Assessing the Effectiveness of Organized Crime Control Strategies ...

The Australian study identified a number of impediments to the success of forfeiture laws
(Freiberg and Fox, 2000:259-260):
• both in Australia and abroad, forfeiture is not viewed as a core function by law
enforcement agencies;
• coordination within and between agencies is lacking;
• expertise is lacking in what is viewed as a highly technical and peripheral aspect of
policing;
• other than in those jurisdictions (primarily the US) where agencies can retain a
percentage of the confiscated assets, little incentive exists to pursue the long and
expensive forfeiture proceedings;
• courts are often hostile to forfeiture legislation, interpreting these laws very strictly due to
their perceived intrusion upon basic rights (e.g., their frequent reversal of the burden of
proof).
4.6 Injunctions, Divestitures, and Trusteeships
Whereas asset forfeitures remove the racketeer’s ill-gotten gains, the federal system in the US
and other jurisdictions have civil remedies designed to eliminate the influence exerted by OC
figures in legitimate businesses, unions, and other organizations (Giuliani, 1986:111). Under
the RICO legislation in the US, court injunctions may require defendants to divest themselves of
interests in tainted enterprises, may impose reasonable restrictions on the future activities and
investments of an individual, and may order the dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise
(Giuliani, 1986:111). While little information exists regarding the frequency with which these
provisions have been used, Giuliani notes that that they have been used very infrequently.
Some labour unions, for example, have historically been dominated by OC. While prosecution
has been unsuccessful in remedying the problem of these captive unions, court-ordered
trusteeships have re-established democratic processes and thereby freed the union of labor
racketeering. One of the best known cases involved Local 560 of the International Brotherhood
of Teamsters in New Jersey (Goldstock, 1994:435). In this case, the district court granted broad
permanent injunctive relief whereby the court enjoined two defendants from “any further contact
of any kind” with the union and removed the union’s entire executive board in favour of a trustee
whose responsibility it was to ensure fair elections (Giuliani, 1986:112). In other cases, such
remedies have been used to deal with racketeering in the hospitality and cement industries.
While systematic evaluations, including the costs of pursuing court injunctions, are absent in this
area, Giuliani (1986:112) has been a strong proponent of these remedies. He asserts that they are
a powerful tool for permanently dissolving criminal organizations and for preventing the
infiltration of legitimate businesses by OC figures. He views these remedies as especially crucial
in industries that have been particularly vulnerable to OC penetration. Giuliani notes that the
incarceration of an OC lieutenant may disrupt operations but does not put the enterprise out of
business. So long as OC’s property remains, new leaders will replace those that have been
imprisoned. These legal tools, according to Giuliani (1986:112) “have the power to permanently
divest organized crime of its corrupt economic base.”
Research and Statistics Division / Department of Justice Canada | 31