Assessing the Effectiveness of Organized Crime Control Strategies ...

Assessing the Effectiveness of Organized Crime Control Strategies:
A Review of the Literature
On the corrupting influence of undercover work, Marx (1988) notes that intimidation,
entrapment, and duplicity are fairly common features of such work. It is not uncommon for
officers to cross the line from creating opportunities for and observing criminal acts to inducing
and tricking people to engage in those acts or even, on occasion, planting evidence. Aggressive
undercover work that crosses this line is often prompted by incentives within a police department
to “get the numbers up.”
Also, undercover officers handling illicit proceeds of crime in the form of cash may succumb to
temptation. They may also accept bribes in return for their tolerance of illicit transactions.
Furthermore, they may develop sympathies for and be co-opted by targets, leading them to
protect rather than vigorously investigate them (Marx, 1988:160).
Another concern is that undercover officers tend to be less experienced investigators and their
supervision in the field may be insufficient (Brown, 1985; Miller, 1987). These agents may be
exposed to great danger without adequate briefing or preparation. Undercover work can
adversely affect third parties when officers facilitate and even encourage the commission of
crimes as part of a sting operation (Marx, 1988). Undercover operations may compromise the
privacy of investigation targets or third parties. One example involves the cultivation of a
romantic relationship between an officer and spouse/lover of a target for the purpose of
generating information relating to an investigation.
In recent years, several undercover agents have yielded numerous convictions. The best know
agent is Joe Pistone, who worked undercover for six years as “Donnie Brasco” inside the
Bonanno crime family in New York. His work led to more than 100 convictions of OC figures
(Albanese, 1996:181). This infiltration was undoubtedly a blow to morale in La Cosa Nostra,
raising concerns about secrets that had been revealed and questions as to whether other members
were government agents (Jacobs and Gouldin, 1999:165).
An example of a successful Canadian undercover operation was that initiated by the RCMP and
targeted currency-exchange houses (Beare, 1996:121). RCMP officers, posing as drug
traffickers, exchanged amounts of cash that were so large they could have qualified as suspicious
transactions and surpassed the $10,000 amount currently requiring the filing of a report to
FINTRAC by financial institutions and specified individuals. Police exchanged a total of $3
million, including single transactions involving sums of up to $70,000. As a result of this
operation, 190 criminal charges were anticipated against 36 corporations and 65 individuals.
Despite such indications of success, undercover work has not been the subject of more
systematic, cost-benefit analyses that consider its far-reaching consequences. Miller (1987)
notes that, “There is little information about how effective undercover investigations are, what
they cost (economically, psychologically, or constitutionally), or why they fail. Similarly, the
extent to which police departments use the strategy is unknown.”
44 | Research and Statistics Division / Department of Justice Canada