Assessing the Effectiveness of Organized Crime Control Strategies ...

Crime Commission in 1994, after this body issued a report linking the State Attorney General to
illegal video poker vendors (Albanese, 1996:183). Such commissions are bipartisan in
composition and, hence, intended to be politically neutral.
Critics of crime commissions have also expressed the concern that civil liberties can be violated
because traditional rules of evidence do not apply and because public commissions are immune
from libel or defamation. Crime commissions can become ideological battle fields for those bent
on destroying an opponent’s reputation. Rogovin and Martens (1994:399) assert that while these
concerns are legitimate, the benefits of these commissions justify the risks inherent in pursuing
the delicate balance between the rights of citizens and the prevention of OC.
This review found no objective, empirical study of the impact of commissions. Hoffman
(1987:83) adds that, “No systematic study has ever been conducted on private sector efforts
directed against organized crime. And previous studies of citizen participation in crime
prevention…failed to examine either the role of the economic elite or citizens’ crime
commissions in efforts directed against organized crime.”
While some evidence shows that commissions have produced convictions and even the
disruption of certain OC activities in certain localities, such accomplishments need to be directly
linked to Commission activities. In addition, convictions alone are not an indication of a
diminution of OC activities and the disruption of the activities of a group may be temporary.
Furthermore, the curtailment of the activities of one group may lead to the emergence of others.
A systematic assessment of the effects of a commission’s activities would entail the careful
selection of outcome measures, along with a comparison of OC before and after the work of a
commission or the comparison of jurisdictions with an active commission to similar jurisdictions
lacking such a commission.
As for grassroots efforts to combat OC, the review found no systematic evaluations of such
initiatives. An example of this type of initiative was the mobilization against arson on the part of
residents of various Boston neighbourhoods in the early 1980s (Brady, 1982). The urban fiscal
crisis at that time contributed to the deterioration of both residential and commercial housing.
Arson for profit escalated in eastern US cities as a means of financing the renovation or
conversion of buildings. Both criminal organizations and legitimate businesses played a role in
this activity. Community action took the form of the resident occupation of various fire
departments that were slated for closing. Brady’s study contains no discussion of the impact of
the community mobilization in Boston on the arson problem. He speculates that, to achieve
success, arson-for-profit ought to be tackled through fundamental change in an economic system
that provides incentives for such activity, rather than punitive measures focusing solely on those
igniting the buildings.
4.12 Strike Forces and Task Forces
In 1966, the first US “Organized Crime Strike Force” was established in Buffalo, New York
(General Accounting Office, 1989). This strike force brought together a team of attorneys and
agents from various federal investigative agencies, operating under the Organized Crime and
Racketeering Section of the US Department of Justice. The aim was to mount a coordinated
Research and Statistics Division / Department of Justice Canada | 41