Assessing the Effectiveness of Organized Crime Control Strategies ...

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Assessing the Effectiveness of Organized Crime Control Strategies: A Review of the Literature On the corrupting influence of undercover work, Marx (1988) notes that intimidation, entrapment, and duplicity are fairly common features of such work. It is not uncommon for officers to cross the line from creating opportunities for and observing criminal acts to inducing and tricking people to engage in those acts or even, on occasion, planting evidence. Aggressive undercover work that crosses this line is often prompted by incentives within a police department to “get the numbers up.” Also, undercover officers handling illicit proceeds of crime in the form of cash may succumb to temptation. They may also accept bribes in return for their tolerance of illicit transactions. Furthermore, they may develop sympathies for and be co-opted by targets, leading them to protect rather than vigorously investigate them (Marx, 1988:160). Another concern is that undercover officers tend to be less experienced investigators and their supervision in the field may be insufficient (Brown, 1985; Miller, 1987). These agents may be exposed to great danger without adequate briefing or preparation. Undercover work can adversely affect third parties when officers facilitate and even encourage the commission of crimes as part of a sting operation (Marx, 1988). Undercover operations may compromise the privacy of investigation targets or third parties. One example involves the cultivation of a romantic relationship between an officer and spouse/lover of a target for the purpose of generating information relating to an investigation. In recent years, several undercover agents have yielded numerous convictions. The best know agent is Joe Pistone, who worked undercover for six years as “Donnie Brasco” inside the Bonanno crime family in New York. His work led to more than 100 convictions of OC figures (Albanese, 1996:181). This infiltration was undoubtedly a blow to morale in La Cosa Nostra, raising concerns about secrets that had been revealed and questions as to whether other members were government agents (Jacobs and Gouldin, 1999:165). An example of a successful Canadian undercover operation was that initiated by the RCMP and targeted currency-exchange houses (Beare, 1996:121). RCMP officers, posing as drug traffickers, exchanged amounts of cash that were so large they could have qualified as suspicious transactions and surpassed the $10,000 amount currently requiring the filing of a report to FINTRAC by financial institutions and specified individuals. Police exchanged a total of $3 million, including single transactions involving sums of up to $70,000. As a result of this operation, 190 criminal charges were anticipated against 36 corporations and 65 individuals. Despite such indications of success, undercover work has not been the subject of more systematic, cost-benefit analyses that consider its far-reaching consequences. Miller (1987) notes that, “There is little information about how effective undercover investigations are, what they cost (economically, psychologically, or constitutionally), or why they fail. Similarly, the extent to which police departments use the strategy is unknown.” 44 | Research and Statistics Division / Department of Justice Canada
Albanese (1996:181) adds: The adjustment problems of undercover officers after completing their assignment has also not received enough attention from either police agencies or the public. The FBI claims that its undercover agents were responsible for 680 convictions, $5.7 million in forfeitures, and $741.1 million in potential economic losses prevented in a single year. Although these figures were modified somewhat by a General Accounting Office audit, the benefits of undercover work have not yet been objectively evaluated against their costs in terms of time invested, risk, manpower, and their impact on the officer, the police agency, and on affected third parties. Albanese points out that agent Joe Pistone and his family had to relocate four times while he was testifying, that he did not see his family for three months while undercover, and that he resigned from the FBI prior to earning a pension because of threats against him. Pistone believes there is a large contract out on his life and he feels hunted by those he once investigated. Marx (1988:113) lists the outcomes for a number of police sting operations set up to ensnare those involved in property crimes. While the tally of arrests and convictions seem impressive, these studies provide little comparison with other investigative methods and provide little information on the overall impact of these operations on crime in the relevant jurisdictions. Where such information was available, no impact on crime was observed. In any event, this evaluation did not pertain to undercover work in relation to large-scale criminal enterprises. Ultimately, the value of information obtained through various undercover operations may defy quantification. Kenney and Finckenauer (1995:332) note that, “there is no obvious way to measure the worth of an informant’s information against the costs of that information and the risks of unreliability and lack of credibility. This remains an exercise of professional judgment and discretion.” 4.14 Electronic Surveillance Electronic surveillance includes a number of techniques, varying in the extent to which they invade the privacy of the target. Some techniques are non-consensual, as none of the parties are aware that they are being monitored. Other techniques adopt one-party consensual monitoring, such as those in which undercover agents use a concealed tape recorder to record conversations or where one party to a telephone conversation consents to the recording of that conversation unbeknownst to the other party (Kenney and Finckenauer, 1995:337). Apart from tape recording and intercepting communications over a telephone line (or wiretapping), electronic surveillance may involve video recordings, eavesdropping through the use of hidden microphones (bugging), and more advanced laser and fiber optics technologies (Abadinsky, 2003:344). Many law enforcement officials believe that the use of electronic surveillance is indispensable in the fight against OC because other sources of evidence are often unreliable or unavailable. Witnesses are often afraid to come forward, informants may be unreliable, and many criminal organizations are difficult to infiltrate. Furthermore, as the business of OC is usually conducted Research and Statistics Division / Department of Justice Canada | 45
Page 1: S E R V I N G C A N A D I A N S RES
Page 5: Table of Contents Acknowledgements.
Page 9 and 10: 1.0 Introduction O ver the past thr
Page 11 and 12: 2.0 Methodology L iterature reviews
Page 13 and 14: 2.1 The Search Strategy Time Frame
Page 15 and 16: 3.0 Definitional Issues, Measuremen
Page 17 and 18: The diverse definitions of OC provi
Page 19 and 20: Beare (1996:26) notes that insiders
Page 21 and 22: charges, arrests, or convictions ar
Page 23 and 24: police thought they were investigat
Page 25: as the surrounding neighbourhood. A
Page 28 and 29: Assessing the Effectiveness of Orga
Page 71 and 72: 6.0 References Abadinsky, H. (2003)
Page 73 and 74: Giuliani, R. (1986) “Legal remedi
Page 75 and 76: Mathews, J. (1990) “One witness
Page 77 and 78: Schlegel, K. (1988) “Life imitati

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