Assessing the Effectiveness of Organized Crime Control Strategies ...

Jacobs and Gouldin (1999:176) are unequivocal about the achievements of this regulatory
initiative in wresting control from OC in an industry that had been so tainted:
The TWC has been remarkably successful. By driving corrupt firms from the
industry and simultaneously protecting customers from exploitation, new companies
(with no ties to organized crime) have entered the industry…For the first time in
history, national waste-hauling companies have entered the New York City market.
In addition, waste-hauling rates have fallen dramatically (recent estimates claim
decreases of 30-40 percent in the past two years)…Thus New York’s Cosa Nostra
crime families have to contend with the loss of a significant revenue source and
power base.
Another way of undercutting OC-dominated cartels, bid-rigging, and other anticompetitive
practices is to establish public benefit corporations that disrupt illegal agreements by competing
against those engaging in them (Goldstock,1994:436).
Whether the approach used is that of more regulation or the creation of public benefit
corporations, the issue that remains to be answered by evaluators is whether the disruption of
such cartels in an industry occasions a net loss for OC or whether crime syndicates re-emerge in
other areas or industries. While the above-mentioned examples of increasing regulation show
considerable promise, comprehensive evaluations must consider the potential adverse affects of
additional regulation on an industry.
4.18 Legalization or Decriminalization of Certain Goods and Services
Rather than increasing regulation, the decriminalization of some goods and services provided by
criminal networks might lessen the social demand that fuels OC. Products and services that are
decriminalized may nevertheless be subject to regulation (Kenney and Finckenauer, 1995: 197).
For example, a number of arguments have been made for the decriminalization of the possession
of various psychotropic drugs. The substantial expenditures associated with drug enforcement
could be allocated elsewhere (e.g., for treatment) and the medical as well as social ills (including
crime) associated with the illicit status of heroin and other substances could potentially be
minimized. Drug enforcement is not only costly; it has also been shown to be limited in its
ability to curtail supply (Lyman and Potter, 1991:325).
Also, it has been argued that the current approach drives up drug prices, thereby subsidizing
rather than combating drug traffickers (Dennis, 1990). Prohibition in the US during the 1920s
and 1930s transformed OC from small peddlers of vice into powerful crime syndicates with
political connections, respectability that came from serving the public the alcohol they desired,
and the organization to deliver contraband to large numbers of people (Lyman and Potter,
1991:323). Without the lucrative profits from drugs, criminal organizations might no longer be
viable, although some evidence suggests that they might shift to other activities. In Colombia,
for example, pressure against the drug cartels led some of their henchman to take up kidnapping
for a living, thereby dramatically increasing the incidence of this crime (Abadinsky, 1994:512).
Also, legalization in one country would have no bearing on the demand for illicit substances in
Research and Statistics Division / Department of Justice Canada | 53