S DECISION TO EXTERMINATE JEWS
be possible. He later contended that he made his proposal to substitute compulsory
sterilization for deportation knowing that the former was technically impossible to implement,
and his assertion is difficult to dispute. Furthermore, with regard to the issue of
compulsory divorce, he proposed a legal measure that could be delayed in a great variety
of ways, and this is just what did happen later.
172. “The future treatment of this class of individuals [the so-called part-Jews of the first
degree] remains undecided,” memo of the party chancellery, January 29, 1942, cited in a
circular letter from the Main Office for National Prosperity (Hauptamt für Volkswohlfahrt),
April 13, 1942, in Herwart Vorländer, Die NSV (Boppard, 1988), p. 427; Aly and Heim
(n. 5 above), p. 470; see also their source document, undated note by Dr. Wetzel, BA R6/
74, fol. 79.
173. Adler (n. 46 above), p. 304. On this issue, see also record of Franz Rademacher, March 7,
and note from the Reich Foreign Ministry D III, June 11, 1942, in Klein (n. 3 above), pp.
57–60.
174. Note by Lindemann (Main Office II, Administration, Ministry of the East), February 11,
1942, BA R 6/74, fol. 78.
175. See Himmler’s indignant notation in his meeting notes from his meeting with Hitler,
Rosenberg, Lammers, and Wilhelm Keitel on February 15, 1942: “Remark by Bräutigam:
[‘]The war in the east can no longer be won militarily, [’]” BA NS 19/1448, fol. 12.
176. As a matter of fact Bräutigam was to escape punishment after the war. In the opinion of
the Landgericht of Nürnberg-Fürth, Bräutigam’s personal responsibility for the murder
of Soviet Jews had not been proven. See the Proceedings Staatsanwaltschaft Nürnberg-
Fürth 72 Ks 3/50a–b in the Staatsarchiv Nürnberg. In 1955 Bräutigam became director of
the Section for Eastern Affairs (Ostabteilung) in the foreign ministry of the Federal Republic.
Public pressure later forced him to retire.
177. In itself that is nothing new. See, e.g., Wolfgang Scheffler, Judenverfolgung im Dritten Reich
(West Berlin, 1964), p. 38; Ludolf Herbst, Das nationalsozialistische Deutschland, 1933–
1945 (Frankfurt am Main, 1996), p. 387. It must be stressed, however, that this was the
most important outcome of the meeting.
178. As a parallel, one might point out Hitler’s repeated prohibition against using the inhabitants
of the occupied Soviet territories as armed collaborators (e.g., document note by
Bormann on the Leadership Conference, July 16, 1941, IMT, vol. 38, p. 88). This was a
significant ideological issue in terms of the creation of a German empire in the east. Hitler
never succeeded in compelling either the armed forces or the SS to observe his prohibition.
179. Quoted from the facsimile reproduction in Tuchel, p. 121; emphasis added.
180. BA D-H ZR 759, A. 14.
181. Göring’s commission of July 31, 1941, is in Pätzold and Schwarz, eds. (n. 23 above), p.
79. The minutes of the Wannsee Conference were not the desired “comprehensive plan”
as Pätzold and Schwarz assert (p. 47). This is clear from the fact that on February 26
Heydrich sent out invitations for a follow-up conference to be held on March 6 “in order
to prepare the necessary document for the Reich Marshall” (facsimile reproduction in
Tuchel, p. 121). Hence the “comprehensive plan” could not have been completed in
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